Introduction (This was a paper written for a Reformed Scholasticism class at Westminster Seminary California)
In recent times middle knowledge has been gaining popularity among evangelical theologians and philosophers . As a result many people believe that this view has given a definitive answer to the problem of reconciling human freedom with divine sovereignty. However, this view did not come out of nowhere; rather it came from a Catholic Jesuit named Luis Molina . Furthermore, Reformed theologians like Francis Turretin objected to this solution of the problem of reconciling free will with divine sovereignty. In this essay we will explore Francis Turretin’s response to divine middle knowledge.
A Survey of the Secondary Literature
There is not much secondary literature on how Turretin responded to middle knowledge, but there are two sources that comment on this subject that ought to be mentioned. The first is Richard Muller’s Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics volume three which has a brief discussion of how Turretin responded to middle knowledge . Muller puts forth what Turretin understood to be middle knowledge as “foreknowledge of future conditionals or conditional future contingencies arising from the free choices of creatures prior to the divine willing .” What Muller means by this is that Turretin believed that middle knowledge is divine knowledge of hypothetical circumstance of how a creature would freely determine itself. Moreover, Muller cited Turretin to support the claim that the Reformed denied middle knowledge . The second source is Paul Timothy Jensen’s work on Calvin and Turretin: A comparison of their Soteriologies in which he gives a lengthy discussion on the six reasons why Turretin rejected middle knowledge . According to Jensen the first reason why Turretin rejected middle knowledge is that God only knows actual and possible things and since middle knowledge is neither then we shouldn’t see them as knowable things . The second reason is that God cannot have knowledge of things that are true that are not true and this is what the object of middle knowledge is by its very nature . The third reason is that since God caused us to exist then we would also need him to cause our actions and this is contrary to the teaching of middle knowledge . The fourth reason is that no uncertain knowledge ought to be given to God and since one cannot know hypothetical circumstances of creaturely freedom through past causes and through the nature of the thing then God cannot know it . The fifth reason is that this destroys divine providence because there are some events beyond the control of the divine will and it makes God dependent on creatures . The sixth reason is that middle knowledge destroys the biblical doctrine of predestination which is based solely on the purposes of God (Rom. 9:11) and not of man’s libertarian free choices . There is not a lot a literature on how Turretin responded to middle knowledge, but Muller and Jensen do provide a helpful analysis of this issue that may not be sufficient, but is at least helpful for the purposes of this paper.
The Thesis
The purpose of this paper is to show that Turretin rejected middle knowledge primarily because God could not know the hypothetical circumstances of creaturely freedom prior to God’s decree to be true and it is inconsistent with God’s sovereignty. I will demonstrate this thesis by first defining what Turretin understood to be middle knowledge. In addition, I will then demonstrate that Turretin rejected middle knowledge. I will discuss the two main reasons why Turretin rejected middle knowledge. Furthermore, I will interact with the secondary literature and then defend my thesis from any possible objections. Finally, I will restate my reasons for believing my thesis and I will conclude with restating my thesis.
Explanation of the Thesis
How Turretin defined Middle Knowledge
Turretin began his discussion on divine middle knowledge by the other two types of knowledge that God can have and then he went on to show what middle knowledge is in light of the other two distinctions in the knowledge of God. The two distinctions in God’s knowledge that Turretin makes is the natural knowledge of God and the free knowledge of God . The natural knowledge has to do with the things that are possible (indefinite) or that which God could have decreed . The free knowledge of God is knowledge of things which God has actually (definite) decreed and that of future events in the decree of God . On the other hand, Middle knowledge is different from both in that it deals with hypothetical foreknowledge of how a creature would “determine itself” in a given circumstance apart from the causal decree of God . This hypothetical circumstance of creaturely freedom does not find its truth in the decree of God, but rather in how the creatures determine themselves. Thus, these hypothetical circumstances of creaturely freedom exist prior and independent from the decree of God . The nature of this creaturely freedom is that this contingent hypothetical circumstance “can be and not be”, that is to say there is alternative possibilities with regards to a given creatures choice . This is how Turretin understood what the proponents of middle knowledge said about their position.
