A Refutation of Theonomy Part 3

A Refutation of the Theological Arguments used to support Theonomy

This is my third post on refuting theonomy. In this post I plan to take a look at one of the strongest arguments in favor of the theonomic position. This argument is more of a systematic/philosophical argument than a textual argument. I believe if this line of argumentation were valid and sound then we would have good reason for accepting theonomy. However, I will argue that this line of argumentation is not sound and thus we have no good reason for accepting it.

The argument goes something like this:

P1: If theonomic principle were false then we could not know that an action x is ethically wrong.

P2: Action x is ethically wrong

C: Hence, the theonomic principle is true

The theonomic principle used in this argument is this: We ought to assume that all of the laws in the Mosaic covenant carry over into the New Covenant of Grace unless it is abrogated or done away with in the New Covenant. The essence of the argumentation here is that the new covenant laws alone are insufficient given a reasonable Christian conception of ethics. The example that Greg L. Bahnsen, the champion of theonomy, famously gave was this: If theonomy were false then you could not ethically condemn bestiality (inappropriate sexual relations with a animal), but Christians seem to know that bestiality is wrong, therefore, theonomy is the way we know bestiality is ethically wrong attesting to the fact that theonomy is true.





In response to this argument: I would suggest that the person who does not embrace theonomy ought to reject premise 1. We can know that actions are wrong apart from the written moral law and the Bible attests to this fact (Rom. 1:32; 2:14-15). In Christian theology, the view point that we can know moral truths apart from the written word is called natural law. In natural law we can simply see which actions are morally right and which actions are morally wrong. We may at times suppress this intuition, but we know it nonetheless.

The Biblical support for this view point as I have mentioned previously is Romans 2:14-15:

Romans 2:14-15 "For when Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse them."

The Gentiles who do not have the Law of Moses like the Jews still know what actions are right or wrong, as this passage teaches clearly.

Therefore, the new covenant Christian can say that he knows that bestiality is wrong on the basis of the natural law and this need not be affirmed explicitly in the New Testament but rather implicitly through the new testaments teaching on natural law. The inference pattern would look like this:

P1: I can only know a moral action x is wrong by what the Bible teaches either explicitly or implicitly through necessary inference

P2: The Bible teaches that we can know moral truths apart from the Bible through the revealed law given to the conscious of men

P3: It has been revealed to my conscious that an action x is wrong

C: Hence, I know that an action x is ethically wrong.

Natural Law gets us out of this theonomic argument. However, it seems to me that natural law itself can also give us an argument against theonomy. This argument in a sense turns the tables on the argument used to support theonomy. The thing that motivates the first argument is the rejection of natural law, but I will argue this theonomic rejection of natural law leads the theonomist to the position that they cannot know certain ethically wrong actions. The argument goes like this:

P1: A rejection of natural law entails that one cannot know that an action x is ethically wrong

P2: We know that an action x is ethically wrong

P3: A position that entails a rejection of natural law is false (from 2)

P4: The Theonomic position rejects natural law

C: Hence, the Theonomic position is false (from 2, 3, and 4)

One of the essential tenets of theonomic position is a rejection of natural law and so this argument proves that natural law has to be true in order for us to know certain moral truths. This entails that the theonomic position is then false because of it’s rejection of natural law. The sort of moral truths that we know through natural law but do not appear on the pages of scripture are things like inappropriate sexual relations with inanimate objects and having impure sexual thoughts about cartoon pornography. These things are obvious moral abominations, but we do not find them referenced as ethically wrong in the Bible. You could say that we know them through the Bible through a necessary inference from natural law (which is taught in the Bible). But you cannot find them referenced as morally wrong actions in the Old and New Testament. Therefore, on the theonomic principle you could not know that it is wrong to look at cartoon pornography or having inappropriate sexual relations with inanimate objects. And clearly this is absurd because these sorts of actions are clearly wrong in the eyes of God.

Conclusion

I will conclude that the main theological argument that theonomy offers is not sound given a robust understanding of natural law as revealed in God’s word and if this theological argument was consistently pursued by the theonomy it would also disprove theonomy.

A Refutation of Theonomy Part 2

Part 2: A Refutation of the arguments in favor of Theonomy

In my last post I offered positive biblical reasons for doubting Theonomy, so I thought it would be only fair to look at the biblical reasons that theonomist use to support their position and then to refute the theonomic view of those biblical texts.

In the next post I will deal with some theological arguments that theonomists give.


I will start with the most popular argument given by theonomists from Matthew 5:17, it reads:

"Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to *fulfill* them.

Explanation: The theonomists wants to translated the Greek word *pleroo* as uphold or establish. Thus, the reading of this text would look something like this: "Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to uphold (pleroo) them. Thus, from this text the theonomists establishes the principle that we are to bring over the Mosaic laws unless they are abrogated in the New Covenant. The problem with this is that this Greek word throughout Matthews Gospel is not used in this way. In fact throughout Matthews Gospel "pleroo" consistently means brought to true meaning in the redemptive historical sense or prophetic fulfillment of some kind (Matt. 1:22;2:15;3:15;5:17;13:35;21:4;21:22). The theonomists has one good response to this sort of objection, they say that the word abolish followed by a "but" suggests a antithesis or a definite contrast and thus the only contrast to abolish is uphold or establish. The problem with this is that Jesus could not necessarily be saying something the opposite but merely something different. For example, If I say I did not come to eat dinner with you but I came to tell you a quick joke. Here we see that a "but" does not mean necessarily complete opposites, but rather indicating that you are simply doing something different (Thanks to Professor Steven M. Baugh for this Point). Jesus in Matthew 5:17 is doing something different than abolishing the law rather Jesus is bringing the law to eschatological completion, or to put it more simply: Jesus is fulfilling the law by bringing out it's true purpose and meaning. Thus, given the context of Matthews Gospel and a few other clarifications we see that there is no reason why we should take this passage the way the theonomists takes it especially when it contradicts clearer scripture (Heb. 8:13; 2 Cor. 3).

Hebrews 2:2-3 2 For since the message declared by angels proved to be reliable and every transgression or disobedience received a just retribution, 3 how shall we escape if we neglect such a great salvation? It was declared at first by the Lord, and it was attested to us by those who heard,

Explanation: Theonomists try to say that the argument being made here is that the Mosaic Law gave just punishments to the people under it then how much worse is the just punishment going to be if we disobey the New Covenant. The theonomists believes that if the non-theonomic view point were true then it would have to make nonsense out of the text in this specific fashion: The Mosaic covenant was only just for a little while and then it became abolished and failed to be just so then the punishment we will receive from the new covenant for disobeying it will also be abolished and fail to be just. The reason they think this is because they believe that the author is making an argument from the lesser to the greater. A argument like this looks something like this: If a lesser x is true then how much more is the greater y true. I want to start off saying that I agree with the theonomists that this verse is arguing from the lesser from the greater like Hebrews 10:26-30. However, I do believe that a non-theonomists can affirm this argument that the author of Hebrews is making without believing in theonomy. In the situation of the Mosaic covenant it was just to execute people for committing adultery and I think given those circumstances it will always be just. However, since we are in a different ethical circumstances of the new covenant our moral obligations are different. But that is fundamentally different from saying that the Mosaic covenant that God established in those circumstances were unjust. Rather what the non-theonomists ought to affirm is that they will always be just in those circumstances, but those circumstances will never obtain again because we are now under a new covenant and the old is faded away (Heb. 8:13).

Matthew 15:4-6: For God commanded, 'Honor your father and your mother,' and, 'Whoever reviles father or mother must surely die.' 5 But you say, 'If anyone tells his father or his mother, What you would have gained from me is given to God, 6 he need not honor his father.' So for the sake of your tradition you have made void the word of God.

Explanation: The theonomists wants to say that Jesus here is affirming the death penalty from a part of the Mosaic law. Even if this were true this would not prove the entire thesis of theonomy; which is that there is a presumed continuity between the new covenant and the Mosaic covenant. But suppose we were to forget about those two points, does this passage teach that Jesus is bringing over a part of the Mosaic law, specifically a law that says we ought to execute our children if they disobey us? All Jesus seems to be doing here is showing how the religious leaders are hypocritical and inconsistent with the Mosaic law they say they follow. Far from this being an endorsement of executing disobedient children this is more a condemnation on the religious leadership in Jesus' day.

Romans 3:31 31 Do we then overthrow the law by this faith? By no means! On the contrary, we uphold the law.

