Immorality involved in taking a Photo of Jesus? (Part 9)

The fourth objection to the abrogation of images of Jesus position is that if cameras existed at the time in which Jesus became incarnate then we would take photographs of Jesus and this would not be immoral, therefore, pictures from cameras are not wrong1. If this is true, so the argument goes, then it follows that any image of Jesus are not wrong because there is something that is not fully captured when you take a picture or video tape something. This is evident by the fact that meeting someone is a fundamentally different experience than seeing a video or a picture of them. So if it is morally permissible to have video recordings and pictures of Jesus which do not fully and accurately represent him then it logically follows that it will also be morally permissible to have other images of Jesus. However, if my five arguments that I have given carry sufficient epistemic weight then this argument begs the question because it simply assumes that it is not wrong to take a photo of Jesus from a camera. After all, unless there is a sufficient reason to doubt my arguments then it follows that if we had cameras at the time of Jesus then we ought not to take pictures of Jesus.

Abrogating Jesus Pictures Leads to Docetism? (Part 8)

The third argument against my position is that if we abrogate images of Jesus then this will lead to or promote docetism . Docetism is the heresy that says that Jesus never assumed a physical human nature but rather he only appeared to . It is hard to see how having or not having pictures of Jesus will promote docetism. After all, the docetic heresy proponent could affirm pictures of Jesus and they could claim that the pictures of Jesus are as he appeared to everyone, but it was only an illusion. So since a docetic and an orthodox theologian could both affirm pictures of Jesus it is hard to see how having or not having pictures of Jesus could lead to either position exclusively. Moreover, I do not see how a position can lead to docetism when there is nothing about that position which entails such a belief especially when a position clearly rejects a docetic perspective. Furthermore, if this argument were valid and sound then it would prove too much because it would entail that the incarnation and scripture jointly are not sufficient to guard against heresy . This argument implicitly attacks the doctrine of the sufficiency of scripture which is clearly taught in the word of God (2 Tim. 3:16-17). Hence, we have good reason to doubt that the abrogation of images of Jesus position will lead to docetism.

Disciples had Images of Jesus (Part 7)

The second argument against the abrogation of Jesus images position is that the disciples saw Jesus which entails that there were images of Jesus on their retinas and their minds, therefore, pictures of Jesus are legitimate . This objection relies on a mischaracterization of my position. My position has never been that seeing and having mental images of Jesus after having a direct encounter with the incarnate Christ when he was on this earth is wrong. Rather my position is that it is only wrong to have mental pictures of Christ in this post apostolic era when Jesus is no longer on this earth visibly in his human nature. The Bible teaches that all the disciples saw the incarnate Christ and they dwelled on their past experiences with him, but the manner in which they communicated the incarnation to those who did not see Jesus was through verbal and written communication. Hence, this argument is ineffective against my position because it attacks a premise which my position does not hold, namely, that it was wrong for the Apostles to see and have mental images of Jesus.

Bible and Mental Images of Jesus (Part 6)

One argument advanced by Professor John Frame is that when most people read certain parts of the Bible it is “psychologically impossible” not to form mental images of Jesus . Frame offers no evidence that it is “psychologically impossible” not to form mental images of Jesus when reading about him . Because Frame offers no evidence for this assertion then this cannot act as defeater against my position on the abrogation of images of Jesus. In fact there is some reason to doubt that it is “psychologically impossible” not to form mental images, namely, the existence of people who have been entirely blind all their lives . But even if we were to suppose that Frame were right in saying that it is “psychologically impossible” not to form mental images of Jesus when reading the Bible this still is not a reason to doubt the abrogation of Jesus pictures position. It is impossible in our present sinful state to follow the law of God perfectly (Rom. 3:10-20) but that does not negate the fact that I am morally obligated to follow the Law of God perfectly (Matt. 5:48). I would go so far as to say that most people do form mental images of Jesus when reading the text, but just because a person is inclined (perhaps inevitably) to do x does not mean that a person is not morally obligated to refrain from doing x. Furthermore, this is not surprising that this is the case because as John Calvin taught that fallen mankind is a perpetual factory of idols (Rom. 1:22-25) . There is no theological problem then with attributing the disposition to form mental images when reading about Jesus as a product of our sinful fallen condition . Hence, it is hard to see how Frame’s assertion that it is “psychologically impossible” to form pictures of Jesus when reading the Bible is to be thought of as a defeater against the abrogation of Jesus images position.

The Incarnation by Proclaimation and Scripture (Part 5)

The last argument in favor of the abrogation of images of Jesus position is that the word of God teaches that the way we are to communicate the doctrine of the incarnation is by verbal and written communication. John 1:1-3 teaches that the way the Apostles, who had a first hand experience of the incarnate Christ, communicate this truth to subsequent believers was by proclamation and writing . Peter says that we have something more sure than his own experience of the incarnation namely the prophetic word which teaches us about the incarnation (2 Peter 1:17-20) . According to Paul, who had seen the risen Christ, the primary way we are to communicate Christ and the Gospel message is not by pictures but rather by preaching (Rom. 10:14-18) . The Apostles, who had seen Jesus and who were inspired by God, proclaimed and wrote about the incarnation to the church. If that was true at that time in redemptive history then it should be all the more evident to us who have not even seen the incarnate Christ. Therefore, the way God ordained us to communicate the incarnation at this time in redemptive history is not through pictures, but through reading, writing, and preaching the word of God.

Pictures of Jesus Can Cause Spiritual Harm (Part 4)

The fourth argument against pictures of Jesus is that there is an inclination after seeing any image of Jesus to associate them with God during worship, prayer, and reading scripture in our personal devotion time. This is an inclination in our visually oriented culture and in the fact that we are all sinners have tendencies toward idolatry. The obvious problem is that if we associate a mental image of Jesus with God we are in direct violation of the second commandment. In my own personal experience this has been a problem, so for myself I know pictures of Jesus are wrong because I tend toward idolatry when I pray to God after seeing them. There are many others who I have met who have also struggled with this same issue. Even if someone does not struggle with this issue personally, this argument by itself is still sufficient in showing that a person ought not to make, have, and endorse pictures of Jesus. After all if you make or have a picture there is a good chance a visually oriented person will see it and thus struggle with associating that picture of Jesus with the invisible God. If someone endorses a picture of Jesus then he or she is giving positive acknowledgment to an object that might cause many people to stumble. Because images of Jesus lead people to breaking the second commandment we ought not to make, have, or endorse them.