Turretins Rejection of Middle Knowledge
Turretin rejected middle knowledge in opposition to the Jesuits, Socinians and the Remonstrants . As Turretin states “Rather the question is whether they belong to a kind of middle knowledge distinct from the natural and the free. The latter we deny .” In this quote Turretin contrasted “future contingencies” with middle knowledge and when he said the “latter we deny” he is referring to middle knowledge. Thus, Turretin rejected middle knowledge and we will now explore the main reasons he had for rejecting it.
The Reasons Why Turretin Rejected Middle Knowledge
One of Turretin’s major reasons for why he rejected middle knowledge is that God could not know the hypothetical circumstances of creaturely freedom to be true. One reason he thought why God could not know hypothetical circumstances of creaturely freedom to be true (or “conditional future things” in Turretins language) is that they could not be known to be true apart from the determination of the divine will . He supported this argument when he stated that our wills cannot act without the determination of the divine will, otherwise our wills would be indifferent and unable act . If we cannot act then it seems that God cannot know the truth value of our actions apart from the decree of God . Another major reason that Turretin had that concerned God’s inability to have middle knowledge is that no uncertain knowledge ought to be given to God and the object of middle knowledge is by its very nature uncertain and indifferent . As Turretin said “No uncertain knowledge should be ascribed to God. The middle knowledge can have no certainty because it is occupied about an uncertain and contingent object (viz., the indifference of the will) .” The basic argument that Turretin gave here and that he expanded upon in the rest of the paragraph is that God cannot know what the creature will choose because he cannot look to it’s nature (since it act’s causally indifferently to it’s nature) and he cannot look to his decree since this free action is causally indifferent to it . Turretin argued that if God were to have middle knowledge it would cease to be knowledge of the hypothetical circumstances of creaturely freedom since God would know it certainly and knowing it certainly is not compatible with the causal indifference of the will . As Turretin said “Again knowledge either makes the event certain or foresees it as certain. If it makes it so, how can it foreknow it as such; where then is the indifference of the will ?” Turretin’s quote is intended to put the proponent of middle knowledge in a dilemma because God knowing it would only be compatible with God’s knowledge causing it or something else causing it, but this would no longer make the will causally indifferent . On the other hand, if the will is (not caused by God or something else) causally indifferent then God cannot know it and then there can be no middle knowledge . Thus, for Turretin uncertainty in God’s knowledge is a reason why we ought to reject middle knowledge.
A second main reason why Turretin rejected middle knowledge is that it is inconsistent with God’s sovereignty. The reason why Turretin thought this is because in middle knowledge the acts of the will are logically prior to the divine decree and the acts of the will are not based on God and his decree, but in the creature’s self-determination . Turretin argued that this is clearly false since it makes the creator dependent on his creature to have a free act of the will while God does nothing . Turretin then argued that middle knowledge is inconsistent with the biblical teaching on God’s sovereignty in salvation . Turretin argued that if middle knowledge were true then God could have a good reason for loving Jacob and hating Esau apart from his purpose and pleasures . This good reason, according to Turretin, would be the foreseen hypothetical faith of Jacob and not Esau, but Romans 9:11 gave no other reason for their election and reprobation other than the purpose of God . Turretin viewed middle knowledge for this reason to be unbiblical . Thus, one of the main reasons why Turretin rejected middle knowledge is because it was theologically inconsistent with God’s sovereignty.
Defense of the Thesis
Interaction with the Secondary Literature
What I have been arguing in this paper is in full agreement with the secondary literature, although there may seem to be some difference in what I have emphasized in this thesis and what Jensen has emphasized in his work. Jensen in his work argues that Turretin gave six reasons for rejection middle knowledge . I don’t disagree with this, since Turretin did separate and number each argument . However, my thesis is that Turretin’s two main reasons for rejecting middle knowledge was that God cannot know the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom to be true and that it is inconsistent with God’s sovereignty. The evidence for God not knowing the counterfactuals of creaturely freedom as being one of his main reasons for rejecting middle knowledge is that in sections two and four there are arguments for God not knowing creaturely counterfactual on the middle knowledge thesis . These are different arguments, but both of the conclusions of these arguments are the same. The evidence for middle knowledge being inconsistent with God’s sovereignty is that in sections five and six there are arguments for God not being sovereign if middle knowledge were true . Both of these arguments are different since one is philosophical and the other is biblical, but they both lead to the conclusion that God’s sovereignty cannot be maintained on middle knowledge. In light of these considerations, the thesis that I have defended is compatible with what the secondary literature says about Turretin’s rejection of middle knowledge.