Explanation: Theonomists see this as support for Matthew 5:17 as being another reference to the idea that there is a presumed continuity between the Mosaic covenant and the new covenant. However, the Greek word nomos does not mean the Mosaic law here since that is clearly abolished elsewhere in Paul (Rom. 6:14;2 Cor. 3). Rather, this verse in context is talking about how we as Christians should not just forget about following the law of God revealed in the New covenant because we have been justified by faith so now we should obey the law. This obedience to the law of God is a rule for sanctification that is produced by gratitude for what Christ has done for us. In Reformed theology this use of the law is called the third use. Paul is teaching the third use of the law rather than bringing the covenant of Moses into the covenant earned by Christ.

Romans 13:1-4 Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. 2 Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. 3 For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Would you have no fear of the one who is in authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive his approval, 4 for he is God's servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain. For he is the servant of God, an avenger who carries out God's wrath on the wrongdoer.

Explanation: Theonomists see this passage as suggesting that there ought to be state laws that are right and wrong in order for the secular authorities to have been instituted by God and able to justly punish guilty individuals. They argue that the non-theonomists cannot offer a objective standard of right or wrong in the realm of the state so we therefore have to go to the law of Moses as our standard for how a state ought to function. The problem with this argument is that the non-theonomists do have a standard by which they can determine wrong or right state laws, this law is called natural law. Natural law is taught twice in the book of Romans (1:32;2:14). Natural law is the general law revealed to all humanity that enables them to know the difference between right or wrong. With this understanding of natural law we see that the theonomists has no argument to offer with this verse.

In Conclusion:

We have seen that the biblical arguments given for theonomy are altogether unconvincing and unreasonable. However, there are more theological arguments that theonomist offer that I will deal with in the next post.

A Refutation of Theonomy Part 1

Theonomy is the position that there is a presumed continuity between the Mosaic covenant and the New Covenant of Grace. This presumed continuity entails that all Mosaic laws that are not abrogated in the New Covenant ought to be carried over. The theonomists would of course see the ceremonial laws as completely abolished in Jesus Christ because this is what the New Testament teaches according to orthodox Christianity. The intended result of theonomy is to allow for a great deal of judicial laws and some other laws to be carried into the New Covenant. A judicial law is a law that ought to be carried out by the magistrate or the state. This would be like economic laws and laws concerning the death penalty. Basically, these laws govern what the state ought to do. Here is an example of one such law in the Mosaic covenant:

Exodus 22:18 "You shall not permit a sorceress to live.

In the Mosaic economy one of the judicial laws was that all Sorceresses were to be executed and so now, says the theonomists, the law should be to execute all sorceresses.

I will argue that theonomy is taught against in Bible and I will refute all of the verses that theonomists uses to establish his/her position. This a rather large task so this will take me about three posts to flush out.

My position, to be clear, is that there is a presumed discontinuity between the Mosaic and the new covenant of Grace. My principle: A Law is to be carried over to the New Covenant if and only if it is repeated in the New Testament which is the entire context of the new covenant inauguration. To put it more simply: If the Law from the Mosaic covenant is not repeated in the New Testament then it is abrogated or abolished.

In This post I will seek to establish my position which entails the denial of the theonomic position and then in the next post I will refute all of the verse that the theonomists uses to positively support his/her position.

Argument 1:

Hebrews 8:13 In speaking of a new covenant, he makes the first one obsolete. And what is becoming obsolete and growing old is ready to vanish away.

Explanation:

Here in Hebrews 8 the author is commenting on the New Covenant spoken by the prophet Jeremiah and he is saying that when Jeremiah even spoke of the New Covenant the Mosaic covenant was obsolete and growing old which is going vanish away. Theonomists try to say that this is only referring to the ceremonial law. However, Jeremiah or the author of Hebrews never makes this distinction in the text and he is speaking of the Mosaic covenant as a whole (Heb. 8:7-10).

Argument 2:

2 Corinthians 3:9-13 9 For if there was glory in the ministry of condemnation, the ministry of righteousness must far exceed it in glory. 10 Indeed, in this case, what once had glory has come to have no glory at all, because of the glory that surpasses it. 11 For if what was being brought to an end came with glory, much more will what is permanent have glory. 12 Since we have such a hope, we are very bold, 13 not like Moses, who would put a veil over his face so that the Israelites might not gaze at the outcome of what was being brought to an end.

Explanation:

Here Paul is saying that both the glory and the Mosaic covenant was being brought to an end once the permanent surpassing glory of the New Covenant comes. Notice again, the text does not bring up distinguishable elements of Mosaic economy such as the ceremonial laws and sacrifices and so we ought to assume that this is referring to the entire Mosaic covenant as a whole.

Argument 3:

Romans 6:14 14 For sin will have no dominion over you, since you are not under law but under grace.

Explanation: When the word law or nomos in the Greek is used here it cannot be in reference to the believer following God’s moral laws or the third use of the law because Paul elsewhere in the book of Romans tells us that we ought to follow God’s moral commands as a guide for sanctification (Rom. 3:31). This also cannot be referring to the covenant of works made with Adam because there was no sin prior to the fall in which the first covenant of works was made prior to the fall. It seems then that nomos or law here can only be referring to the Mosaic covenant. This suggests that we are no longer under the Mosaic covenant as a whole or in part, but only under the New and if we are under the New then there is no reason to follow the laws of the old mosaic covenant unless of course they are repeated in the New.

Conclusion:

I have shown that given these three biblical texts that theonomy is not biblical. Because it is taught against in God’s word the church should teach against it. We should strongly teach against the theonomists notion that the abolished Mosaic covenant laws are binding on the New Covenant believer.

Can you Lose your Salvation?

I believe the Bible clearly teaches the Reformed Doctrine of Perseverance of the Saints, which means that those who are saved will by no means lose their salvation, rather they will preserver until the end. In this post I will provide biblical reasons for thinking this is the case and I will provide a defense against reasons for not thinking that this is the case.



The Bible clearly teaches in many places that you cannot lose your salvation:

John 6:44 No one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draws him. And I will raise him up on the last day.

All those who are drawn and come to God will be raised up on the last day. The term last day in the context of John 6 refers to the resurrection of glory (John 6:40). Which leads me to the next verse:

John 6:40 For this is the will of my Father, that everyone who looks on the Son and believes in him should have eternal life, and I will raise him up on the last day."

John 10:28-29 28 I give them eternal life, and they will never perish, and no one will snatch them out of my hand. 29 My Father, who has given them to me, is greater than all, and no one is able to snatch them out of the Father's hand.

No one can snatch those who have salvation out of the Father's and the Son's hand.

Philippians 1:6 And I am sure of this, that he who began a good work in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus Christ.

Paul, the inspired apostle, here says that the believers who God has begun a good work in will in fact make it on the last day.

1 Corinthians 1:8 who will sustain you to the end, guiltless in the day of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Paul is saying that God will sustain believers until the end. Notice the word guiltless here. This is quite a stab at christian denominations and groups that say a believer can have guilt before God at any point.

Romans 8:28-30 28 And we know that for those who love God all things work together for good, for those who are called according to his purpose. 29 For those whom he foreknew he also predestined to be conformed to the image of his Son, in order that he might be the firstborn among many brothers. 30 And those whom he predestined he also called, and those whom he called he also justified, and those whom he justified he also glorified.

All those who are justified are glorified. Justification in the context of Romans refers to a event in the when one first receives righteousness and hence salvation (Rom. 3:20-25; 4:1-13). Paul is saying here that those who receive justification will in fact be glorified on the last day and given the context we have no reason to think that this glorious chain of redemption can be broken. This is even more evident when one reads the proceeding context which stresses that nothing can seperate the elect or saved from the love of Christ (Rom. 8:31-39), which is another clear proof of the doctrine of perseverance of the saints.


Now what about the objections to this biblical doctrine?

Well the most common objection to this doctrine is surprisingly philosophical in orientation, it goes something like this:

P1: If I have experienced S who went to x:church, y:professed faith, and z:had works for a long time T and at a future time T1 ceased from doing x, y, and z then S has lost his salvation.

P2: I have experienced S who did x,y, and z for a long time T and at a future time T1 ceased from doing x,y, and z.

C: Therefore, S has lost his salvation

The problem with this argument is premise 1. Someone can cease from doing x, y, and z and could of never been saved to begin with. The presence of x, y, and z does not necessitate the presence of salvation because someone could have man made reasons and intentions for doing x,y, and z and people could not be aware of those intentions and reasons. But this in no way defeats perseverance of the saints because it states that one cannot lose their salvation which is wrought by God alone, but surely someone can for other reasons stop performing x,y, and z.

