Tuesday, January 13, 2009

An Argument for Eternal Punishment from Anselmian Perfect Being Philosophy

In this age people have found the doctrine of eternal damnation offensive to say the least. They use many philosophical arguments from God being perfectly loving or from God being unjust for punishing finite sins for an infinite duration. I believe that the doctrine of eternal punishment is biblical (Matt. 25:41-46; Rev. 20:10-15), but in this post I plan to explore an argument from God being the greatest possible being to the existence of a place of eternal punishment to settle the philosophical score as so to speak.

The argument would run as follows:

1: Hell is the greatest possible punishment
2: God is the greatest possible being (let us label this definition of God as G*)
3: G* will have every property that is better to have rather than not
4: It is better to have the greatest possible value rather than not
5: G* instantiates greatest value necessarily
6: It is better to have greatest possible justice rather than not
7: G* instantiates greatest possible justice necessarily
8: Any sin against G* who has the greatest amount of value is the greatest possible evil (from 5)
9: Agents committing the greatest possible evil deserve the greatest possible punishment
10: G* necessarily punishes agents that commit the greatest possible evil with the greatest possible punishment (from 6)
C: Hence, hell exists

Premise one seems reasonable because most Christians have argued that the duration and quality of hell makes it the greatest possible punishment. Premise two is just something obvious about God, that he is the greatest possible being either you see that or you do not. Premises 8, 9, and 10 are the really contentious premises so I will argue for them.

Premises 8, 9 and 10:

If I do not treat God as the greatest possible being then I am not treating him for what he is worth (the greatest possible worth that is). Any sin I commit I am not treating God as being with the greatest worth rather I am treating something which is created and not as good as if it were greater than God. This seems obvious wrong and such blasphemy deserves the greatest measure of punishment if a being were to maintain his justice. I am treating something that is of highest greatness as if it were not the highest greatness (or put different: I am sinning against the greatest possible being). Thus, when one sins he is being maximally unjust toward God since he is treating the evil desires as something of more importance than the greatest possible good. This is so unequal and such an unjust choice that it deserves greatest punishment. After all what could be a greater sin than sinning against the greatest possible being? Because God is just to the greatest possible degree then he ought to serve justice and in this case justice would require the greatest possible punishment. We sin against the greatest possible being and thus such a sin deserves and requires the greatest possible punishment and this punishment Christians call Hell.

The Nature of Hell:

Since our sin is that of infinite evil qualitatively (since God has the greatest possible value) I would think that God cannot punish us with a qualitative infinite amount of wrath since we are qualitatively finite so instead God extends the duration forever and makes the punishment the greatest possible given our finite creaturehood (and this would be the greatest possible justice that God could instantiate given the metaphysical conditions of this possible world).

This is an obvious truth of General revelation, as Paul Writes:

Romans 1:18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth.

God has revealed his great wrath towards sinners through general revelation. The only way one can be saved from this wrath is to grab onto Christ’s perfect righteousness through faith alone in the God-man Jesus Christ.

4 comments:

  1. First, I'm not really sure how (8) follows from (as you say) (5). Why does it follow that any (read: any _particular_) sin against G* is "the greatest possible evil." Could not one commit a sin x against G*, and then commit y--a crime worse than x--against G*? I fail to see why not. Nothing about G*--including the fact that it allegedly instantiates greatest worth necessarily--jumps out at me as providing any even prima facie justification for the claim that any act against this being is the greatest possible evil. So (8) doesn't appear to follow.

    Furthermore, (9) makes a lot of questionable assumptions, or at least, assumptions that I would question. Why assume that agents deserve anything? Why assume free will or moral responsibility, much less both? We can ask less controversial, but nevertheless vexing questions as well: Why assume a retributive view (desert-based) view of punishment? These presuppositions will have to be defended at some point, I would think.

    Lastly, this argument makes the mistake of assuming God's existence, as I pointed out with respect to an ontological argument you proffered. Nowhere in this argument did I see any defense of the claim that God exists at all.

    You have to choose: On the one hand, you can say that "God is defined as having so-and-so properties" then make move to actual prove that God exists and make more than a point about definitions. On the other hand, you can leave it at the definitions and have an argument that gives us the hypothetical conclusion: "If God (of a particular kind) exists, then _______."

    I'm not sure if it was your intent to prove the existence of hell apart from the existence of God or not. But if so, then this argument is also wholly unsuccessful in that respect.

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  2. First, I'm not really sure how (8) follows from (as you say) (5). Why does it follow that any (read: any _particular_) sin against G* is "the greatest possible evil." Could not one commit a sin x against G*, and then commit y--a crime worse than x--against G*? I fail to see why not. Nothing about G*--including the fact that it allegedly instantiates greatest worth necessarily--jumps out at me as providing any even prima facie justification for the claim that any act against this being is the greatest possible evil. So (8) doesn't appear to follow.