A Possible Criticism of the Thesis
One possible criticism of the thesis is that it might be seen as misguided because Turretin gave six reasons for why he rejected middle knowledge and not two primary reasons.
A Response to the Criticism
The thesis is not misguided because it is important to summarize the central points of Turretin’s criticism against middle knowledge. The reason why it is important to summarize main points of an important theologian is so that others can understand what the author generally thought about a topic without having to read him word for word in complex and outdated theological/philosophical jargon. This is what I intended this thesis for; I wanted to concentrate on the central points of Turretin’s arguments against middle knowledge without getting bogged down on two small obstructer sections of his response.
Conclusion
The research from how Turretin responded to middle knowledge confirms my thesis. The reason why it confirms it is because Turretin rejects middle knowledge at the beginning of his response to it. Turretin then rejects middle knowledge for two central reasons. The first is that God cannot know the hypothetical circumstances of creaturely freedom to be true. The second is that middle knowledge is inconsistent with God’s sovereignty. These two reasons are central because most of Turretin’s arguments end with the conclusion that God can’t know the hypothetical circumstances of creaturely freedom to be true and that it is inconsistent with God’s sovereignty. Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that Turretin rejected middle knowledge primarily because God could not know the hypothetical circumstances of creaturely freedom prior to God’s decree to be true and it is inconsistent with God’s sovereignty.
Bibliography
Craig, William Lane. The Only Wise God. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1987.
Jensen, Paul Timothy. Calvin and Turretin: A Comparison of their Soteriologies. Michigan UMI Dissertation Information Service, 1988.
Muller, Richard A. Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics Volume three. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003.
Turretin, Francis. Institutes of Elenctic Theology Volume 1. New Jersey: P&R Publishing, 1992.
Wow, I've always wanted to read Turretin on this, but if your summary is accurate, I'm not sure that it's a must read anymore.
ReplyDeleteHis arguments, as you state them, are basically:
1) Libertarian freedom entails a certain "indifference" of the will in which our wills would be unable to act.
2) If we cannot act then God cannot foresee any such action because then God would have "uncertain knowledge". He cannot look at the nature of the agent to know what he will do and he cannot look at his own decree.
3) It undermines God's sovereignty since the actions are "logically prior" to God's decree and so God is dependent on the actions of his creatures.
4) A Biblical argument of Romans 9.
Responses:
1) To the degree that his argument depends on this limited philosophical argument against Libertarianism, to that extent his thesis will fail. One can merely argue an agent-causation view of the will, or some different version and his argument will easily not appply. If the human is saddled with the problem of "indecision" because of this type of will, then how is it that God can act? I don't know if he offered arguments to support this, but if that was his only attack of Libertarianism, it's a pretty limited one.
2)It's not the case that God would have "uncertain knowledge". Turretin seems to assume that God would have to look at the nature of an agent, but why can't he just look at the actions the agent produces? Because he assumes that the agent can't act, but like I said, if his first argument fails, everything that depends on it goes down with it. And why is it that he can't look on his own decree? His decree is to actualize a certain world, and in such "decreeing", the future actions of agents would be "absorbed". So yes, he could look at his own decree. And even if he couldn't, it would matter very little since Turretin seems to want to base all of God's possible knowledge on what he does, which is patently false.
3) God is dependent on his creatures? I really hope that he went deeper than this because this is probably the weakest argument. Besides his begging the question on sovereignty, he seems to not even want to entertain the idea of how free agents would fit into this scheme. An analogous situation is that of Bill Craig's idea of "God in time". Oh - but that undermines his eternality! No, that would be such a superficial analysis of the argument, Craig (regardless of whether he is right) is arguing that God, of his own free will, decided to condescend to that level. "God's becoming incarnate limits his sovereignty", "the free actions of creatures limits his sovereignty" - these are all pretty much the same. If God so desires to condescend, he is placing limits on himself and is by definition not undermining his own sovereignty. And what do we know of the limits of his condescension? So apart from biblical arguments, this argument fails.