Now lets take a look at the biblical arguments against this position:

I will respond to each of these arguments by what is called the Reformed covenantal view point, which is to say: People can loose their membership within the covenant community, but that the covenant community is not synonymous with ones salvation. For surely one can be in the covenant community and not have salvation (Romans (9:6).


Lets take this approach from a few of the supposed falling away passages:

Hebrews 10:29-31 29 How much worse punishment, do you think, will be deserved by the one who has spurned the Son of God, and has profaned the blood of the covenant by which he was sanctified, and has outraged the Spirit of grace? 30 For we know him who said, "Vengeance is mine; I will repay." And again, "The Lord will judge his people." 31 It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God.

This verse is teaching that if one falls away from the covenant community permanently that they will obtain more guilt than had they not been in the covenant community.

This verse would be teaching the same:

Hebrews 6:4-9 4 For it is impossible to restore again to repentance those who have once been enlightened, who have tasted the heavenly gift, and have shared in the Holy Spirit, 5 and have tasted the goodness of the word of God and the powers of the age to come, 6 if they then fall away, since they are crucifying once again the Son of God to their own harm and holding him up to contempt. 7 For land that has drunk the rain that often falls on it, and produces a crop useful to those for whose sake it is cultivated, receives a blessing from God. 8 But if it bears thorns and thistles, it is worthless and near to being cursed, and its end is to be burned. 9 Though we speak in this way, yet in your case, beloved, we feel sure of better things- things that belong to salvation.

John 15 would also be teaching this as well:

John 15:1-2 "I am the true vine, and my Father is the vinedresser. 2 Every branch of mine that does not bear fruit he takes away, and every branch that does bear fruit he prunes, that it may bear more fruit.

This verse teaches that those who do not produce fruit in the covenant community will eventually be cut off and this is made evident by them not producing x, y, and z.

Romans 11:17-22 17 But if some of the branches were broken off, and you, although a wild olive shoot, were grafted in among the others and now share in the nourishing root of the olive tree, 18 do not be arrogant toward the branches. If you are, remember it is not you who support the root, but the root that supports you. 19 Then you will say, "Branches were broken off so that I might be grafted in." 20 That is true. They were broken off because of their unbelief, but you stand fast through faith. So do not become proud, but stand in awe. 21 For if God did not spare the natural branches, neither will he spare you. 22 Note then the kindness and the severity of God: severity toward those who have fallen, but God's kindness to you, provided you continue in his kindness. Otherwise you too will be cut off.

This verse teaches that the Jews were cut off from the covenant community and that if the gentiles do not continue in the faith then there will be some day in which they are cut off from the covenant community. But you might say "well if one being in the covenant community is dependent on faith then how can you avoid the fact that this passages is referring to ones loss of individual salvation". My response to this is that a gentile parent could baptize their child in the covenant community and then their child could have never believed in the first place but stayed in the covenant community and then that unbelieving parent had children and baptized them out of tradition and then the children of that parent has no Godly influence and thus remains a non-believer and this could continue on until the entire cooperate unit would be cut off covenantally. In this way you can have a sort of cooperate breaking off of the covenant community without it effecting one's individual salvation.

Conclusion:

Thus, given the covenantal understanding of these verses and the strong passages we have in support of perseverance of the saint we have to conclude that the answer to the question of whether or not one can lose their salvation has to be a confident No.

James White-1, William Lane Craig-0

This is a short clip from Dr. James White's podcast, The Dividing Line (Radio Free Geneva edition), where he takes a look at some clips of Dr. William Lane Craig attempting to refute Calvinism.

Christless Evangelicalism

The Evangelical Outpost (which was formerly the blog of Joe Carter, who is now the Web Editor for First Things) has just re-launched with a brand new website (graciously sponsored by Biola University's Torrey Honors Institute) and a new team of authors, including myself. For my first article, I wrote a brief review of Dr. Horton's latest book, Christless Christianity.

Click here to read the article.

-David Nilsen

A Good Argument For Infant Baptism?

Here is one of the Arguments:

Matthew 19:13-14 13 Then children were brought to him that he might lay his hands on them and pray. The disciples rebuked the people, 14 but Jesus said, "Let the little children come to me and do not hinder them, for to such belongs the kingdom of heaven."

P1: Believers should baptize members of the kingdom

P2: Children that believers have are members of the kingdom

C: Hence, believers should baptize the children they have

It seems valid and sound to me.

NPT

A Critique Of Coherentism and Toward A Proper Functionalist Epistemology

Introduction

In the pre-modern and modern periods foundationalism was the most popular epistemological theory to address the problems arising from “the epistemic regress problem” . The epistemic regress problem is as follows: S knows P because she inferred it from X, and S knows X because she it inferred from B and on and on ad infinitum. Foundationalism offers a response to this problem by assuming skepticism to be false and by postulating a belief that is grounded, warranted, and reasonable that does not require inferences . These beliefs are non-inferential warranted; these sorts of beliefs are called foundational beliefs or properly basic beliefs . However, since the collapse of the modern project of classical foundationalism, there has been a new proposed epistemological theory that has been embraced by many postmodernists to address the epistemic regress problem. This epistemological theory is called coherentism. In this paper I will define and state the essential features of coherentism by surveying it. Then, I will offer critiques of the essential features of coherentism, and finally I will propose a contemporary alternative foundationalist theory of knowledge called proper functionalism.



What is Coherentism?

One might think that characterizing coherentism should be a relatively simply task, however this is simply not the case. As Alvin Plantinga points out when he is describing coherentism in his book Warrant: The Current Debate
“Our first problem, naturally enough, is to characterize coherentism. This problem is not wholly trivial: there is considerable confusion as to what coherentism is and no generally accepted account of the relevant coherence relations .”

It seems that what Plantinga is noting here is a difficulty to find the necessary and sufficient conditions that would characterize coherentism. I will survey and define coherentism in the following three ways: 1) by looking at how coherentism responds to the epistemic regress problem, 2) by looking at where coherentism is positioned on the internalism and externalism debate, 3) by looking the various necessary and sufficient conditions that various coherentist offer. After taking a look at 1-3 I will give the conditions that characterize an essential element to coherence theories.

(1) Coherentism and the Epistemic Regress Problem

While foundationalism tries to say that the answer to the epistemic regress problem is to posit basic beliefs, coherentism does just the opposite by rejecting the notion of proper basicality. However, just because coherentism rejects proper basicality does not commit it to holding to infinitism, which is the belief that we have an infinite amount of justified beliefs. Rather, coherentism states that only beliefs can justify other beliefs and that there are no basic or properly basic beliefs . Coherentism, on the other hand, does not necessarily endorse viciously circular arguments like this for justification: I know A on the basis of B, and I know B on the basis of C and I know C on the basis of A . The idea of most coherentisms is more holistic in orientation that is beliefs are justified by virtue of them fitting into a system of beliefs . Thus, we can at this point characterize two essential conditions of coherentism: 1) it rejects basic beliefs; 2) beliefs are justified or warranted by virtue of how well they fit in with ones system of beliefs.

(2) Coherentism and the Internalism/Externalism Debate

Before looking at whether or not coherentists are externalist or internalists I will give conditions that defines and distinguishes these two options. Externalism is the view that can be broadly characterized by these conditions:

S is warranted for her belief in a proposition p iff her belief in p was formed by some truth conductive process that does not require awareness .

In other words warrant or justification does not depend on an internal reflection, evidence that one can give, or cognitive access (although internal reflection on externalism might strengthen warrant for a belief, but it is not necessary or required for a belief to be warranted). Rather warrant depends on how the belief was formed. Internalism is the view that can be broadly characterized by these conditions:

Doxastic attitude D toward proposition p is epistemically justified for S at t iff having D toward p fits the evidence S has and is aware of at t .

In internalism, it is clear that justification depends on one’s internal reasons, evidence or grounds rather than how the belief was formed by some process that does not require awareness for it to be warranted. Internalism accepts the awareness requirement for warrant, whereas externalism rejects it.

Now that the meaning of internalism and externalism are clarified we can now ask the question: Is coherentism internalist or externalist? Epistemologists generally seem to think that coherentism is committed implicitly or explicitly internalism . In fact Plantinga goes so far as to categorize coherentism as “post-classical Chisholmian internalism .” However, it must be noted that some epistemologists disagree with the majority assessment and think that coherentism can be externalist . In order to settle this issue, argumentative ground ought to be pursued to show that coherentism entails internalism and since this issue is relevant to my critique of coherentism and not relevant to a descriptive analysis of what coherentism is, then I will deal with it in the critique of coherentism. I then conclude that most epistemologist see coherentism as being internalistic.

