An Argument for the Active Obedience of Jesus Christ

An Argument for the Imputation of The Active Obedience of Jesus Christ

Introduction

There are many Christians who are perfectly comfortable saying that Jesus Christ died for the forgiveness of our sins. But the Historic Reformed Protestant Christians have wanted to say more than this. Reformed Christians have wanted to say that Jesus Christ not only paid the legal debt for our sins on the cross, but that Jesus also followed the demands of the law perfectly in our place¹. In other words, Jesus' suffering the debt for our sins and his perfect obedience to God’s law is legally imputed to us in our justification. Jesus' suffering for the legal debt of our sin is referred to as the passive obedience of Christ, whereas Jesus following the law perfectly in our place for our justification is referred to as the active obedience of Christ. Evangelical Protestants who hold to justification by faith alone typically hold that justification involves the forgiveness of sins on account of Christ's death on the cross. However, there are many who hold to both passive obedience and justification by faith alone, but reject Christ’s active obedience, arguing that there is no clear scriptural evidence for this doctrine. This position is endorsed by evangelicals like Robert Gundry and Norman Shepherd, and also many federal visionist proponents². The question of whether or not Christ's active obedience is imputed to us is very pressing because it concerns our justification: how we are made right before a Holy God. Moreover, many have cast much doubt on this crucial doctrine, which makes it all the more important to investigate. Therefore, it is my intent to argue that the active obedience of Jesus Christ is taught in scripture by a good and necessary inference from the doctrine of justification by faith alone. I do this by first giving a biblical and theological justification for the use of a good and necessary inference from scripture to support doctrinal positions. Secondly, I argue that justification requires perfect obedience to the law, which cannot be replaced by sacrifice. Thirdly, I argue briefly for the doctrine of justification by faith alone. Fourthly, I use the previous three points to establish that Christ is the ground of our active obedience, which is legally imputed to us. Lastly, I answer an objection to my thesis.

A Good and Necessary Inference

Many individuals object to the active obedience of Christ on the basis that there is no specific text that says "Christ's perfect obedience to the law is imputed to you". This is why it is essential to my argument that I demonstrate that, from scripture, a good and necessary inference is legitimate for establishing points of doctrine. To be clear, a good and necessary inference is an inference that is compatible with other biblical truths, and is reasonable to the degree that to doubt it would be unreasonable³. I will now give a theological justification of a good and necessary inference for establishing doctrine.

The two main reasons it is warranted to make a good and necessary inference are that we presuppose it in the doctrine of the two wills of Christ, and we see that Jesus makes use of a good and necessary inference when he reasons from the Old Testament during his earthly ministry. There is no text in the Bible that says that Jesus has two wills- a human will and a divine will. However, this is a legitimate inference when we read texts that tell us that Jesus was fully human and fully divine, because a fully divine nature will have a divine will, and a fully human nature will have a human will. So if the inference is legitimate with respect to the two wills of Christ, then it ought to be legitimate when formulating other doctrine. The second reason we should hold that a good and necessary inference is warranted when establishing doctrine is because the Bible, itself, teaches this method for establishing doctrine. This is what Jesus does in Matthew 22:31-32 when he argues for an afterlife by appealing to the Old Testament against the Sadducees, who rejected an afterlife. Jesus makes the inference that because God is God of Abraham, Issac, and Jacob, they will have an afterlife. He is implying that if God is your God, you will not be dead, but living. The text that Jesus appeals to does not explicitly say anything about them having an afterlife at all. Rather, Jesus infers from the text that the great patriarchs of the Old Testament will have an afterlife, based on the nature of God and his relationship to the patriarchs. Hence, because it was legitimate for Jesus to make a good and necessary inference from scripture to establish points of doctrine, it is also legitimate for us to make a good and necessary inference from scripture to establish points of doctrine.

Perfect Obedience For Justification

With this understanding of scripture and doctrine in place, I can move on to the second step in the argument, which is that God demands in his law perfect perpetual obedience for justification, which cannot be replaced by sacrifice.