4)One can easily cite a counterexample of when God tells David that if he had gone to a certain town, he would be captured (or whatever). God knows this. How? There is no such state of affairs that actually obtained and God did not decree this possibility (that wouldn't even make sense). So this, coupled with Turretin's previous arguments, entails that God has "uncertain" knowledge since he cannot look at the nature of the agent to determine this possible world, and he cannot look at his own decree. So God is just spewing gobbledygook in this case.
Hello Samuel,
ReplyDeleteIt sure is nice to hear from you again. I hope all is going well with you and your wife.
I agree with your points 1-2 but I disagree about point 3-4.
As you have pointed out 1 is built on a misunderstanding of libertarianism which is obviously true. 2 is a bad argument because it presupposes that the only way for God to have foreknowledge or middle knowledge is in a perceptualist sense but of course most molinist would hold to a more intuitionist understanding of how God know the future free actions of men. This paper I wrote is descriptive and prescriptive and evaluative, so I do not entirely agree with everything that Turretin believed.
I think 3 is one of his strongest arguments. Far from begging the question I think this assumption on sovereignty has behind it one of the strongest intuitions about God, namely the conception of God as the greatest possible being. If God is the greatest possible being then it seems counter intuitive to say that the greatest possible being is dependent upon the lesser actual or possible created beings for his knowledge. In libertarianism and middle knowledge you have the idea that God's knowledge is dependent on what you would or would not do in a given circumstance making God's knowledge dependent on a creature. Thus, I have come to the conclusion that because God is the greatest possible being this entails that libertarian free will is impossible with respect to creatures (assuming that Anselmian perfect being theology entails that God is a necessary being which is pretty obvious). I do not see how God coming into time undermines his eternality but it does undermine his atemporality which is why I hold to God being outside of time and I hold to a B theory of time, but I do not see how this bad critique of bill craigs view of time is analogous to what I have said above. So you might have to flush out as to how that bad argument is the same. How would being incarnate undermine his sovereignty? I would say the incarnation is entailed by God having the greatest possible justice in conjunction with mercy and grace. But I do not see the parallels here at all or how any of this is inconsistent with thoroughgoing Anselmianism as I hold. The limits of God's condescension is if it compromises himself as the greatest possible being (which it is impossible for God to do this).
And as for 4: I am not really sure if this refutes 4 if one rejects Turretin claims 1-2. What God is saying in these passages is that would causally decree some different consequent if the causally decreed antecedent were to obtain. In short, I view counter factual statements in the Bible of how God would have sufficiently caused something to occur if the antecedent (which was sufficiently caused by God) were different. The Bible clearly teaches causal determinism and it especially teaches such determinism in salvation.
For more on this check out these previous posts:
http://reasonfromscripture.blogspot.com/2009/02/arguments-for-irresistible-or-causally.html
http://reasonfromscripture.blogspot.com/2009/02/biblical-arguments-for-divine-causal.html
Thanks for your time and for the interesting discussion.
God Bless,
NPT
Correction***
ReplyDeleteThis paper I wrote is descriptive and ***NOT*** prescriptive and evaluative
Hey Nate, thanks for replying, hope you're doing well and you're thoroughly enjoying Westminster. I see that it was descriptive, thanks for making that clear.
ReplyDeleteYou are basically arguing from an Anselmian type of God, as you say, to a certain view of how God would act. But I think this is the problem exactly: assuming that you're Anselmian intuition is right, the farthest it can get you is what type of being God is. It'll get you to "God is sovereign" but not how that really fleshes out. God can be sovereign in a lot of ways and it is prerogative to choose. If God did not decree my action to scratch my nose he does not suddenly become un-sovereign. So what I'm saying is that a world in which he influences but does not causally determine everything is compatible with his sovereignty. I think the burden of proof lies with the person who so wants to limit his ability here to God must necessarily determine everything. To me that's just a narrow definition.