(3) On the Essential Conditions of Coherentism

Now we will explore the varieties of coherentism and then conclude with the essential conditions to a coherent system that all coherence theories of justification would subscribe to.

The first type of coherentism is the strong or broadly logical coherentism. This form is the oldest and there seems to be some evidence that suggest that it went back to Plato. One might argue that Plato’s view of the real could be interpreted as an absolute set of truth in which all the forms are coherent and grant unified design . After the pre-modern period Hegel, F.H. Bradley, and Blanshard have represented earlier models of the coherence theory of justification . The strong form of coherentism is very general and the necessary and sufficient conditions are as follows:

“S is justified in believing P iff P coheres with S’s system of beliefs .”
This sufficient condition for justification is just saying that all a belief has to do to be justified is be coherent in logically consistent sense. This is a very broad notion of coherence that contemporary coherentists will expand to something more than just being logically consistent.

Contemporary coherentism finds one of its best expression in Lawerance BonJour, who has developed a lot more nuanced and up to date version of coherentism . He gives five conditions of coherence:

“(1) A system of beliefs is coherent only if it is logically consistent. (2) A system of beliefs is coherent in proportion to its degree of probabilistic consistency. (3) The coherence of a system of beliefs is increased by the presence of inferential connections between its component beliefs and increased in proportion to the number and strength of such connections. (4) The coherence of a system of beliefs is diminished to the extent to which it is divided into subsystems of beliefs which are relatively unconnected to each other by inferential connections. (5) The coherence of a system of beliefs is decreased in proportion to the presence of unexplained anomalies in the believed content of the system .”

Bonjour’s criteria for justifying a belief is a lot specific than just saying mere logical coherence. Bonjour makes subtle distinctions in his theory such as belief system and subsystem. He also clarifies his picture by speaking about degrees of justification by way of the connection to other beliefs. These clarifications are helpful for having a clear and understandable epistemological system, yet they are still recognizably in the same family as the old coherentism of F.H. Bradley.

Coherentism: A General Depiction

In light of what we have gone over we have concluded that coherentism rejects basic beliefs and that beliefs can only be justified on the basis of others beliefs while not necessarily committing itself to an idea of viciously circular justifiers . Furthermore, we have seen that coherentists usually are internalists in terms of justification. Finally we have seen that coherentists believe that their beliefs are justified by virtue of them being at least logically consistent with one another and among other qualifications with respect to contemporary coherentist. Therefore, I would agree with Richard Feldman’s General Depiction of Coherentism which is as follows:

“S is justified in believing p iff the coherence value of S’s system of beliefs would be greater if it included a belief in p than it would be if it did not include that belief .”

The condition that a belief contributes to belief systems coherences more so than it would had that belief not been in the belief system seems to be a condition that all mere coherentists would embrace.

Critiques of Coherentism

I will offer my criticism of coherentism now that we understand what it purports. However, I will begin my section addressing an issue that I left hanging in my description of coherentism; this is the issue of whether or not coherentism is committed to internalism. This is important to my thesis because in order for my first two critiques of coherentism to be effective, internalism has to be an essential feature of it. I shall argue that coherentism has internalism as an essential feature by offering various arguments. Then I will offer three arguments critiquing coherentism.

Arguments that Coherentism is internalistic
The opposite of internalism is externalism and it is my contention that if coherentism tries to adopt externalism then it either leads to 1) beliefs that are not justified, 2) or foundationalism. Either 1 or 2 are clearly unacceptable and thus coherentism has to be internalistic.

Let’s take a look at the prospects of contention 1: Suppose I am reading a math book and I decide to believe all the propositions on 7th line on every page of the book . Let us further suppose after I have read the text that all my beliefs form a wonderfully coherent mathematical set of beliefs but the mathematical propositions are far to complex and deep for me to grasp or to be aware of it . I am completely lacking in awareness of the coherent relations and connections among my beliefs and thus it seems very counter intuitive to say that I am justified in believing these mathematical propositions . This counter example is effective because internalists and externalists tend to agree that internal reflection and evidence of a belief makes it more reasonable to believe (although externalists do not require it for warrant). In this case, this example completely lacks internal reason or proper function. Thus, on either view this belief is not warranted.

As for contention 2 it seems that externalism can only be accommodated within foundationalism and thus a coherentist cannot be an externalist. Externalists say that beliefs are warranted or justified by virtue of them being formed by a reliable process, by your facilities functioning properly, or by them being caused by truth indicative causal chains. If one has beliefs that sufficiently receive their warrant by virtue of beliefs being formed correctly rather than from them being in coherent relations to one another then one is no longer a coherentist at all. A externalistic coherentist would be unable to fulfill the intuitions of externalism (reliable formation) or internalism (reflection of reason). This is why only foundationalism can accommodate externalism; beliefs do not need to be coherent in order to be justified but rather only formed correctly without being aware of such.

Argument 1: Can We Ever Coherently Justify Millions of beliefs?

Coherentism sets the bar too high or impossible for any particular belief to be justified. Coherentists think that in order for a belief to be justified that belief has to give more coherence to the rest of one’s beliefs more so than not. But how many beliefs might a person have? Well it seems that a person has millions of beliefs, albeit they do not think about them all at once. For example, most people believe that 2 is greater than 1 and that 3 is greater than 2 and so on. And most people believe that there are least 2 cars in the world and at least 3 cars and on. We can do this with any number of objects and things about various objects that we believe. The point is we have millions of beliefs (although I would not go so far to say an infinite amount). If someone were to ask: why I believe a given proposition p in order for me to be justified in believing p on coherentism, I am required to demonstrate how one belief gives more coherence value to millions of beliefs. Not only is that a nearly impossible task, but it puts too high of a requirement on justification. Because coherentism puts an unreasonable standard of justification, it is an unreasonable epistemological theory.

Argument 2: Epistemological Problems about the External World

One of the strongest reasons for rejecting coherentism is that it cannot justify our beliefs about the external world, that is to say a world of physical objects not dependent on our subjective apprehension of them. Here is how the argument goes:

P1: Internalism cannot justify our beliefs about the external world

P2: Coherentism entails Internalism

C: Coherentism cannot justify our beliefs about the external world.

Out of all the premises 1 is the most contentious so I shall give some good reasons for thinking that internalism cannot provide a justification for our belief in the existence of the external world. There seems to be two ways we can know about the external world given internalism: 1) sense experience and 2) intuition. 1) There is nothing about sense experience that justifies our belief in the external world because we could have the very same sense experience if there were no external world. So for example we could be in the Matrix and, in terms of sense experience alone, we could not tell the difference between our sense experience in or outside of the Matrix with respect to the external world. 2) There is nothing about intuition alone or in conjunction with sense that would lead us to think that the external world exists. This is because there is nothing necessary about me having sense experience that would allow me to intuit that there has to be a external world because there could be a possible world W* in which I have sense experience but there is no external world . Thus, P1 is reasonable and even the leading proponent of internalism, Laurence Bonjour, grants that he presently lacks the ability to give a reason for why he believes in the external world

I have already argued for premises 2 so the conclusion follows out of logical necessity.

We are left with either picking coherentism or the belief in the external world. It is clear that I know more that there is an external world than I know that coherentism is a plausible epistemological theory. Therefore, it is more reasonable to believe that the external world exists resulting in coherentism being unreasonable.

Argument 3: The Lottery Paradox

The Lottery Paradox demonstrates that coherence is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for justification because two beliefs can be incoherent and still be justified contrary to an essential tenet of coherentism . The example of the lottery paradox is that there are four subjects competing for a lottery prize; lets designate them: K, H, C, A. In the competition there can only be one winner out of the four. So suppose you were to believe that one of them will win and another belief that it is statistically improbable that any particular individual might win given that they are facing 1 out 4 odds . Both of these beliefs seem reasonable or justified yet they are completely incoherent. As shown by the propositions below:

1: It is improbable that K wins the lottery

2: It is improbable that H wins the lottery

3: It is improbable that C wins the lottery

4: It is improbable that A wins the lottery

In conjunction with:

5: Either one of K, H, C, or A will win the lottery.