Images of Jesus are in Violation of Sola Scriptura (Part 3)

The third argument is that images of Jesus are a clear violation of the biblical teaching of sola scriptura . Sola Scriptura is the Protestant doctrine that scripture alone is the only infallible authority for faith and practice . This principle is taught in 1 Corinthians 4:6 when Paul says “that you may learn by us the saying not to go beyond what is written”. The Greek word for “written” here is gegraptai and every time gegraptai is used in the Pauline epistles it always means the Old Testament scripture . Hence, this verse establishes the principle that whatever scripture we have we are not to go beyond it with respect to faith and practice. Clearly then things involving images of Jesus Christ is something concerning faith and practice. The problem is that there is nothing in scripture that suggests that we ought to believe that it is morally permissible to make pictures of Jesus. The burden of proof is on those who believe it is morally permissible to make, have, or endorse images of Jesus because they have to show where it teaches in scripture that people ought to believe such a practice is morally permissible. After all, if we allow pictures of Jesus into our faith and practice then how is this any different from allowing such theological belief’s as Mary Ascending into heaven before she died. It is hard to see how a belief about Mary Ascending into heaven is anymore warranted than a belief that pictures of Jesus are permissible to make, have, or endorse. Hence, if one wants to have a more consistently biblical Protestant doctrine of sola scriptura then they ought not to believe that it is morally permissible to hold to the pictures of Jesus position.

Is It Unethical To Have Pictures Of Jesus? (Part 1)

This is part one of a ten-part series in which I shall argue for the position that, in our present position in redemptive history, we ought not to make, have, or endorse any picture or image of Jesus Christ (I will refer to this position as “The abrogation of images of Jesus" position). When I qualify this position with “in our present position in redemptive history” I am not suggesting that it was morally permissible to make, have, or endorse pictures of Jesus during his earthly ministry. Rather I make this precise qualification in order to reject the notion that it was wrong for those who had first hand experience of Jesus to form mental images of him.

I will begin by giving five arguments in favor of the position, followed by 5 arguments against my position with some possible responses. Only on the last post will I provide full bibliographical details. Here is the first argument in favor of thinking that it is unethical to have pictures of Jesus:



Argument 1: Ethical dilemma of Pictures of Jesus


The first argument for thinking that the abrogation of images of Jesus position is true is the immoral ethical dilemma that the person is put in when he encounters an image of Jesus. If someone were trying to create an image of Jesus with the intention of making it an accurate depiction of what Jesus actually looked like then when a person is confronted with that picture he has two options: 1) he can either bow down, and worship it, or 2) he can treat it as any other image that lacks religious significance . 1 is clearly unacceptable because it is a violation of the second commandment (Exo. 20:5) . However, 2 is also unacceptable because it treats the image, which is intended to accurately portray Jesus, as a common object. It is wrong to treat a representation with the intention of accuracy of the person of Christ as common because the person of Christ was not common, but rather he was the unique human expression and revelation of God (John 1:14, 18; Col. 2:9). We would treat the propositions conveyed by God as having more unique value than those propositions that are merely conveyed by man, if this is true of propositions it would also be true with respect to visual imagery and expressions. Hence, we ought not to have pictures of Jesus because we are forced to treat the unique revelation of God through human flesh as any other common picture.

Is Christianity Compatible with Supererogatory Actions?

A Supererogatory action is an action that goes above and beyond one's moral duty, but how can this be a possible perspective in christian ethics when Jesus seems to teach against it? Such as these scriptures:

Matthew 22:36-39 36 "Teacher, which is the great commandment in the Law?" 37 And he said to him, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. 38 This is the great and first commandment. 39 And a second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself.

How can we go above our moral duty when Jesus teaches that we are to continually love the Lord with all that we are. If s performs an action x that were good but there were a greater action y that s were aware of, then according to these scriptures s should have performed y. How then can this be compatible with supererogatory actions?

Defending The Law/Gospel Distinction: Revelation 14:6-7

In this post I will be addressing an argument against the Law/Gospel distinction from Eastern Orthodox blogger MG's post “Breaking down the Law-Gospel dialectic”. His argument tries to show that the Law and the Gospel are not distinct theological categories. I will distinguish the two in the following way: Gospel is believing in the promises of God especially as it relates to our salvation in Christ alone and the is Law the commandments of God. In short what distinguishes these two: the Gospel is “believing” and the Law is “doing”. In Pauline thought believing is never doing and doing is never believing. Now that we understand the distinction let us take a look at MG's supposed counter example to this distinction:

Revelation 14:6-7 6 Then I saw another angel flying directly overhead, with an eternal *gospel* to proclaim to those who dwell on earth, to every nation and tribe and language and people. 7 And he said with a loud voice, "Fear God and give him glory, because the hour of his *judgment* has come, and worship him who made heaven and earth, the sea and the springs of water."


MG writes, after quoting this verse:

“If law is observance of commandments (fear, give glory, worship), and the everlasting gospel teaches us to obey God’s commandments, then are the two really in opposition?”

The first theological mistake that MG makes is by pointing out that people who hold to the Law/Gospel distinction think that there is actually opposition between the Law and the Gospel. This is far from the truth because most Reformed/Lutheran accounts of the Law and The Gospel never say that they are opposed to each other but rather they are distinct from one another. The Law and the Gospel work together to bring about God’s redemptive historical plan and thus there is no opposition here, but only a distinction here.