My other illustrations were examples of this point. Muslims despise the idea of the incarnation because of their conception of God as overly transcendent. And they do not wish to entertain the idea of God's entering into our realm. But I would say that God's entering into our realm would not somehow detract from God's transcendence or power or whatever. I think the burden of proof is on the person who wants to offer such a narrow definition of transcendence such as God must necessarily never enter this realm to maintain his transcendence.
Your comments on the David passage do not seem sensitive to taking the text as it stands. It is very naturally read as David asking a question about what would have happened and God saying, "yes, if you had chosen this, this other thing would have happened". If anything, it is naturally libertarian but it definitely cannot be read naturally in a Calvinist sense as it stands. I'm okay with holding biblical theology in tension with systematics, because there are such different emphases and points of view. As it stands, I think romans 9 may teach some sort of determinism but the David passage just can't be construed that way and is an appropriate counterexample (it's not mean to be a refutation, just a counterexample).
Thanks for replying,
-Sam
Hey Samuel,
ReplyDeleteWell responding is really my pleasure, I really enjoy these sorts of discussions.
Why think that those holding to Anselmian perfect being philosophy have no way to flush out God clearly on some matters and others have some vagueness? It seems to me that I can have a sufficiently clear understanding of the greatest possible being such that it rules out all libertarian actions for creatures. Previously I discussed why I would think this because God's knowledge would be dependent on our free choice to choose x or y. So when you say things like if God allowed for 1 libertarian free action then this would not diminish his sovereignty, this simply begs the question on the argument I gave previously. It would be a lot like saying: if God caused meaningless and purposeless evil then this would not make him any less holy and just. Well I have given an argument for this position so I do not see why you asserted the burden of proof was on me when I gave reason for thinking my position is true. The reason was a bit something like this:
God is the greatest possible being.
This entails that he have property that is better to have rather than lack. It is better that the greatest possible being only be dependent on himself as the greatest possible being and not on lesser beings (so long as this does not conflict with other divine great-making properties). But if creatures have libertarian freedom then God is dependent on what they will choose with respect to his knowledge. Creatures are less beings than God so the greatest possible being is dependent on the lesser possible or actual beings. Certainly none of this is true if God is the greatest possible being for God as the greatest possible beings will not be dependent on lesser actual or possible beings.
The point about Islam is understood but I have stressed that God can in limit his sovereignty if it conflicts with any other divine great making property. I simply do not see what divine great making properties this would conflict with so the burden of proof would be on you to demonstrate that we have good reason to limit it. The problem with Islam is that they compromise the mercy, justice, and grace of God in order to make transcendence the most maximal properties and this is why they do not believe in the incarnation.
The passage with David is not addressing determinism or free will. So the passage is entirely neutral to the entire question. The reason why I read it the way I do is because of passages like this:
Ephesians 1:11 11 In him we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will,
So here it says that God works all things by the his will. I interpret every event in history this way, but that does not mean that every event in history is going to be addressing philosophical questions about libertarianism or semi-compatiblism. The same is true of the Biblical text. This text does not prove libertarianism anymore than it proves semi-compatiblism. Why think that it teaches one over the other and why think one is more natural than the other?
God Bless,
NPT
Nate,
ReplyDeleteOkay, let me rephrase what I'm saying because you seem to misunderstand my method a little and so of course you think that I'm begging the question.
You talk about an Anselmian perfect being. I say "fine" but then I want to ask why you think this perfect being is less perfect if his knowledge is dependent on future actions of free creatures. Maybe I should think of myself as some miniature deity with the power to give life to very small toys.
In one scenario, I have the power (and use it) to determine everything they will ever do so this entails that I know everything that will happen based on my will. In another scenario, I give them a power of free will in which they can act freely in the absence of my decree and, obviously, my knowledge now is a sort of “seeing” of the states of affairs in which they act. The assumption here for both of us has been that Libertarian free will is at least possible, though not in the determinist scenario. My contention is that if it is at least possible, then no reason has been given for supposing that one scenario reflects my "perfection" more faithfully than the other. And to the degree that we take into account moral intuitions, we have at least a prima facie case against any such "free" will in the first scenario. So far from begging the question, this is simply investigating the reasons why one could possibly think the former scenario to be "perfect" and the other not.