    Response: Thanks for your taking your time and reading my blog posts. If something has the greatest possible worth and I do not treat it as such and I have a moral obligation to do so then I am not treating God with a right measure of justice and am in a sense dishonoring God (who ought not ever be dishonored because of having the greatest possible worth). My sin is against the greatest possible being and I am treating him as if he were not. My sin is thus against the greatest possible being and justice being equal demands that he gives us the greatest possible punishment. And with regards to sinning more than once perhaps one can view this sort of like infinite sets that are smaller and greater, if one sins more than once then one would have a greater infinite set of the punishment. God having the greatest possible worth/value and justice would suggests that sinning against the greatest possible being would deserve the greatest possible punishment and since God has the greatest degree of justice then he would bring about such a punishment. Obviously the worth or value would be infinitively qualitative but since God cannot metaphysically give a infinite qualitative amount of punishment to finite creatures he would bring about never ending duration of punishment to us (that is the greatest possible amount). But if you do not see that it follows then I do not know what to tell you. Just like how I would not know what to tell someone who thinks that 1 + 1 = 3,098, it is sort of a conversation stopper if you will. A large amount of these arguments depend on intuition, which is the same way we justify mathematical and moral propositions.

    Furthermore, (9) makes a lot of questionable assumptions, or at least, assumptions that I would question. Why assume that agents deserve anything? Why assume free will or moral responsibility, much less both? We can ask less controversial, but nevertheless vexing questions as well: Why assume a retributive view (desert-based) view of punishment? These presuppositions will have to be defended at some point, I would think.

    Response: I would say that moral responsibility is just intuitively obvious. I mean anyone could say you need to justify the existence of the external word or perhaps that we have been existing longer than 5 minutes and that all of our memories have just been implanted by robot aliens....but these things cannot be given a internal justification, which is why we either have to base these on intuition or some form of externalistic basic beliefs.

    Lastly, this argument makes the mistake of assuming God's existence, as I pointed out with respect to an ontological argument you proffered. Nowhere in this argument did I see any defense of the claim that God exists at all.

    Response: Yes, I offer a argument for his existence on your blog notes and on this site on the classical ontological argument, but here is a argument that I have used on you before:

    1: God is the greatest possible being
    2: It is better to exist necessarily rather than not
    3: Being the greatest possible being entails possessing every property that it is better to have rather than not
    4: God is necessarily
    C: Hence, God exists and exists necessarily

    You have to choose: On the one hand, you can say that "God is defined as having so-and-so properties" then make move to actual prove that God exists and make more than a point about definitions. On the other hand, you can leave it at the definitions and have an argument that gives us the hypothetical conclusion: "If God (of a particular kind) exists, then _______."

    Response: Yeah, my argument is open to either interpretation depending if the reader has the background data of the other theistic arguments.

    I'm not sure if it was your intent to prove the existence of hell apart from the existence of God or not. But if so, then this argument is also wholly unsuccessful in that respect.

    Response: Thanks for your comments on this. I would have to disagree, I still think that the argument is valid and sound.

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  3. I think it goes without saying you must be a Christian to believe #2, just as you pointed out ,to accept the conclusion. Therefore, if you are atheist you need not respond because #2 is not a correct assumption.

    That said:
    The definition of justice includes the following:
    –noun 1. the quality of being just; righteousness, equitableness, or moral rightness: to uphold the justice of a cause.
    2. rightfulness or lawfulness, as of a claim or title; justness of ground or reason: to complain with justice.
    3. the moral principle determining just conduct.
    4. conformity to this principle, as manifested in conduct; just conduct, dealing, or treatment.
    5. the administering of deserved punishment or reward.

    With regard to definition 3, is it truly moral to say that enacting the greatest possible punishment is among the greatest possible values? Having the ability to infinitely punish sinners does not necessarily mean that acting on said power is just. It seems to me that the notion of inflicting a physical punishment on someone is distinctly human, as it involves a physical presence and is a means of getting even.

    As Gandhi said ‘An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind.’ Yet the sinner deceased has no ability to in turn get even with God and is therefore helpless in his punishment. At the time of punishment then, God would be torturing a helpless person who has no ability to redeem himself in the future. The concept of Hell seems both cruel and revengeful (is God really in the business of enacting revenge?).

    Key to your 10th claim and therefore conclusion is that Hell is the greatest possible punishment. The conclusion however is dependent on #6 which states that the greatest possible punishment must also be just.

    The notion of Hell suggests that God has an ego problem, choosing to damn people to eternal torture, for their transgressions against him, instead of focusing on those who have lived a virtuous life. It would seem to me that the greatest justice would be non-existence for sinners and eternal salvation for the rest of us. That repositions the concept of justice as a moral reward for people who follow God’s will.