Secondly, why does MG assume that when it speaks of the Gospel it has to be referring to all the imperatives mentioned (fear, give glory, worship)? My contention is that John is only referring to God’s judgment or justice being displayed to believers and non-believers. The Gospel does contain, after all, God’s justice and righteousness (Rom. 1:17) and surely John is talking about God’s justice which is the Greek word “krisis” used in this passage (in the ESV translation above it is translated as judgment). It seems that this is all John is trying to say: that the eternal gospel is God’s coming justice. This is something that Protestants who hold to the law/gospel distinction agree with. This is a statement of fact about God’s righteous purposes and not an imperative for us to follow.

The reason why MG took the verse in this way is because as an Eastern Orthodox person he rejects the follow Protestant positions: 1) The clearer passages of Scripture ought to interpret the unclear; 2) the Gospel is that of believing and not doing.

Paul states clearly that an aspect of the Gospel is justification by Faith alone (Rom. 1:16-17). Also, that those who reject the Gospel and try to add any works to it, as Paul's Jewish opponents did, are condemned to hell (Gal. 1:8-9). If we would let the clear scriptures define what is the Gospel rather than some difficult apocalyptic imagery in Revelation then one would clearly see that what John was talking about was God’s righteousness and justice as an aspect of the eternal gospel rather than bundle of imperatives. But MG did not do this because his church rejects the Gospel and rejects the reasonable interpretive principles that lay at the heart of the Reformation.

A Refutation of Theonomy Part 3

A Refutation of the Theological Arguments used to support Theonomy

This is my third post on refuting theonomy. In this post I plan to take a look at one of the strongest arguments in favor of the theonomic position. This argument is more of a systematic/philosophical argument than a textual argument. I believe if this line of argumentation were valid and sound then we would have good reason for accepting theonomy. However, I will argue that this line of argumentation is not sound and thus we have no good reason for accepting it.

The argument goes something like this:

P1: If theonomic principle were false then we could not know that an action x is ethically wrong.

P2: Action x is ethically wrong

C: Hence, the theonomic principle is true

The theonomic principle used in this argument is this: We ought to assume that all of the laws in the Mosaic covenant carry over into the New Covenant of Grace unless it is abrogated or done away with in the New Covenant. The essence of the argumentation here is that the new covenant laws alone are insufficient given a reasonable Christian conception of ethics. The example that Greg L. Bahnsen, the champion of theonomy, famously gave was this: If theonomy were false then you could not ethically condemn bestiality (inappropriate sexual relations with a animal), but Christians seem to know that bestiality is wrong, therefore, theonomy is the way we know bestiality is ethically wrong attesting to the fact that theonomy is true.





In response to this argument: I would suggest that the person who does not embrace theonomy ought to reject premise 1. We can know that actions are wrong apart from the written moral law and the Bible attests to this fact (Rom. 1:32; 2:14-15). In Christian theology, the view point that we can know moral truths apart from the written word is called natural law. In natural law we can simply see which actions are morally right and which actions are morally wrong. We may at times suppress this intuition, but we know it nonetheless.

The Biblical support for this view point as I have mentioned previously is Romans 2:14-15:

Romans 2:14-15 "For when Gentiles, who do not have the law, by nature do what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law. They show that the work of the law is written on their hearts, while their conscience also bears witness, and their conflicting thoughts accuse or even excuse them."

The Gentiles who do not have the Law of Moses like the Jews still know what actions are right or wrong, as this passage teaches clearly.

Therefore, the new covenant Christian can say that he knows that bestiality is wrong on the basis of the natural law and this need not be affirmed explicitly in the New Testament but rather implicitly through the new testaments teaching on natural law. The inference pattern would look like this:

P1: I can only know a moral action x is wrong by what the Bible teaches either explicitly or implicitly through necessary inference

P2: The Bible teaches that we can know moral truths apart from the Bible through the revealed law given to the conscious of men

P3: It has been revealed to my conscious that an action x is wrong

C: Hence, I know that an action x is ethically wrong.

Natural Law gets us out of this theonomic argument. However, it seems to me that natural law itself can also give us an argument against theonomy. This argument in a sense turns the tables on the argument used to support theonomy. The thing that motivates the first argument is the rejection of natural law, but I will argue this theonomic rejection of natural law leads the theonomist to the position that they cannot know certain ethically wrong actions. The argument goes like this:

P1: A rejection of natural law entails that one cannot know that an action x is ethically wrong

P2: We know that an action x is ethically wrong

P3: A position that entails a rejection of natural law is false (from 2)

P4: The Theonomic position rejects natural law

C: Hence, the Theonomic position is false (from 2, 3, and 4)

One of the essential tenets of theonomic position is a rejection of natural law and so this argument proves that natural law has to be true in order for us to know certain moral truths. This entails that the theonomic position is then false because of it’s rejection of natural law. The sort of moral truths that we know through natural law but do not appear on the pages of scripture are things like inappropriate sexual relations with inanimate objects and having impure sexual thoughts about cartoon pornography. These things are obvious moral abominations, but we do not find them referenced as ethically wrong in the Bible. You could say that we know them through the Bible through a necessary inference from natural law (which is taught in the Bible). But you cannot find them referenced as morally wrong actions in the Old and New Testament. Therefore, on the theonomic principle you could not know that it is wrong to look at cartoon pornography or having inappropriate sexual relations with inanimate objects. And clearly this is absurd because these sorts of actions are clearly wrong in the eyes of God.

Conclusion

I will conclude that the main theological argument that theonomy offers is not sound given a robust understanding of natural law as revealed in God’s word and if this theological argument was consistently pursued by the theonomy it would also disprove theonomy.

A Refutation of Theonomy Part 2

Part 2: A Refutation of the arguments in favor of Theonomy

In my last post I offered positive biblical reasons for doubting Theonomy, so I thought it would be only fair to look at the biblical reasons that theonomist use to support their position and then to refute the theonomic view of those biblical texts.

In the next post I will deal with some theological arguments that theonomists give.


I will start with the most popular argument given by theonomists from Matthew 5:17, it reads:

"Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to *fulfill* them.