They are incoherent because of the obvious fact that you have a belief that one of the individuals will win but another belief that it is improbable that any of them should win . But it seems that we want to say that propositions 1-5 are all justified, but if this is true then one of the essential tenants of coherentism is false, namely, that beliefs have to be coherent in order for them to be justified .

An Alternative Epistemological Theory: Externalistic Foundationalism

In light of the objections above coherentism seems vastly implausible, so what epistemological theory should we hold in place of collapsed web of coherentism? We know that any form of internalistic foundationalism whether classical or moderate will be untenable because we cannot give a justification for our belief in the external world . Furthermore, it seems that I know more firmly that the external world exists more than I know that classical and moderate internalistic foundationalism is a viable theory. Thus, Alvin Plantinga’s theory Proper Functionalism, which is a moderate externalistic foundational theory of knowledge, is the most warranted fit after the collapse of the web. The necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for a belief to be warranted in proper functionalism are as Alvin Plantinga explains:

“we may say that a belief B has warrant for S if and only if the relevant segments (the segments involved in the production of B) are functioning properly in a cognitive environment sufficiently similar to that for which S’s faculties are designed; and the modules of the design plan governing the production of B are (1) aimed at truth, and (2) such that there is a high objective probability that a belief formed in accordance with those modules (in that sort of cognitive environment) is true; and the more firmly S believes B the more warranted B has for S ”

The benefits of this theory are many, contrary to coherentism. It does not rely on internal reflection, but rather on my faculties functioning properly. Thus, it does not require a nearly impossible high bar of justification. If one holds to proper functionalism they are able to say with confidence that the ordinary person knows that there is an external world, and that Bible is the word of God without her having the ability to give some abstract philosophical argument for how these two beliefs coheres with all the other millions of beliefs she has. In addition, proper functionalism does not face any insurmountable critiques such as the lottery paradox that coherentism faces. Thus, all these considerations ought to lead someone to accept proper functionalism as the most reasonable epistemological theory available.

Conclusion

Once we have understood coherentism I have found it is unable to account for the particulars of knowledge that I have and the only theory that seems to accommodate the articles of knowledge is proper functionalism. We have to find a theory that accommodates all the things we know and it seems to me that coherentism lacks that important condition. But we should not live in epistemic despair because it seems that proper functionalism accounts for all these things that coherentism lacks. Thus, we can be assured that heady academics as well as the average person can have knowledge about everyday life without having to speculate for hours.






Bibliography

Bonjour, Editor DePaul, Resurrecting Old-Fashioned Foundationalism. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, INC., 2001.

BonJour, Laurence. The Structure of Empirical Knowledge. Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1985.

Conee and Feldman. Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies, 1985.

Dancy, Jonathan. Introduction to Contemporary Epistemology. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Basil Blackwell, Inc, 1985.

Feldman, Richard. Epistemology. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc. 2003.

Fumerton, Richard. Editor Louis P. Pojman, The Theory of Knowledge Classical and Contemporary Readings; A Critique of Coherentism. Wadsworth: Thomson Learning Inc., 2003.

Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant: The Current Debate. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Plantinga, Alvin. Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
Pojman, Louis P. What can we Know?: An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge .USA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1994.

Porter, Steven L. Restoring the Foundations of Epistemic Justification (UK: Lexington Books, 2006

Grad School Final Papers and Tests!

We will not be posting that much for the next month or so because we are all working hard toward the end of the semester. But this blog at the end of the month should be getting some good posts because two of authors of the blog will be writing theological and philosophical papers for their classes. Sorry about the long wait!

In Christ,

Nathanael P. Taylor

Greg L. Bahnsen on Justification

Here is a paper demonstrating that the late Greg L. Bahnsen would not have agreed with the federal visionist and that he held a orthodox view of justification:

http://www.westminsterrpcus.org/pdf/Bahnsen.pdf

There is one quote he cites that is rather controversial and hard for me to deal with, but at the same time I think the author shows pretty clearly that at the end of Bahnsen's life he held a orthodox view of justification, which is something that cannot be said of the federal visionist.




This is the quote that the federal visionist cite from Bahnsen when he was doing a lecture on Calvin and James 2:

"I think (this) is rather convoluted … let me very briefly point
out, some people will say James can’t mean the word justify
in a forensic sense, because then he would contradict Paul.
Paul says we are justified by faith, not works. James says we
are justified by works. So if they both mean “justify” in the
forensic sense, there is a contradiction. Well, I don’t think so,
because in Galatians 5:6 Paul teaches exactly what James
does. Paul says we are justified by faith working by love. We
are justified by working, active, living faith. I think that’s
what James is teaching. They mean exactly the same thing.
But nevertheless some people have insisted- and this has
been a bone of controversy in my denomination even,
because a professor at Westminster Seminary insisted James
means this in the forensic sense.
Now … people who don’t like that say, It is to be taken in the
demonstrative sense. The problem is, the demonstrative
sense of the word justify means “to show someone to be
righteous,” and that doesn’t relieve the contradiction between
James and Paul, because Paul in Romans 4 looks at Abraham
as an example of how God justifies the ungodly. James is saying,
Look at how God justifies someone demonstrated as
godly. The contradiction is not relieved. And so what you
really get – and this is crucial, this is a crucial point- modern
interpreters who don’t like what I am suggesting and what
Professor Shepherd is suggesting end up saying that to justify
in James 2 really means “to demonstrate justification,” not
to “demonstrate righteousness.” That is, they make the word
to justify mean “to justify the fact that I’m justified.” And the
word never means that. That’s utterly contrived. It means
either “to declare righteous” or “to demonstrate righteous” It
does not mean “to justify that one’s justified.”
… Am I making myself clear? I’m suggesting that the reason
Paul and James are not contrary to one another is because the only
kind of faith that will justify us is working faith, and the only kind
of justification ever presented in the Bible after the Fall is a justification
by working faith, a faith that receives its merit from God
and proceeds to work as a regenerated, new person."

This is the statement that he made the end of his life when preaching on Romans:

"Justification is not causing someone to have sanctifying grace
in his heart. The Roman Catholic church is simply wrong
about this. For God to justify the sinner is for God to act as a
judge and to declare the sinner righteous. God will also make
the sinner righteous. You say, “Well then what difference
does it make, Dr. Bahnsen; you admit what the Roman
Catholics do, that those who are going to be saved need to
lead new lives.” Absolutely, But that isn’t what the Roman
Catholic church teaches. It teaches that those who lead new
lives will be saved. Don’t think that I am just drawing a very
minor point in English grammar when I put it to you that way
because on that point rests your salvation. It is a matter of
eternal consequences that you get this right. God does make
saved people to be holy but He does not save them by making
them holy."

I really hope he believe the latter rather than the former.

A Christian Conceptual Pragmatist Epistemology: Part I

By David Bruner

In this part I will give a brief summary of Lewis’ construal of conceptual knowledge in MWO.

In the opening chapter of MWO C. I. Lewis prescribes the boundaries of the philosophical domain. Unlike the natural sciences, the dealings of philosophy are said to be exclusively in further investigation of what is already known.

“It is not the business of philosophy, as it is of the natural sciences, to add to the sum total of phenomena with which men are acquainted. Philosophy is concerned with what is already familiar.”

Those who practice philosophy are not to rely on collection of empirical data in order to establish the logical and ethical judgments which they are after, nor are they to prophetically forecast constraints upon what will be the actual findings of metaphysical investigation. Rather,


“just this business of bringing to clear consciousness and expressing coherently the principles which are implicitly intended in our dealing with the familiar, is the distinctively philosophic enterprise.”

Lewis points out that study of logic requires the use of logic as a rule and guide, that inquiry about right and wrong requires a moral sense for direction, and that formulation of principles of interpretation of reality must make use of, “principles of interpretation already immanent [inherent] in intelligent practice.” Lewis claims that philosophy exceeds its responsible bounds when it takes up speculation about what transcends experience and that it is rightly limited to reflective consideration of the ways in which we deal with what is already possessed within ordinary experience. So the ethicist will make it his or her ambition to more clearly define the good, the logician to define the valid, and the metaphysician to define the real all in terms of experience already encountered and our attitudes taken toward it. Yet as antecedent clarifiers of the meanings of the terms which are to be used in whatever ampliative propositions one may make, these definitions which philosophy will attempt to elucidate shall be determinative of the way in which we understand experience. Lewis writes,

“So understood, the principles of the categories, which metaphysics seeks, stand, on the one side, in close relation to experience and can not meaningfully transcend it. But on the other side – or in a different sense – they stand above or before experience, and are definitive or prescriptive.”