    In that sense, Hell is a human invention based on our innate insecurities and need to *see* people who do us harm punished. It is not enough for us to focus on divine reward; instead, we focus on eternal damnation and punishment for sinners.

    For me, there’s really nothing scarier than the concept of non-existence. It makes this life feel empty and meaningless. And I believe an omnipotent being would be more inclined to let those who sin against him to cease to exist entirely than to be tortured by wrathful vengeance for eternity.

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  4. think it goes without saying you must be a Christian to believe #2, just as you pointed out ,to accept the conclusion. Therefore, if you are atheist you need not respond because #2 is not a correct assumption.

    Response: All one would need grant is that God exists as the greatest possible being is all you would need to grant, at this point in the argument all one would need to be is a theist that thinks that God is a being that than which nothing greater can be thought or as I like to put it the greatest possible being. So you could not be a christian and accept this argument.

    That said:
    The definition of justice includes the following:
    –noun 1. the quality of being just; righteousness, equitableness, or moral rightness: to uphold the justice of a cause.
    2. rightfulness or lawfulness, as of a claim or title; justness of ground or reason: to complain with justice.
    3. the moral principle determining just conduct.
    4. conformity to this principle, as manifested in conduct; just conduct, dealing, or treatment.
    5. the administering of deserved punishment or reward.

    With regard to definition 3, is it truly moral to say that enacting the greatest possible punishment is among the greatest possible values?

    Response: Well if someone commits evil that is of the greatest possible amount it ought to be given justice equal to that. So that seems pretty reasonable to me.

    Having the ability to infinitely punish sinners does not necessarily mean that acting on said power is just. It seems to me that the notion of inflicting a physical punishment on someone is distinctly human, as it involves a physical presence and is a means of getting even.

    Response: My argument is not that having the power makes it just but rather being just entails punishing evil doers and rewarding those who are righteous. It is getting even or making something equally right, but it is hard to see what the problem with that would be if one is a perfect judge.

    As Gandhi said ‘An eye for an eye makes the whole world blind.’ Yet the sinner deceased has no ability to in turn get even with God and is therefore helpless in his punishment.

    Response: I do not think man has a right to be vengeful and get someone back because we are all sinful and thus we have to no right to be the judge in this life. Once we sin we are not in a position to ever pay back God since it happened in the past, but people cannot change the past. At the time we committed evil we were not helpless, but we are just helpless to change the evil we did.

    At the time of punishment then, God would be torturing a helpless person who has no ability to redeem himself in the future. The concept of Hell seems both cruel and revengeful (is God really in the business of enacting revenge?).

    Response: Yes he is because he is just, if he did not he would not be just and then he would not be the greatest possible being. But luckily he has given us a way out by apprehending Christ's righteousness by faith alone and some people accept that gift and others do not.

    Key to your 10th claim and therefore conclusion is that Hell is the greatest possible punishment. The conclusion however is dependent on #6 which states that the greatest possible punishment must also be just.

    Response: I agree with that, but that seems pretty reasonable considering that punishing evil and rewarding righteousness is what justice entails.

    The notion of Hell suggests that God has an ego problem, choosing to damn people to eternal torture, for their transgressions against him, instead of focusing on those who have lived a virtuous life.

    Response: Well no one lives a virtuous life because we have all sinned, no one is perfect. It seems to me you want to redefine the idea of virtuous in a way that is not as difficult, but I do not think we should redefine things just to make us feel better about ourselves, we ought to be honest and truthful about our state of existence. Why is being just suggest that one has a ego problem? It just a matter of doing the right thing.

    It would seem to me that the greatest justice would be non-existence for sinners and eternal salvation for the rest of us. That repositions the concept of justice as a moral reward for people who follow God’s will.

    Response: That is interesting idea...some christian theologians hold that perspective but I would respectfully disagree. But we have all sinned so it still seems to me that we would all be destroyed in your view. I would say that we have committed a sin of infinite weight and justice requires we are punished as such and I do not think that annihilation covers that sort of punishment.

    In that sense, Hell is a human invention based on our innate insecurities and need to *see* people who do us harm punished. It is not enough for us to focus on divine reward; instead, we focus on eternal damnation and punishment for sinners.

    Response: Perhaps it might be, but I would have to accept your sociological and psychological story is the cause for our belief in hell and I do not. I could say your belief is caused by your influences in modern liberal culture that deals with real evil with excuses and acceptance. But giving these types of causal explanations are not going to be helpful to the discussion so we should deals with reasons for belief rather than causes of beliefs.

    For me, there’s really nothing scarier than the concept of non-existence. It makes this life feel empty and meaningless. And I believe an omnipotent being would be more inclined to let those who sin against him to cease to exist entirely than to be tortured by wrathful vengeance for eternity.

    Response: Well thank you for your thoughts Kyle. I really appreciate your input. Although I would have disagree with what you have said in this section on the basis of the reasons I have given above. I hope I have not offended you.

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