Explanation: The theonomists wants to translated the Greek word *pleroo* as uphold or establish. Thus, the reading of this text would look something like this: "Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to uphold (pleroo) them. Thus, from this text the theonomists establishes the principle that we are to bring over the Mosaic laws unless they are abrogated in the New Covenant. The problem with this is that this Greek word throughout Matthews Gospel is not used in this way. In fact throughout Matthews Gospel "pleroo" consistently means brought to true meaning in the redemptive historical sense or prophetic fulfillment of some kind (Matt. 1:22;2:15;3:15;5:17;13:35;21:4;21:22). The theonomists has one good response to this sort of objection, they say that the word abolish followed by a "but" suggests a antithesis or a definite contrast and thus the only contrast to abolish is uphold or establish. The problem with this is that Jesus could not necessarily be saying something the opposite but merely something different. For example, If I say I did not come to eat dinner with you but I came to tell you a quick joke. Here we see that a "but" does not mean necessarily complete opposites, but rather indicating that you are simply doing something different (Thanks to Professor Steven M. Baugh for this Point). Jesus in Matthew 5:17 is doing something different than abolishing the law rather Jesus is bringing the law to eschatological completion, or to put it more simply: Jesus is fulfilling the law by bringing out it's true purpose and meaning. Thus, given the context of Matthews Gospel and a few other clarifications we see that there is no reason why we should take this passage the way the theonomists takes it especially when it contradicts clearer scripture (Heb. 8:13; 2 Cor. 3).

Hebrews 2:2-3 2 For since the message declared by angels proved to be reliable and every transgression or disobedience received a just retribution, 3 how shall we escape if we neglect such a great salvation? It was declared at first by the Lord, and it was attested to us by those who heard,

Explanation: Theonomists try to say that the argument being made here is that the Mosaic Law gave just punishments to the people under it then how much worse is the just punishment going to be if we disobey the New Covenant. The theonomists believes that if the non-theonomic view point were true then it would have to make nonsense out of the text in this specific fashion: The Mosaic covenant was only just for a little while and then it became abolished and failed to be just so then the punishment we will receive from the new covenant for disobeying it will also be abolished and fail to be just. The reason they think this is because they believe that the author is making an argument from the lesser to the greater. A argument like this looks something like this: If a lesser x is true then how much more is the greater y true. I want to start off saying that I agree with the theonomists that this verse is arguing from the lesser from the greater like Hebrews 10:26-30. However, I do believe that a non-theonomists can affirm this argument that the author of Hebrews is making without believing in theonomy. In the situation of the Mosaic covenant it was just to execute people for committing adultery and I think given those circumstances it will always be just. However, since we are in a different ethical circumstances of the new covenant our moral obligations are different. But that is fundamentally different from saying that the Mosaic covenant that God established in those circumstances were unjust. Rather what the non-theonomists ought to affirm is that they will always be just in those circumstances, but those circumstances will never obtain again because we are now under a new covenant and the old is faded away (Heb. 8:13).

Matthew 15:4-6: For God commanded, 'Honor your father and your mother,' and, 'Whoever reviles father or mother must surely die.' 5 But you say, 'If anyone tells his father or his mother, What you would have gained from me is given to God, 6 he need not honor his father.' So for the sake of your tradition you have made void the word of God.

Explanation: The theonomists wants to say that Jesus here is affirming the death penalty from a part of the Mosaic law. Even if this were true this would not prove the entire thesis of theonomy; which is that there is a presumed continuity between the new covenant and the Mosaic covenant. But suppose we were to forget about those two points, does this passage teach that Jesus is bringing over a part of the Mosaic law, specifically a law that says we ought to execute our children if they disobey us? All Jesus seems to be doing here is showing how the religious leaders are hypocritical and inconsistent with the Mosaic law they say they follow. Far from this being an endorsement of executing disobedient children this is more a condemnation on the religious leadership in Jesus' day.

Romans 3:31 31 Do we then overthrow the law by this faith? By no means! On the contrary, we uphold the law.

Explanation: Theonomists see this as support for Matthew 5:17 as being another reference to the idea that there is a presumed continuity between the Mosaic covenant and the new covenant. However, the Greek word nomos does not mean the Mosaic law here since that is clearly abolished elsewhere in Paul (Rom. 6:14;2 Cor. 3). Rather, this verse in context is talking about how we as Christians should not just forget about following the law of God revealed in the New covenant because we have been justified by faith so now we should obey the law. This obedience to the law of God is a rule for sanctification that is produced by gratitude for what Christ has done for us. In Reformed theology this use of the law is called the third use. Paul is teaching the third use of the law rather than bringing the covenant of Moses into the covenant earned by Christ.

Romans 13:1-4 Let every person be subject to the governing authorities. For there is no authority except from God, and those that exist have been instituted by God. 2 Therefore whoever resists the authorities resists what God has appointed, and those who resist will incur judgment. 3 For rulers are not a terror to good conduct, but to bad. Would you have no fear of the one who is in authority? Then do what is good, and you will receive his approval, 4 for he is God's servant for your good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the sword in vain. For he is the servant of God, an avenger who carries out God's wrath on the wrongdoer.

Explanation: Theonomists see this passage as suggesting that there ought to be state laws that are right and wrong in order for the secular authorities to have been instituted by God and able to justly punish guilty individuals. They argue that the non-theonomists cannot offer a objective standard of right or wrong in the realm of the state so we therefore have to go to the law of Moses as our standard for how a state ought to function. The problem with this argument is that the non-theonomists do have a standard by which they can determine wrong or right state laws, this law is called natural law. Natural law is taught twice in the book of Romans (1:32;2:14). Natural law is the general law revealed to all humanity that enables them to know the difference between right or wrong. With this understanding of natural law we see that the theonomists has no argument to offer with this verse.

In Conclusion:

We have seen that the biblical arguments given for theonomy are altogether unconvincing and unreasonable. However, there are more theological arguments that theonomist offer that I will deal with in the next post.