The reason you gave was still not specific enough in terms of your definition of “dependent.” You said “It is better that the greatest possible being only be dependent on himself as the greatest possible being and not on lesser beings...” But I would submit that you have assumed that your sense of “dependent” here is equivalent to the sense “dependence” has in terms of knowledge. One can be dependent on another in many ways, like for nutrition or protection or permission to do certain things. But none of those are anything like a dependence relation merely involving knowledge. So this argument equivocates and does not set up an adequate foundation. Add to that our moral intuitions of free will and I would say we must at least assume from the outset that we have free will and hold it as our default position until proven otherwise. You would be free to use Scripture at this point, but that is only at the cost of chucking the Anselmian argument.
When you say “if God caused meaningless and purposeless evil then this would not make any less holy and just” I can simply appeal to the moral intuition I just mentioned and say, “yes, that may make him less perfect, but the question would then be if he does indeed allow such evil.” Similarly, you say that God can limit himself insofar as he does not contradict his other “great making properties” which I will readily grant – it is merely to say that there is no contradiction in God’s nature. For this to work against my position, however, you have to show that there is a contradiction here and this, I have already explained, is not yet persuasive to me.
You are right in saying that the passage about David does not directly address the question of determinism, compatibilism, or free will but that hardly settles the case as if we can now move on without a backwards glance. It’s an exegetical question of what has been assumed by the author’s portrayal of that event. And to twist and turn the words in every which way to make it fit into some Calvinist scheme simply will not do. I believe most people will simply find it self-evident (prior to and even simultaneously with systematic theology) that a certain kind of counterfactual freedom is strongly implied.
continued in next post
And that is exactly why I must strongly object to your use of Ephesians when we are talking about David in 1 Samuel. As Biblical Theologians we attempt to come to the Old Testament without our New Testament glasses. To not do so is simply to force the Old Testament into foreign patterns of our choosing. Cherry-picking NT passages is simply not relevant to the OT text in this exegetical context of trying to hear the original author’s purpose. Citing an NT passage at this juncture is as useful as reading the English NT when you’re trying to get the sense of the original Greek.
ReplyDeleteYou ask why not think the David example teaches semi-compatibilism and not libertarianism, to which I would respond that to do so would be to do a gross injustice to the original intention of the author. It’s a fact that semi-compatibilism is a recent invention and that libertarianism isn’t. Fatalism also has an ancient pedigree as do certain (vague) forms of compatibilism. But the one that makes most sense in 1 Samuel is Libertarianism, and I’m okay in holding that in tension with other verses. The key thing is getting at the original intent, and in the case of David, it is clear that we have a real example of counterfactual freedom.
Have a good one,
-Sam
Hello Samuel,
ReplyDeleteYou talk about an Anselmian perfect being. I say "fine" but then I want to ask why you think this perfect being is less perfect if his knowledge is dependent on future actions of free creatures. Maybe I should think of myself as some miniature deity with the power to give life to very small toys.
Response: I already gave a reason for thinking this, namely it would go against God’s great making property of independence (aseity) in any sense that is logically possible.
In one scenario, I have the power (and use it) to determine everything they will ever do so this entails that I know everything that will happen based on my will. In another scenario, I give them a power of free will in which they can act freely in the absence of my decree and, obviously, my knowledge now is a sort of “seeing” of the states of affairs in which they act. The assumption here for both of us has been that Libertarian free will is at least possible, though not in the determinist scenario. My contention is that if it is at least possible, then no reason has been given for supposing that one scenario reflects my "perfection" more faithfully than the other. And to the degree that we take into account moral intuitions, we have at least a prima facie case against any such "free" will in the first scenario. So far from begging the question, this is simply investigating the reasons why one could possibly think the former scenario to be "perfect" and the other not.
Response: You are begging the question here because my arguments conclusion is that libertarianism is logically impossible with respect to creatures, but certainly it is conceivably possible. So obviously I disagree with you that this is possible with creatures.