One of the strongest biblical arguments in favor of God demanding perfect perpetual obedience for justification is Luke 10:25-28. In verse 25 we see that the Lawyer asks Jesus this question: "Teacher, what shall I do to inherit eternal life?" The Lawyer is asking a question that has to do with how someone can have the right to inherit eternal life. Jesus answers in verse 26 by asking the Lawyer his understanding from the law, of what one needs to do to have the right to inherit eternal life. The Lawyer answers in verse 27 by saying that one needs to love God with all that he is and that one should also love his neighbor as himself. Jesus confirms his understanding in verse 28 by saying "You have answered correctly; do this, and you will live.” To firmly establish that Jesus is teaching that in order to have the right to inherit eternal life one needs to be perfectly perpetually obedient, two points from this text should be considered. The first point is that when Jesus says "do this, and you will live" he is not speaking of earthly life, but of eternal life. Given that the context indicates that the nature of the lawyer’s question in verse 25 has to do with eternal life, this is the most plausible reading of the text. The second point is that the conditions for eternal life in the passage are that "you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your strength and with all your mind," and this entails perfect perpetual obedience to God’s law. The reason for thinking that this entails perfect perpetual obedience to God's law is that if a person does not follow just one commandment, then he could not be loving God with all that he is. If the person were loving God with all that he is, then he would follow all of the commandments perfectly. To delineate this more precisely, suppose we have two persons, Jones and Smith. Jones follows all of the commandments except one, whereas Smith follows all of the commandments perfectly. It seems we would say that Smith is loving God with all that he is and Jones is not loving God with all that he is. Therefore, it follows that if one were to love God with all that he is, then he would have to follow the law with perfect perpetual obedience; this, according to Jesus, is what it takes for one to have the right to inherit eternal life.

The general testimony of the scriptures affirm that in order to be justified one needs to follow the law with perfect perpetual obedience. For instance in Romans 2:13 Paul writes "For it is not the hearers of the law who are righteous before God, but the doers of the law who will be justified. " Paul writes this verse in the context of a larger argument that shows that both Jew and Gentile are guilty before God on the basis of their works (Rom. 3:19-20). Therefore, the sense in which dikaio,w is being used in this passage is not demonstrative, but it is in the sense that those who do and follow God’s law will be declared righteous⁴. According to James 2:10, if one fails to do and follow the law at just one point, he or she is guilty for all of it. So, in order to do the law at all one has to do all of it perfectly, because if one were to fail at any point, he or she would be held accountable for all of it. This is further clarified in Galatians 3:10 were Paul argues that all who want to be justified by keeping the law are under a curse because a person has to do "all" of the things in the law or else be under a curse. Clearly, Paul says that all are under this curse because everyone has failed to do all of the things in the law. This curse is contrasted by the blessing of justification by faith alone, and Paul’s implication is that one who is under this curse cannot be justified. In addition, when Jesus is communicating the true meaning of the Mosaic Law at the sermon on the mount in Matthew 5, he reveals to us God's standard in his law. Verse 48 states "You therefore must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect." When this phrase in verse 48 is used, it occurs within the context of Jesus quoting and commenting on a commandment contained in the Mosaic Law, so it is evident that this phrase has to do with God’s obligation to us in the Mosaic Law. Therefore, the scriptures clearly teach that in order to be justified one needs to "do" with perfect perpetual obedience.

Another reason for thinking that justification requires perfect obedience is Anselmian Perfect Being Theology⁵. Perfect Being Theology starts with the premise that God is the most perfect being, and from that premise infers certain characteristics about the nature of God⁶. The reasoning for the law requiring perfect obedience for justification is as follows: God is the most perfect being, and because he is the most perfect being, he will have every property that is better for him to have rather than lack. It is better for God to have the property of requiring perfection in his law for justification, rather than not requiring perfection in his law for justification. A perfect being would obligate perfection for justification rather than be satisfied with imperfection for justification. Therefore, it follows that God, a perfect being, obligates perfection for justification. It also seems likely that it would be better for the most perfect being to have the highest quality of righteousness, rather than lack this property. The highest quality of righteousness would require perfection for righteousness. God has the highest degree of righteousness, and therefore requires perfection for righteousness.