A Refutation of Theonomy Part 1

Theonomy is the position that there is a presumed continuity between the Mosaic covenant and the New Covenant of Grace. This presumed continuity entails that all Mosaic laws that are not abrogated in the New Covenant ought to be carried over. The theonomists would of course see the ceremonial laws as completely abolished in Jesus Christ because this is what the New Testament teaches according to orthodox Christianity. The intended result of theonomy is to allow for a great deal of judicial laws and some other laws to be carried into the New Covenant. A judicial law is a law that ought to be carried out by the magistrate or the state. This would be like economic laws and laws concerning the death penalty. Basically, these laws govern what the state ought to do. Here is an example of one such law in the Mosaic covenant:

Exodus 22:18 "You shall not permit a sorceress to live.

In the Mosaic economy one of the judicial laws was that all Sorceresses were to be executed and so now, says the theonomists, the law should be to execute all sorceresses.

I will argue that theonomy is taught against in Bible and I will refute all of the verses that theonomists uses to establish his/her position. This a rather large task so this will take me about three posts to flush out.

My position, to be clear, is that there is a presumed discontinuity between the Mosaic and the new covenant of Grace. My principle: A Law is to be carried over to the New Covenant if and only if it is repeated in the New Testament which is the entire context of the new covenant inauguration. To put it more simply: If the Law from the Mosaic covenant is not repeated in the New Testament then it is abrogated or abolished.

In This post I will seek to establish my position which entails the denial of the theonomic position and then in the next post I will refute all of the verse that the theonomists uses to positively support his/her position.

Argument 1:

Hebrews 8:13 In speaking of a new covenant, he makes the first one obsolete. And what is becoming obsolete and growing old is ready to vanish away.

Explanation:

Here in Hebrews 8 the author is commenting on the New Covenant spoken by the prophet Jeremiah and he is saying that when Jeremiah even spoke of the New Covenant the Mosaic covenant was obsolete and growing old which is going vanish away. Theonomists try to say that this is only referring to the ceremonial law. However, Jeremiah or the author of Hebrews never makes this distinction in the text and he is speaking of the Mosaic covenant as a whole (Heb. 8:7-10).

Argument 2:

2 Corinthians 3:9-13 9 For if there was glory in the ministry of condemnation, the ministry of righteousness must far exceed it in glory. 10 Indeed, in this case, what once had glory has come to have no glory at all, because of the glory that surpasses it. 11 For if what was being brought to an end came with glory, much more will what is permanent have glory. 12 Since we have such a hope, we are very bold, 13 not like Moses, who would put a veil over his face so that the Israelites might not gaze at the outcome of what was being brought to an end.

Explanation:

Here Paul is saying that both the glory and the Mosaic covenant was being brought to an end once the permanent surpassing glory of the New Covenant comes. Notice again, the text does not bring up distinguishable elements of Mosaic economy such as the ceremonial laws and sacrifices and so we ought to assume that this is referring to the entire Mosaic covenant as a whole.

Argument 3:

Romans 6:14 14 For sin will have no dominion over you, since you are not under law but under grace.

Explanation: When the word law or nomos in the Greek is used here it cannot be in reference to the believer following God’s moral laws or the third use of the law because Paul elsewhere in the book of Romans tells us that we ought to follow God’s moral commands as a guide for sanctification (Rom. 3:31). This also cannot be referring to the covenant of works made with Adam because there was no sin prior to the fall in which the first covenant of works was made prior to the fall. It seems then that nomos or law here can only be referring to the Mosaic covenant. This suggests that we are no longer under the Mosaic covenant as a whole or in part, but only under the New and if we are under the New then there is no reason to follow the laws of the old mosaic covenant unless of course they are repeated in the New.

Conclusion:

I have shown that given these three biblical texts that theonomy is not biblical. Because it is taught against in God’s word the church should teach against it. We should strongly teach against the theonomists notion that the abolished Mosaic covenant laws are binding on the New Covenant believer.

Can a Christian Struggle With Sin?

The short answer to this question is yes, a christian can and does struggle with sin. In fact, I would go so far to say that if one does not struggle with sin in this life then he or she is not a christian. The reason I say this is because the more holy one becomes the more they hate their sin and the sins they commit even if they have grown in their walk with Christ. But unbelievers do not struggle with sin because they do not care about whether or not they violate God's law. Thus, I believe, with the majority of Reformed Christians that Christians in this life always struggle with sin.

The main biblical text that justifies this position is Romans 7:14-25. In this blog post I will offer three of the strongest reasons for thinking that the person in Romans 7 is Paul, a believer, rather than a unregenerate Jew struggling with the law.

Reason 1: The person in Romans 7 relies and gives thanks to Christ and then continues to struggle.

Romans 7:25 - 8:1 25 Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then, I myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin.

A unregenerate Jew does not have this sort of relation with Christ, rather only a believer has this sort of relation with Christ, a relation that is such that one gives thanks and relies on Christ in the midst of their struggles.

Reason 2: The person in Romans 7 is speaking in the first person and in the present tense.

This makes a good case that if this person is speaking in the first person and in the present tense that this is in fact Paul and that this is his normative experience as a believer.

Reason 3: The person in Romans 7 delights in the law of God and wants to do the good.

These two characteristics are not true of unbelievers but only believers.

For John writes of unbelievers:

John 3:19 19 And this is the judgment: the light has come into the world, and people loved the darkness rather than the light because their deeds were evil.


But Paul writes of the person in Romans 7:

Romans 7:15-18 15 I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but I do the very thing I hate. 16 Now if I do what I do not want, I agree with the law, that it is good. 17 So now it is no longer I who do it, but sin that dwells within me. 18 For I know that nothing good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh. For I have the desire to do what is right, but not the ability to carry it out.


And again Paul Writes in Romans 7:

Romans 7:22 22 For I delight in the law of God, in my inner being,

It is pleasing to God that we love and delight in his law, but unbelievers cannot please God as Paul writes in the very next chapter:

Romans 8:7-8 7 For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God, for it does not submit to God's law; indeed, it cannot. 8 Those who are in the flesh cannot please God.