The reason you gave was still not specific enough in terms of your definition of “dependent.” You said “It is better that the greatest possible being only be dependent on himself as the greatest possible being and not on lesser beings...” But I would submit that you have assumed that your sense of “dependent” here is equivalent to the sense “dependence” has in terms of knowledge. One can be dependent on another in many ways, like for nutrition or protection or permission to do certain things. But none of those are anything like a dependence relation merely involving knowledge. So this argument equivocates and does not set up an adequate foundation. Add to that our moral intuitions of free will and I would say we must at least assume from the outset that we have free will and hold it as our default position until proven otherwise. You would be free to use Scripture at this point, but that is only at the cost of chucking the Anselmian argument.
Response: I was using dependence broadly to incorporate every since that is logically possible so it is not really equivocation at all. I would say my intuitions about God being the greatest possible being and him being only dependent on himself to the greatest measure that is logically possible is stronger than my intuition that creatures have libertarian free will so I do not see any good reason for chucking my argument. Thomas V. Morris in his book on Anselmian explorations in philosophical theology asserts that the Anselmian intuition is so strong that it can even rule out modal intuitions about that there is possible world in which one tiny rabbit exists in and this rabbit is suffering without any explanation. Some theist would even rule out instances of meaningless suffering as not even possible because of their Anselmian intuitions that God is necessary and morally perfect, all I am doing is the very same thing but I am just explaining the great making property of Aseity and how Libertarian free actions in creatures contradict such a great making property and hence are not possible.
When you say “if God caused meaningless and purposeless evil then this would not make any less holy and just” I can simply appeal to the moral intuition I just mentioned and say, “yes, that may make him less perfect, but the question would then be if he does indeed allow such evil.” Similarly, you say that God can limit himself insofar as he does not contradict his other “great making properties” which I will readily grant – it is merely to say that there is no contradiction in God’s nature. For this to work against my position, however, you have to show that there is a contradiction here and this, I have already explained, is not yet persuasive to me.
ReplyDeleteResponse: I think this gives up the divine great making property of aseity and if you do not believe in that great making property there is not a whole lot I can do for you. I would be at the stand still with someone who was a open theist or a mormon who believed God to be physical.
You are right in saying that the passage about David does not directly address the question of determinism, compatibilism, or free will but that hardly settles the case as if we can now move on without a backwards glance. It’s an exegetical question of what has been assumed by the author’s portrayal of that event. And to twist and turn the words in every which way to make it fit into some Calvinist scheme simply will not do. I believe most people will simply find it self-evident (prior to and even simultaneously with systematic theology) that a certain kind of counterfactual freedom is strongly implied.
Response: There is no doubt this is a counterfactual since that is virtually true by how the text is structured but you have failed to give arguments that the text is actually discussing the issue of the nature of human freedom or the lack of thereof.
And that is exactly why I must strongly object to your use of Ephesians when we are talking about David in 1 Samuel. As Biblical Theologians we attempt to come to the Old Testament without our New Testament glasses. To not do so is simply to force the Old Testament into foreign patterns of our choosing. Cherry-picking NT passages is simply not relevant to the OT text in this exegetical context of trying to hear the original author’s purpose. Citing an NT passage at this juncture is as useful as reading the English NT when you’re trying to get the sense of the original Greek.
Response: But is not Ephesians talking about ever event in history? If this is so then this would seem contradict your reading of 1 Samuel. If you are okay with contradictions in your systematics that is fine, but do not expect people who want to be rational to follow you on that. So where do you get that it is the authors intention in this text to talk about the nature of creaturely freedom? I asked for an exegetical argument. The Apostles believed that the New Testament clarified the Old Testament (1 Cor. 10) and thus it is legitimate to read back the clarified doctrines and make them compatible with the Old Testament data. If you were strictly going by the popular biblical theological movement of the evangelicals from which you were trained then surely you could find me one biblical theology or commentary that comments on this passage and tells us that is somehow gives a discussion on the nature of freedom or that it is even referring to that in the authors intention (or at least an exegetical argument by yourself).
You ask why not think the David example teaches semi-compatibilism and not libertarianism, to which I would respond that to do so would be to do a gross injustice to the original intention of the author. It’s a fact that semi-compatibilism is a recent invention and that libertarianism isn’t. Fatalism also has an ancient pedigree as do certain (vague) forms of compatibilism. But the one that makes most sense in 1 Samuel is Libertarianism, and I’m okay in holding that in tension with other verses. The key thing is getting at the original intent, and in the case of David, it is clear that we have a real example of counterfactual freedom.