This is to say that in philosophy we work to analyze only the content of our experience and our relation to it in order to make explicit and to sharpen our decisions about categorizations of the elements of experience, but that these categorizations as explicated and sharpened determine exactly what we will make of the content of our experience and our relation to it. Again on this point, Lewis explains,

“It is through reflective examination of experience (more particularly of our own part in it or attitude toward it) that we may correctly formulate these principles of the categories, since they are implicit in our practical dealings with the empirically given. But they are not empirical generalizations in the sense that some later experience may prove an exception and thus invalidate them. They formulate an attitude of interpretation or discrimination by which what would be exceptional is at once thrown out of court.”

So philosophy, in bringing into focus the blur of our implicit decisions about how to interpret experience, legislates explicit rules of interpretation of experience which experience itself cannot alter. The explicit rules of interpretation determine how any experience whatsoever is to be understood. These rules of interpretation which philosophy is concerned to bring to conscious light in the form of definitions constitute what Lewis refers to as the a priori in his epistemological design.

The mind’s formation and use of legislative rules of interpretation are an integral part of Lewis’ holistic conception of human cognitive experience which I will here recount in some detail. Lewis, in accord with philosophical tradition, cites two distinct elements in the mind’s experience of the world. He states,

“There are, in our cognitive experience, two elements; the immediate data, such as those of sense, which are presented or given to the mind, and a form, construction, or interpretation, which represents the activity of thought.”

Lewis introduces a conception of these two elements and their relation to one another which emphasizes the activity of thought as the mind’s volitional contribution to knowledge. The given element of experience, the immediate data, is recognized as that aspect of experience which we have no part in creating and which we cannot alter by our thinking. The a priori element is that interpretation which we place upon the given – our abstractions of parts of the given from the whole and the associations we make between the parts of the given and parts of past experiences and relations we have observed between our own actions and parts of these past experiences. Lewis at one point recounts an exemplary illustration of the interplay between the two elements of cognitive experience in a description of his experience of a fountain pen:

“At the moment, I have a fountain pen in my hand. When I so describe this item of my present experience, I make use of terms whose meaning I have learned. Correlatively I abstract this item from the total field of my present consciousness and relate it to what is not just now present in ways which I have learned and which reflect modes of action which I have acquired. It might happen that I remember my first experience of such a thing. If so, I should find that this sort of presentation did not then mean, ‘fountain pen,’ to me… This present classification depends on that learned relation of this experience to other possible experience and to my action, which the shape, size, etc. of this object was not then a sign of.

Lewis, upon encountering a certain array of sense data, purports, by his own thought process, to abstract from the array a single object and to ascribe to that object qualities which he does not at present observe in it based on its apparent similarity to objects which he has observed in the past that exhibited these qualities when acted upon in certain ways. He notes that any number of different interpretations could be applied to the same given array of sense data depending upon the individual mind’s past subjective experience or pragmatic interest, thereby showing that the immediate sense data are indeed given by an external source and that the mode of interpretation is indeed volitionally contributed by the mind itself. Thus Lewis views the two elements in knowledge as operating independently of one another to an extent. The given is clearly independent of the mind’s interpretation since no activity of the mind can in any way control or alter its nature; and while the characteristics of the given serve as stimuli for the mind to interpret it by ascribing to it certain presently unobserved qualities, the decision of the mind to correlate instances of objects like the one at hand with a specific set of presently unobserved qualities is made independently of and antecedently to encountering the given object. Even the decision of the mind to abstract from instances of arrays of sense data somewhat similar to the one at hand parts which can be recognized as instances of similar objects is independent of and antecedent to encountering the given array of sense data. Lewis speaks of this basic interpretation of the given saying,

“The absolutely given is a specious present, fading into the past and growing into the future with no genuine boundaries. The breaking of this up into the presentation of things marks already the activity of an interested mind.”

For Lewis the most fundamental singling out of specific parts of experience from the rest of consciousness involves the mind’s working independently of what is given.
Since its operation is independent of the sense data given to the mind, Lewis views the element in knowledge comprised of the mind’s interpretational contribution as, in itself, entirely abstract from sense data. He claims that the interpretations made by the mind consist of, “concepts,” or terms with specific logical intensions or connotations. Considered in isolation, these concepts are not tied to any specific sense data. Lewis extricates the conceptual element in knowledge from the sensorially given for us by describing it, for expository purposes, as, “that meaning which must be common to two minds when they understand each other by the use of a substantive or its equivalent.” This manner of describing the purely conceptual is illustrative of its purely logical character since it is obvious that despite considerable idiosyncrasy in different minds’ sense data, people still understand one another. Lewis at one place inserts an example of a logical conceptual interpretation bridging the gap of possible sensory variation between two minds:

“What I would point out is, rather, that in the determination of common concepts, the conveying of ideas, such possible idiosyncrasy in the correlated sense feelings is entirely negligible. You and I mean the same by, ‘red,’ if we both define it as the first band in the sun’s spectrum, and if we both pronounce the same objects to be red. It does not matter if neither the red rug nor the first band of the spectrum give to the two of us identical sensations so long as we individually discover that same sense-quality in each thing which we agree in describing as, ‘red.’ ”

So we see that on Lewis’ view concepts in their pure and shareable form are not references to given sense data but consist in logical definitions. Lewis does hold that these logical concepts would be meaningless if they were not referred to specific aspects of sensory experience by each mind that employed them. However, as sharable between two minds, the concept is not necessarily correlated to any specific aspect of sense. He points out that,

“no such concept ever existed, apart from imagery and sensory material, in any human mind. For each individual there must be a correlation of concept with specific sense-quality. But this correlation is intrinsically individual; if it, too, should be shared, we could not verify that fact, and it is not in the least essential to common understanding that it should be.”

For Lewis the mind’s interpretational work is active in the whole of our cognitive experience bringing logical conceptual shareable meaning to given experience. Even the most basic recognitions of facts in experience are said to be supplied a cognitive significance by a concept’s denotation of them. As Lewis remarks,

“The end-terms which for us are thus understood directly by reference to sense and feeling, have still a conceptual meaning; they are not indefinable. This conceptual meaning is shareable; our imagery is essentially not. Thus the end-terms of such analysis are no different than the beginning terms.”

If the mind’s activity of thought in interpreting experience is thus construed, it becomes apparent that what form our completed knowledge will take is up to us to decide. It is up to us to enumerate whatever specific types of sensory occurrences we choose by means of specific concepts and it is up to us to declare these basic concepts to be related to one another in whatever ways we choose. The sum of these decisions about what our attitude will be in interpreting experience amounts to Lewis’ a priori, the clarification and conscious apprehension of which constitutes his proper domain of philosophy.

Lewis’ a priori consists in designations of criteria by which to classify certain parts of experience into categories. When a sensory experience is inducted into a category on account of its displaying a satisfactory amount of the criteria associated with that category, all of the criteria of that category which are not at the moment displayed in the experience are also attributed to the experience. The category is a complete set of characteristics, the fullness of which may be ascribed to a sense experience when enough of the characteristics are present in the sense experience to safely judge that it may be assumed that the rest will be near in following. Categorizing experience is a matter of examining experience for signs cluing us to the applicability of certain categories and if certain of these categories are applied, predicting that other specific experiences will be forthcoming in connection with what is presently experienced, should certain changes take place. So the a priori designation of criteria by which to classify certain parts of experience into categories takes the form of conditional statements. Lewis uses the statement, “If this is round, then further experience of it will be thus and so (the empirical criteria of objective roundness)” as an example of an a priori designation. A more lucid example would be the statement, “If it is an apple, it will feel smooth, appear smallish, round, and red, and have a sweet taste.” The category, “apple,” is designated a priori to denote an experience which exhibits the criteria of being smooth, smallish, round, red and sweet etc. If an experience is encountered which exhibits a good many of these criteria (smoothness, smallness, roundness and redness), I may a posteriori (upon discovery in the world) apply the category of apple to it and in doing so assume that the present experience will lead directly to other experiences such as an experience of a sweet taste if I act in certain ways or if other changes occur.

3 Reasons Evangelicals Should Accept The Essence-Energies Distinction

Over the next year or so I will be exploring the concept of the "energies" of God. This is an ancient Christian doctrine that goes back to the Early Church Fathers. While it remains an integral part of the doctrine of God in the Eastern Orthodox churches, it never truly took hold in the Latin West and seems to have been almost entirely forgotten until the Reformers. Both John Calvin and the Reformed Scholastics (such as Francis Turretin) made frequent use of the essence-energies (E-E) distinction in their theology. Sadly, this began to fall out of practice even in Reformed circles, so that today virtually no Western Protestant has even heard of the energies of God.