Thus, given these reasons it seems that it is most reasonable to think that Paul is speaking of himself in Romans 7 and thereby showing that this is the regular life of the Christian.

Aristotle On Moral Responsibility: A Reformed Analysis Of Ethics Book III

My project is to analyze Aristotle’s claims in Book III of Nicomachean Ethics regarding actions performed out of ignorance and determine whether or not they are valid in respect to Biblical teaching. First he claims that a man who performs a wrong action out of ignorance does so neither voluntarily nor involuntarily, but what he calls “non-voluntarily”. Second he claims that if a man is ignorant not just of the morality of a particular action but of the universal moral rule itself, then he is wicked. My thesis is that Aristotle’s first claim is valid in respect to the Bible, but not his second claim. My plan is to briefly summarize Aristotle’s discussion of what constitutes voluntary and involuntary action, then to explain in more detail the two claims I have mentioned above, and finally to critique those two claims from a Biblical standpoint.

Aristotle begins his discussion of voluntary and involuntary actions by addressing what he sees as the differences between them. Essentially what he ends up claiming is that the only way an action can be considered involuntary is if it is totally compelled by some force which is external to the agent of the action, while the agent takes no willful part in the action whatsoever. So, suppose a man’s family is taken hostage and a ransom is demanded. Though the man may not want to pay the ransom he will choose to pay it anyway because he wants his family back safely. In this case, we would not call the action involuntary because the man chose to act and caused, by his own power, the action to occur. Thus, even though external forces were compelling him, it was a voluntary action.

Continuing from this first claim, Aristotle also concludes that it would be foolish to blame external circumstances rather than oneself for performing any action that the agent chooses to perform. External circumstances, he says, can be said to be involved in every action that one does, whether it be good or bad. If we are going to blame those circumstances for our actions instead of blaming ourselves when the actions are bad, we must also give credit to those circumstances rather than give credit to ourselves when our actions are good. As Aristotle observes, not many are readily willing to admit that they are not responsible when they do good things.

With a basic understanding of voluntary and involuntary action established, Aristotle moves on to actions performed out of ignorance. Here Aristotle adds the third class of actions; the non-voluntary acts. He claims that if a man is ignorant of the fact that he has performed a wrong action he cannot be considered voluntary, from a morally culpable standpoint, for he was unaware of the fact that the action was wrong. Had he not been ignorant, had he known that the action was wrong, he may not have done it. However, if he never learns of his ignorance, if he never discovers that the action was wrong and thus he is never regretful for it, neither can he be considered involuntary. He was not aware of the moral implications of the action either way, thus he was simply non-voluntary. Having established this conception of ignorance with regard to moral action, Aristotle then makes a distinction between being ignorant of particulars and ignorant of universals. For example, if a man knows that it is wrong to steal the property of others, but he does not know that a certain animal belongs to his neighbor and so he takes it, he is aware of the universal (namely, that it is wrong to steal), but he is unaware of the particular (namely, that this particular animal belongs to his neighbor and thus taking it would be stealing). In this case, Aristotle would excuse the man and say that his action was non-voluntary (and, if the man later discovers his misdeed and is penitent, the action is then involuntary). However, if a man is unaware of the universal, that it is wrong to steal the property of others, Aristotle says that such a man is not innocently ignorant, but wicked! He further asserts, “Every wicked man is in a state of ignorance as to what he ought to do and what he should refrain from doing.” Thus his conclusion is that a wicked person is such because he is ignorant of the right thing to do. This he would consider a moral defect on the part of the person, and thus he is still responsible for his wickedness.

Aristotle then ends this discussion of voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary actions with one final thought on moral responsibility. He claims that voluntary actions must be those whereupon the initiative lies within the agent performing the action, even if that initiative be the baser passions or appetites. This effectively rejects the modern notion of “crimes committed in the heat of passion” as a defense for ones actions. The next question is, do we not also perform good acts out of passion or appetite? It would seem that we do. As before, with the attempt to blame ones bad actions on circumstances, this is merely an attempt by some to blame bad actions on passions. But this would effectively categorize all good actions as being voluntary and all bad actions as being involuntary, which Aristotle says is “ridiculous, since the cause in both cases is one in the same.” He concludes that, “Both are to be avoided; but the irrational emotions are considered no less a part of human beings than reasoning is, and hence, the actions of a man which spring from passion and appetite are equally a part of him.”

With all this in mind let us consider the validity of Aristotle’s claims when held up to scripture. The first claim seems rather self-evident. If a person is ignorant that an action is wrong; say they offended someone without knowing it or honestly forgot to do part of a homework assignment and said that they had completed it all, we would not hold them morally responsible for such actions. It seems obvious to me that this claim is valid in respect to Biblical teaching and no more need be said about it. What is truly important, both to Aristotle and to the Christian, is that a man be aware of the universal rules that should guide the way he lives, for example, that it is not right to offend others or to lie about completing your homework. This is Aristotle’s next point.

Essentially Aristotle is saying that men’s wickedness is intimately tied to their ignorance of universal moral principles, in a kind of causal relationship. So the most immoral person you can imagine is one who is ultimately ignorant of the fact that lying, stealing, murder and so forth are all morally wrong. What first struck me as odd was that he considered this ignorance to still be worthy of reproach. Most modern thinkers would use the excuse of ignorance to free people from moral responsibility, not to condemn them. Upon reflection and a deeper reading of the text I realized that what Aristotle is really saying is this: men who are ignorant of the fact that it is wrong to steal are still voluntarily stealing, and thus are still responsible for their actions. On the other hand, the man who knows that stealing is wrong, but who does not know in a particular instance that he is stealing, is not voluntarily stealing, and thus is not responsible for the action.

Scripture is very clear, however, that no man is ignorant of the universal moral principles, which we would call God’s law. To use Biblical language, we would say that all men are “without excuse.” God’s invisible attributes are plainly revealed in nature and His law is written on our hearts. We cannot claim ignorance of what we ought to do.