ReplyDeleteResponse: Actually in this history of freewill and determinism libertarianism has developed the ancient form is different from the contemporary form you find in analytic philosophy today. But at the time Samuel was written philosophical discussions about freedom had not even developed (at least from what we can find in written documents). But even if any form of compatibilism were true this text is perfectly compatible with it. Why would it not be? As a compatiblist I can say if I were in a different circumstance I would do such and such…why would being a compatiblist prevent me from doing that?
God Bless,
NPT
Nate,
ReplyDeleteI don't have time to reply to most everything you said right now, but I will say the following about what I think is the most important point of all this.
If you do not agree that we must take the intention of the author of 1 Samuel at face value and not as Ephesians generally may capture it (it's not even interpreting it!), then we're never going to see eye to eye. I never said that 1 Samuel is directly addressing these direct questions and your repeated characterization of my position as exactly that is simply not fair. Again, to be clear, 1 Samuel does not explicitly address this topic. I was pointing to plausible assumptions the author would have made and how that would make more sense in that context.
You say that you don't want contradictions in your system but I don't see that as a practical virtue. It, of course, is good to have truth and to increasingly reject false beliefs while acquiring true ones. But an interpretational enterprise that is motivated by non-contradiction is not the same as being motivated to possess truth insofar as we can know it.
There is something wrong with us if we are not willing to live with things in tension, and a theological enterprise that is fueled by this lack of tension will necessarily lack that sense of humility. It's okay to hold biblical authors in tension and not know how to reconcile them, just like it's okay to hold natural law and biblical support in tension as well. Our concern is truth, not freedom from contradiction. If your reply is "well, truth is freedom from contradiction" then you are simply missing my point.
I will agree with you that it is legitimate to use the NT in reading the OT, but only when you're at the point of systematic theology. To punt to the NT every time you have a problem in the OT is simply not good hermeneutics; it's neither here nor there. Taking this approach, you will inevitably think that Isaiah 9 and Psalm 110 are really talking about Jesus directly. You'll end up thinking that when God talked to Abraham about his "seed" in the OT, that he really actually meant Jesus in that moment (as Galatians says). But this is (arguably) simply not plausible when you take the OT on its own. The OT deserves to be read in its own right.
Systematic Theology has its place, but biblical theology and plain proper hermeneutics is logically prior. Systematic Theology MUST follow lest we end up with some desperately incomplete system, and then they will interact with each other. But that's the key: a proper sequence followed by true interaction.
Let me know what you think. However, if you disagree with me on this last essential point, it's pointless to continue the conversation. In that case, our disagreements run too deep.
Best,
-Sam
Sorry, I meant Isaiah 7 not 9.
ReplyDeleteHello Samuel,
ReplyDelete"I never said that 1 Samuel is directly addressing these direct questions and your repeated characterization of my position as exactly that is simply not fair. Again, to be clear, 1 Samuel does not explicitly address this topic. I was pointing to plausible assumptions the author would have made and how that would make more sense in that context."
Okay then: if it is not addressing the issue of freedom of the will or lack thereof then it seems to me that this text cannot be used as a defeater. But your last claim is much weaker and I wish to address it: Why is it plausible to think that the author would have made these assumptions in writing this particular text in Samuel? What evidence do you have for this?
As you guessed the rest is a fundamental disagreement about contradictions and systematic theology. This is why I am Reformed because I think such a theology is more reasonable and I think baptist evangelicalism to be irrationalistic. I think that contradictions are not truth conductive so I always avoid them in every instance.
God Bless,
NPT
Then you have misunderstood me to say that contradictions are truth conducive like I thought you might. Well, it was nice talking to you, I hope Westminster has been fun. Take care.
ReplyDelete-Sam
Hello Samuel,
ReplyDeleteThere was no misunderstanding here. I think because of the anti-truth conductive nature of contradictions that we ought to in every instance avoid them in our system of thought (systematics and biblical interpretation as well) which is something you have seemed to reject? Is this not your position?
It was nice talking to you as well. I hope all is well with you education and your personal life.
God Bless,
NPT