So, what are the energies? Crudely speaking, they are the "activites" of God. Because God's essence is wholly other, outside of the realm of space and time, incomprehensible, we cannot come into direct contact with it. And yet God is a God who intervenes in his creation and enters into relationship with his creatures. It is the energies of God that we come into contact with. God's glory and love and goodness are all energies. According to Mike Horton:

God's energies are radiations of divine glory, but are no more the divine essence than rays are the sun itself. God's uncreated glory emanates, but the essence does not. ...[The energies are] God-in-Action... They are not God's essence, but a certain quality of God's self-revelation and saving love.
(Covenant And Salvation, 268.)

But we must also keep in mind that the energies are not ontologically separate from God's essence, nor are they parts or pieces of God. They are God.

This may seem a bit confusing, and I have not even begun to do the topic justice. This is merely an introductory post that, I hope, will show that such a distinction is desperately needed in Western Protestantism today. All that is important at this point is that idea that there is a distinction between God as He is in Himself (His essence) and God as He manifests Himself to His creation (His energies).

Now then, three reasons Evangelicals need to start thinking about this distinction:

1) Pantheism (or Panentheism)

There has long been a tendancy in the West toward a kind of Pantheism. Medieval mysticism and its quest for the Beatific Vision was an extreme form of this. If God is absolutely simple and "only" an essence, how do we come into contact with Him without in a sense become a part of Him? What does the Apostle Peter mean when he says that we will "partake" of the divine nature? Do we partake directly of God as He is in Himself? At the very least, this seems to imply some sort of Panentheism, which is the belief that God is contianed within and permeates all of the natural world, as if He were the "world soul." By positing the doctrine of the energies of God, we can explain how it is that we come into direct contact with God and even partake of Him without falling into this dangerous tendency of Western theology.

2) Stoicism

This is not as dangerous of a problem for Protestants today, but it is always a potential. If God is, as traditional Christian theology has always maintained, unchanging and impassible, not affected by his creation (as He says in Samuel, He is not a man that he should repent), one could easily come to the conclusion that God is like the great Stoic philosopher in the sky. After all, impassible could mean "cold" and "unfeeling." Perhaps God is just an impersonal being from which all reality flows, a being who doesn't care about us or love us (certainly not enough to save us from our sin). Again, the E-E distinction saves us from such extremes. God in His essence is simple, unchanging and impassible. But his energies are manifold. Through His energies He comes into contact and enters into relationships with his creatures, and in an analogous way He feels with them, responds to their pleas, etc.

3) Open Theism

I saved the best for last! Of the three reasons I've given, this one is obviously the biggest potential danger for contemporary Protestantism. After considering Stoicism, it should be easy to see how the E-E distinction will help here, since Open Theism is simply the opposite problem. Open Theists want a God who can feel our pain, react to our cries for help, and genuinely respond to our prayers. Ignoring for the moment that the incarnation of Christ solves many of these problems (Hebrews specifically addresses how Christ can empathize with our struggles with sin, for example), the E-E distinction does as well. God's essence can remain unchanging while His energies remain manifold. His essence is simple while His activities in creation are varied.

So, are you interested yet? At any rate, I hope you can see how potentially important this distinction can be for the problems facing modern Protestantism. As I said, I will continue to explore this theme in greater detail over the next year. This is only the tip of the iceberg. If I've managed to whet your appetite, you can hear more on the E-E distinction in Mike Horton's systematic theology lectures (click here), specifically the most recent lectures on the incommunicable attributes of God. For a slightly more detailed introduction to the topic and its relation to the early Reformers' theology, check out the last section of Dr. Horton's book Covenant And Salvation (click here to buy the book online).

A Fine Argument Against Donatism

Here is a Biblical Argument against Donastism, a ancient Hersey that taught that the effective administration of the sacrament was based on the ministers holiness. In Philippians Paul teaches against such thinking:

Philippians 1:15-18 15 Some indeed preach Christ from envy and rivalry, but others from good will. 16 The latter do it out of love, knowing that I am put here for the defense of the gospel. 17 The former proclaim Christ out of rivalry, not sincerely but thinking to afflict me in my imprisonment. 18 What then? Only that in every way, whether in pretense or in truth, Christ is proclaimed, and in that I rejoice. Yes, and I will rejoice,

Here Paul is saying that the motive behind preaching the Gospel is not of concern, but rather that the Gospel is preached correctly.

Perfect Being Theology And The Classical Western Conception of God

Anselmian Perfect being theology and philosophy argues for the Divine properties from the conception of God being the greatest possible being. In this blog post I will argue for the traditional western conception of God on the basis of Perfect being theology and philosophy.

The formula to determine what properties God has in Anselmian Perfect Being theology is the following propositions:

P1: God is the greatest possible being

P2: God being the greatest possible being entails that he will have every property that is better to have rather than not.

P3: It is better to have x rather than not

C: Hence, God has x



This is an example of how this would work in practice: Reformed Theology wants to say that God is omniscient which means He knows all true propositions even future ones.

Lets apply this to the argument formula provided above:

P3: It is better to have omniscience rather than not

C: Hence, God is omniscient

This seems pretty reasonable considering that we think that it is better to know things rather than being completely ignorant. Thus, it seems more reasonable than not to think a greater being would know every truth rather than not.

From this example we see that the concept of God as the greatest possible being acts as a sort of divine properties generating machine; that is to say: we can apply this formula to warrant many of the properties we would want to predicate of God.

Here are some more Divine Properties that God has in Reformed Theology and in Traditional Western theology:

Divine Properties:

1) Omnipotence: being able to do anything that is logically possible and great (this is a good combination of Anselm's and Aquinas's Definition of omnipotence)

2) Morally Perfect: Being of the highest moral perfection and grounding moral perfection it-self

3) Omnipresent: God being conscience of ever event and point in History, God is not bound to any particular historical event but is boundlessly present at every point in the natural world.

4) Immutability: God's essential, necessary, and intrinsic properties are such that they are not subject to any sort of change.

5) Impassibility: No one can act on God, God only acts on all things. Thus, God in his Divine nature cannot be destroyed, suffer, or be injured.

6) Atemporal: God is timeless. He is not bound by time or bound inside of time.

7) Eternal: God does not begin to exist, but he always exists.

8) Aseity: God is only dependent upon himself.

Reasons for believing 1-8 (the numbers below corresponds with the numbers above)

1) When we think of a great being we tend to think of him being able to a lot of great things rather than being able to either do a) really bad things or b) nothing good at all all.

2) This one is perhaps the most obvious a perfect being is better than a evil being.

3) A God that is everywhere at once is better than a God that is limited to time and space.

4) If God is already the greatest possible being then why would he need to change if he already is the greatest.

5) A God that can be damaged and is not the source of action on everything is not as good as a God who cannot be damaged and acts on everything.

6) A God who is bound by time is not as great as a God who is not constrained by time or atemporal.

7) If God is the greatest possible being then it would be better if he always existed rather than not because this makes him unique from his creation and the it is better for the best to always be existing.

8) Everything outside of God is not as great so it seems that a being that is only dependent upon himself as the greatest possible being would be the greatest possible being.

All one has to show is that there is more reason to believe that 1-8 is greater to have rather than not in order to show that God has these properties. The way we justify that these properties are better to possess rather than not is our intuition. Intuition is basically our mental seeing. We sort of just see that 1+1=2 and we just sort of see that murdering infants for fun is in fact wrong. We cannot give arguments for these sort of things but they are reasonable to believe. This is just like it is reasonable to believe that you see a tree in front of you and that you believe rightly that a tree exists in front of you. You cannot give any argument apart from saying "look and see the tree is in front of me". Likewise, you cannot give a argument for these apart from just using your mental conception to see that one is better to have rather than not.

Conclusion:

The Divine properties 1-8 are properties had by the traditional Western concept of God and since these properties are more reasonable to believe rather than not then we are warranted in believing that a God such as this exists.

A Problem For The New Perspective

One of the major tenants of the New Perspective on Paul is that the phrase "works of law" only refer to the specific Jewish identity markers in law. As James Dunn (1) puts it:

"‘Works of law', 'works of the law' are nowhere understood here, either by his Jewish interlocutors or by Paul himself, as works which earn God's favor, as merit-amassing observances. They are rather seen as badges: they are simply what membership of the covenant people involves, what mark out the Jews as God's people;...in other words, Paul has in view precisely what Sanders calls 'covenantal nomism.' And what he denies is that God's justification depends on 'covenantal nomism,' that God's grace extends only to those who wear the badge of the covenant."