A counter-example might seem to fit here: what of the psychopath? A person who seems so apart from reality and reasonable thinking that he must be ignorant of what is right and wrong? This is where Aristotle’s comment on wrong actions committed due to the passions comes in. I would argue that the psychopath is no more ignorant of right and wrong than anyone else, but rather he is ruled by his passions and not his reason. When the psychopath desires to kill he kills, when he desires to steal he steals, and so on. There is no rationality guiding his actions, but as Aristotle aptly points out, his appetitive and passionate desires are no less a part of his humanity, his self, then is his reason. Thus we can reasonably conclude that such a person is merely ruled more by passion than reason and is still very much aware of moral universals.

What Aristotle didn’t have, what we might say is the final piece he needed to finish the puzzle, was a right view of human nature. Specifically, that our nature is fallen and in bondage to sin. Aristotle seems to conclude that the only reason a person would willingly choose to do evil is if he is at least partially ignorant of the fact that his action is actually evil. But the Bible shows us that men choose to do evil because our sinful nature naturally inclines us to do so. We are well aware that stealing is evil, but we choose to steal anyway because we cannot help but sin.

This still leaves us with some questions. Again, let use the psychopath as our example. It seems that the psychopath really doesn’t know that what he’s doing is wrong, even if his appetites rule him. Or perhaps a better example might be that the majority of people in today’s society don’t see anything wrong with having premarital sex with multiple partners, aren’t we to conclude that they are ignorant that such acts are wrong? Here we are forgetting an important metaphysical quality of humanity, namely the conscience. Immortalized by the Disney character Jiminy Cricket, the conscience is the exemplification of the law of God that is written on our hearts. It is that nagging feeling that people get when they know something is wrong. The more people suppress their consciences, the shorter and smaller those nagging feelings become until they are barely noticeable at all. But would it be reasonable to conclude that once a person no longer notices his conscience he is now suddenly ignorant of a moral principle that he knew before? Of course not. Moreover, most people understand why monogamy is such a good thing, but they choose to ignore that knowledge because promiscuous sexual activity is, in the moment at least, more desirable to them. In addition to this, scripture tells us that God gives depraved people over to their depravity, in essence giving them over to a place where they no longer feel that little nagging feeling.

Finally, Aristotle was equally unaware of the fact that, due to man’s corrupted moral state, he can only perform good actions and be a moral person by the grace of God. It is not a simple matter of knowing universal moral principles, because scripture is clear that all men know these. As with all things, it is entirely a matter of God’s sovereign grace.

Thus Aristotle provides an excellent definition of what constitutes voluntary and involuntary actions, but he fails to determine what makes men wicked. Ultimately this is due to the fact that Aristotle was lacking the divine or special revelation necessary for him to fully grasp the relationship between God, man, and sin. But for his part, Aristotle was certainly on the right track, and actually ends up providing a good philosophical case for how men can still be responsible for sinful actions in the face of their corrupted sinful natures.

The Dark Side Of Divine Command Theory?: A Response To Erik Wielenberg

In Chapter Two of Value And Virtue In A Godless Universe, Erik Wielenberg introduces two theses that he believes implicitly support Divine Command Theory. The first is the Control Thesis which states that “every logically consistent ethical claim, E, is such that God could make E true.” The second is the Dependency Thesis which states that “every true ethical claim is true in virtue of some act of will on the part of God.” Essentially, the great difference between these two is that in the former God creates ethics (by divine fiat we might say), while in the later ethics is based upon and originates from God’s nature or character. From this, Wielenberg distinguishes between two forms of Divine Command Theory. The first or “strong” form accepts both the Control and Dependency Thesis, while the “weak” form accepts only the Dependency Thesis.

It is important to consider Wielenberg’s objection to the strong form of Divine Command Theory first (which is essentially an objection to the Control Thesis), since it will play a role in his objection to the weak form. He objects to the strong form by way of an illustration. He asks us to imagine a competition in which the prize is omnipotence. One contestant is a very good person, while the other is very evil. Suppose, he says, that the evil person wins the contest and gains omnipotence. According to the Control Thesis, the evil contestant can now make it such that all of the evil acts he intends to perform (mass slaughter of innocents, torture, etc.) are actually very good. Moreover, he can make it such he is now a morally perfect being, not by changing himself, but by changing the nature of moral perfection. Thus, in the end, evil becomes good and the killing and torture of innocent people is morally commendable. Wielenberg relies primarily on intuition to argue that “there is simply no amount of power that would enable a being to make that true.” He further argues that “This story seems to get things backwards by making morality subject to power.” Fair enough. Our moral intuitions certainly do seem to suggest to us that no amount of power could make such atrocities good. We want to argue, especially as Christians, that morality is somehow objective and fixed, and that it could not be otherwise. At least on the surface, Wielenberg’s argument seems to offer convincing reasons to reject the Control Thesis on just such grounds. And so, for the sake of argument, we will grant him his conclusion.

Now Wielenberg turns his philosophical gun on the weak form of Divine Command Theory, specifically on the Dependency Thesis, which he states as follows, “It is still divine willing that determines which ethical claims are true, but the scope of divine willing is limited by the divine character.” In other words, God still retains the prerogative to say what things humans can and cannot do in certain times and places, but contra the Control Thesis He cannot command simply anything, but can only command those things which are in accordance with His own character, which sets the standard of moral goodness. Wielenberg proposes three objections to this thesis. First, he suggests that “implicit in the proposal is the notion that God has the power to make any logically consistent ethical claim true.” In the weak claim, God’s character prevents Him from making evil things good, but Wielenberg seems to be suggesting that the Control Thesis still manages to slip in the back door, and that we are left with the same problem, just moved back a step. If it were the case that God’s character turned out to be like the evil contestant in Wielenberg’s imaginary story, then even on the Dependency Thesis alone it would still be conceivable that God could make the slaughter of innocents a morally good thing. But Wielenberg has already refuted such a notion.