In this blog post I will give two counter examples to what Dunn argues here about the phrase "works of law", I will show that the term means more than the narrow definition of mere Jewish identity markers.



Counter Example 1:

Romans 2:14-15 14 For when Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. 15 They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse them

Explanation: Here Paul is teaching us that us that the gentiles lack the Mosaic law, which would include these Jewish identity markers like circumcision and so on. But yet Paul says that even though they do not have the Mosaic law they have another law, namely, the Law that is written on their heart, this would be the natural law. But Paul uses the Greek phrase argon tou nomou or "work of the law" to describe this natural law. Thus, this shows us that the phrase "work of the law" is not refering only to the narrow use of the Mosaic law but the general natural law instilled on all mankind.

Counter Example 2:

Romans 3:19-20 19 Now we know that whatever the law says it speaks to those who are under the law, so that every mouth may be stopped, and the whole world may be held accountable to God. 20 For by works of the law no human being will be justified in his sight, since through the law comes knowledge of sin.

Explanation: At this point Paul has shown that both Gentiles (Romans 1) and Jews (Romans 2) both stand condemned before God. Romans 3:19-20 offers a summary statement of this universal condemnation to lead us to the Gospel of Justification by faith alone. Paul begins in verse 19 to remind us that all are held accountable to God because they are under the law. This cannot be referring to just the Mosaic law alone because only the Jews are held accountable to the Mosaic law, but not the Gentiles and then, if this were true, the whole world would not be held accountable under the law. But Paul seems to be stressing that the whole world is held accountable and thus the phrase "under the law" has to be referring to the moral law of God by which everyone is subject to; both Jew and Gentile. Paul continues in verse 20 to say that no one will be justified in his sight by "works of the law". Paul has just shown that all are held accountable to God and then he goes on to argue that because of this no one will be justified in his sight because of being under the law. Paul uses the phrase "works of the law" to title this universal law by which Jews and Gentiles stand condemned. Thus, the phrase works of law have a much broader meaning than just the narrow identity badges of the Jewish people.

Conclusion:

We can see from this that the New perspective on Paul is unreasonable because it ultimately rests on unbiblical presuppositions. But I think Paul's traditional Reformed message is worth considering. Paul tells us that we are all condemned before a Holy God. But the question that we must think about is this: How are we to be made right before a Holy God that is terribly angry at the countless sins we have committed ? I think Paul answers this question clearly:

Romans 3:21-22 21 But now the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from the law, although the Law and the Prophets bear witness to it- 22 the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ for all who believe.

And again:

Romans 4:5-8 5 And to the one who does not work but trusts him who justifies the ungodly, his faith is counted as righteousness, 6 just as David also speaks of the blessing of the one to whom God counts righteousness apart from works: 7 "Blessed are those whose lawless deeds are forgiven, and whose sins are covered; 8 blessed is the man against whom the Lord will not count his sin."


Thus, the Word of God teaches us that we cannot be made right before God by works, but by Faith in Jesus Christ who imputes to us his works (Phil. 3:9).


*** For more useful material on this subject read Douglas Moo's commentary on the Book of Romans***

Bibliography

1. Cf. Jesus, Paul, and the Law: Studies in Mark and Galatians (Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press), 1990; Romans; The Epistle to the Galatians (Black's New Testament Commentary; Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers), 1993.

Does everyone believe in God?

Romans 1:18-21 says that all people believe in God:

18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth. 19 For what can be known about God is plain to them, because God has shown it to them. 20 For his invisible attributes, namely, his eternal power and divine nature, have been clearly perceived, ever since the creation of the world, in the things that have been made. So they are without excuse. 21 For although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their foolish hearts were darkened.

1) It seems that there are people who are unbelievers. 2) Paul says that all people believe in God in Romans 1. Does not 1 in conjunction with 2 seem like a contradiction? In this post I will argue that there is no contradiction here.



I think the contradiction disappears when one understands the distinction between believing *in* and believing *that*. Believing *in* would be trusting in someone, this would be a non-propositional personal relationship. On the other hand, believing *that* would be believing that a certain proposition or state of affairs is true. So for example, when I say I believe that my girlfriend is watching I love Lucy at 12:35 am on Sunday, this is a example of believing that a proposition is true. But when I say I believe in my girlfriend to be faithful to me, this is a non-propositional trusting relationship I have. Thus, the distinction is between believing that and trusting in.

Clearly Romans 1 is teaching that all people believe *that* God exists but certainly it is not teaching us that unbelievers believe *in* God and have a relationship because this is something that is only true of a believer who has faith and a personal relationship with Jesus Christ. Thus, it is clear that there is no contradiction here.

But there is another sort of problem that has been answered By Greg L. Bahnsen in his famous dissertation on the paradox of self deception. The problem is that atheists claim that they do not believe *that* God exists. In other words they reject that they believe the proposition that God exists. If they are right then this means the bible is unreasonable in what it says about unbelievers. But there is no reason for thinking this, as Bahnsen has argued they might be very well self-deceived. Here is what that possibly might look like. The unbeliever possibly believes:

P1: S believes that p is true

P2: S believes that he is not the kind of person to say that he believes that p is true.

Let us say that S would stand for subject or person; P would be the proposition that God exists. Thus, this shows us that there is no contradiction between what Romans 1 has to teach and what an atheist has to say. Because a atheist is self-deceived and from what I have shown from P1 and P2 in conjunction it seems that self-deception is certainly possible. But why would a unbeliever do this? Well perhaps it is because they hate God and the worst thing they could do to God in their mind is say that he does not exist. It is sort of like if I were to pretend that my father did not exist anymore, certainly this would be a hateful action I would perform in order to cause disrepute to my father. Likewise unbelievers do the very same thing, they hate God so they say that he does not exist. It is reasonable to think this, that unbelievers hate God because John says that they love the darkness:

John 3:19 19 And this is the judgment: the light has come into the world, and people loved the darkness rather than the light because their deeds were evil.

In light of this, it seems that Paul's teaching in Romans 1 is reasonable.

Can a Christian Struggle With Sin?

The short answer to this question is yes, a christian can and does struggle with sin. In fact, I would go so far to say that if one does not struggle with sin in this life then he or she is not a christian. The reason I say this is because the more holy one becomes the more they hate their sin and the sins they commit even if they have grown in their walk with Christ. But unbelievers do not struggle with sin because they do not care about whether or not they violate God's law. Thus, I believe, with the majority of Reformed Christians that Christians in this life always struggle with sin.

The main biblical text that justifies this position is Romans 7:14-25. In this blog post I will offer three of the strongest reasons for thinking that the person in Romans 7 is Paul, a believer, rather than a unregenerate Jew struggling with the law.

Reason 1: The person in Romans 7 relies and gives thanks to Christ and then continues to struggle.

Romans 7:25 - 8:1 25 Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then, I myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin.

A unregenerate Jew does not have this sort of relation with Christ, rather only a believer has this sort of relation with Christ, a relation that is such that one gives thanks and relies on Christ in the midst of their struggles.

Reason 2: The person in Romans 7 is speaking in the first person and in the present tense.

This makes a good case that if this person is speaking in the first person and in the present tense that this is in fact Paul and that this is his normative experience as a believer.

Reason 3: The person in Romans 7 delights in the law of God and wants to do the good.

These two characteristics are not true of unbelievers but only believers.

For John writes of unbelievers:

John 3:19 19 And this is the judgment: the light has come into the world, and people loved the darkness rather than the light because their deeds were evil.


But Paul writes of the person in Romans 7:

Romans 7:15-18 15 I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. 16 Now if I do what I do not want, I agree with the law, that it is good. 17 So now it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells within me. 18 For I know that nothing good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh. For I have the desire to do what is right, but not the ability to carry it out.


And again Paul Writes in Romans 7:

Romans 7:22 22 For I delight in the law of God, in my inner being,

It is pleasing to God that we love and delight in his law, but unbelievers cannot please God as Paul writes in the very next chapter:

Romans 8:7-8 7 For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God, for it does not submit to God's law; indeed, it cannot. 8 Those who are in the flesh cannot please God.

Thus, given these reasons it seems that it is most reasonable to think that Paul is speaking of himself in Romans 7 and thereby showing that this is the regular life of the Christian.