Wielenberg’s second objection to the Dependency Thesis is even stronger. He argues that an implication of the Dependency Thesis is that nothing is intrinsically good or evil. He says, “If an act of will on the part of God bestows value on something distinct from God, that value cannot be intrinsic.” By intrinsic value he means that a thing is valuable only in virtue of its nature. As an example of an intrinsic evil, he suggests pain. Pain is just bad, in and of itself, without reference to anything else. Conversely, falling in love is intrinsically good; it is simply good for its own sake. Following Chisholm, who argues that any theory of epistemology that doesn’t allow for obvious instances of knowledge should be rejected, Wielenberg suggests that any theory of morality that rejects something as obvious as the fact that some things are intrinsically good or evil should also be rejected.

What might the Christian say in response to these arguments?

In response to Wielenberg's first argument, it seems perfectly reasonable for the Theist to assert two propositions. The first being that it is impossible for God’s character to be different than it is, and the second being that it is impossible to actually change the nature of moral perfection, as the evil contestant does in Wielenberg’s story. The second claim rests on the first. God’s character simply is the definition of moral perfection, and if His character cannot change, than neither can moral perfection. But to the first proposition Wielenberg might ask why God’s character cannot change. The response is simple, because if it did, then He would cease to be morally perfect, and thus cease to be God. At this point, Wielenberg might accuse the Theist of a contradiction. If God’s character cannot change without ceasing to be morally perfect, then isn’t there some outside standard to which we are holding God’s character? To this the Theist may reply that God’s character is indeed the only standard of perfection, and that all things are either good or bad based on their relation to Him alone, but that His character, being what it is, cannot be otherwise. It is simply a brute fact of the universe. For God is the ground of all being, the source and foundation for all reality. He simply is. And he could not be otherwise. If Wielenberg still wishes to object to this claim, then the Theist can quickly remind him that this is precisely what he wishes his reader to believe about the brute moral facts of the universe. Indeed, this is the thesis of his book! Moral facts such as “it is wrong to torture babies for fun” are, according to Wielenberg, real moral entities that exist and simply cannot be otherwise. But as far I can tell, there is no reason to believe that brute moral facts cannot change and not believe that God’s character cannot change. Thus, for Wielenberg to reject the Dependency Thesis for this reason would also be for him to reject his own moral theory.

For the second argument, I believe that two possible responses are open to the Theist. First, it can be argued that since a thing’s nature is given to it by God, it is still possible for something to be either good or evil by virtue of its nature, even though God indirectly made it so. Taking the example of falling in love, a Theist might say that falling in love is most certainly an instance of intrinsic good, its very nature is simply and completely good, but that because its nature was given to it by God, it is ultimately God that has, in a sense, “declared” it to be what it is. It sounds to me as though Wielenberg’s argument is actually saying, “nothing can be good in virtue of its nature because God gave it its nature.” But of course that doesn’t follow. What Wielenberg is really attacking is the notion that falling in love is not good for its own sake, but that it is good because God told us so. What he overlooks is the simple solution that God “told us so” by giving it a nature that was either good or evil.

However, there is another response that seems perfectly reasonable to me, namely that the Theist simply accepts that nothing actually is intrinsically good or evil apart from God. Why is suffering evil? Because God doesn’t want his creatures to suffer. Why is falling in love good? Because God wants us to be happy, and in part because it facilitates the creation of families, children, and society. Wielenberg is relying on the unshakable intuition that pain is evil in and of itself. It is better to keep this obvious truth than to accept a theory that rejects it. But isn’t it just as likely that the unshakable intuition in question is merely that pain is evil, leaving entirely open the question of why or how it is evil? This seems more plausible to me.

In conclusion, I should make clear that I have not attempted to offer reasons for preferring DCT over Wielenber'g Atheistic Moral Realism. I have, however, attempted to provide sufficient reason to reject his arguments against DCT.

Transcendental Arguments For God's Existence Part 1

The first Transcendental argument I am going to give is the moral one. William Lane Craig and Greg Bahnsen use this form of argumentation and I have been greatly influenced by both of these men on issues pertaining to arguments for God's existence. So here goes my formulation of the Transcendental argument for God's existence from what I will call "moral facts". Here it goes:

P1: If God does not exist moral facts do not exist
P2: Moral facts exist
C: Hence, God exist


Moral Facts:

What I mean by moral facts is that there are good and bad things independent of our recognition of it. This is sort of like the fact that sea world exists, even if no one recognized the existence of such a place as sea world the place would still exist. Likewise, with moral facts they exist independent of our recognition of it. Suppose there were a possible world P* where everyone thought that the holocaust was morally praiseworthy and that everyone thought putting your first born child into a microwave was morally obligatory, in P* everyone would be moral wrong in doing these things even if not a single human being recognized it.

God and Moral Facts:

If God does not exist then these sort of moral facts do not exist. God is a necessarily good being that always commands what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. It is necessary that God command the good in the Christian theistic tradition. This sort of God would be the necessary meta-ethical foundation for all moral facts.

No Moral Facts without God:

If God does not exist how could moral facts exist? They simply cannot. Some might argue for atheistic moral realism, the view that immaterial forms or propositions are our meta-ethical foundation for moral facts. But this view is implausible for a number of reasons: 1) It is hard to conceive of a immaterial objects having content apart from a mind with thoughts that possess content, 2) We are only obligated to persons and morality requires moral obligation and there can be no moral obligation on atheistic moral realism since they reject the person hood of God, 3) we would have no way to know what is in fact good because these immaterial forms or propositions do not cause or relate to the world, 4) The meta-ethical foundation of the good (forms or propositions) would be themselves not good because only persons can possess moral properties of goodness and badness. The good would not be good in this case which would be a contradiction.

Conclusion:

The God of Christianity or tradition theism fulfills criteria 1-4 and thus if one wants to be a) reasonable and b) believe in moral facts then they ought to believe in the existence of God.