The requirement for perfect perpetual obedience for our justification cannot be replaced by any sacrifice or a payment of the debt we owe as sinners, but rather obedience in addition to sacrifice is required. It is not that sacrifice or payment of debt can replace obedience, but rather obedience must be in addition to a payment of debt or a sacrifice. The example given by Dr. David VanDrunen suffices to demonstrate this point: Suppose there was a father who told his son that if he completed all of his homework he would receive dessert as a reward, and if he failed to complete this task he would be punished⁷. The boy, in fact, fails to complete the task and is punished. It would then be counter-intuitive to think that because the boy was punished he is rightfully entitled to the reward of dessert that he was initially promised, if he then completes his homework⁸. This is analogous to the position that Adam was in when he was asked by God to follow a command to receive eschatological life, as symbolized by the tree of life. As demonstrated in previous paragraphs, God requires perfect perpetual obedience to his law for justification, thereby meriting the attainment of eschatological life. Therefore, in order for a person to be justified he or she would need to pay the debt of the sins committed, and to obey the commandments given by God. It would be irrational to think that this could be replaced by any mere sacrifice or payment of debt.

The fact that sacrifice and payment of debt cannot replace perfect perpetual obedience to God’s law is not just a truth of reason, but a truth of scripture, which is specifically taught in Mark 12:28-34. In Mark 12:30, Jesus teaches that the greatest commandment is to love God with all of our ability. In verse 33, the scribes say this about the nature of the relationship between obedience and sacrifice: "And to love him with all the heart and with all the understanding and with all the strength, and to love one's neighbor as oneself, is much more than all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices." Affirming the scribes in verse 34, Jesus teaches that perfect perpetual obedience to God's law cannot be replaced by sacrifices to pay the debt for our sins, because perfect perpetual obedience is the most important element in keeping God's law⁹. If obedience is better than sacrifice from God’s perspective, then it is implausible to suggest that Christ’s sacrifice could replace God's demand for our perfect perpetual obedience. Therefore, perfect perpetual obedience remains a necessary condition for anyone to be justified, and this demand cannot be replaced by any sacrifice.

Justification by Faith Alone

The doctrine of justification by faith alone is very relevant to the question of active obedience because if justification is truly by faith alone, then there are no works or upholding of the law that can contribute to one's justification. Therefore, when a person is justified by faith alone, the keeping of the law cannot be on the basis of the sinner’s work, but on the basis of a sinless person’s work. It is the purpose of this section to establish the forensic doctrine of justification by faith alone, so that in the next section I can make a good and necessary inference that Christ is the ground of our active obedience.

The scriptures explicitly teach the forensic doctrine of justification by faith alone. Romans 3:28 says "For we hold that one is justified by faith apart from works of the law." Those who disagree with justification by faith alone try to object to this passage on the basis that "works of law", or e;rgwn no,mou, refers only to a specific type of works, therefore not excluding all types of works from justification. The problem with this response becomes apparent as Paul continues his argument about the nature of justification in Romans 4 as indicated by verses 1-2 and 5. Paul reaches a crucial point in verse 5 when he says that a person is ungodly when justified. The Greek word for justified is dikaio,w, and this word means to be declared righteous, to acquit, or to treat as righteous. But what dikaio,w can never mean is to be inwardly transformed to be righteous, and then declared righteous. So when Paul says in Romans 4:5 evpi. to.n dikaiou/nta to.n avsebh/ logi,zetai h` pi,stij auvtou/ eivj dikaiosu,nhn\, he does not mean to suggest that God transforms the ungodly sinner to be righteous and then the individual is declared righteous. Rather, what the text is suggesting is that the ungodly are legally declared righteous by God. This legal context is all the more apparent when one realizes that terms such as count or logi,zomai in Romans 4:5 can carry a legal meaning as well¹⁰. In addition, logi,zomai is also used in verse 4 with ovfei,lhma, which is a legal term for debt¹¹. If the ungodly are justified by faith in Romans 4:5, then it would it follow that there are no type of works that have contributed to one's justification. If any work could count toward one’s justification, then it would be the same as the godly being justified, which clearly contradicts Romans 4:5. Therefore, when Paul speaks of e;rgwn no,mou in Romans 3:28, he is excluding all types of works since Romans 4:5 teaches that one is ungodly when justified by faith.

Another argument in favor of justification by faith alone is that works are incompatible with the gracious nature of justification. Romans 3:24 describes justification as ultimately gracious when it says that we have been "justified by his grace". If we then discover that grace excludes all types of works, I will have good reason for thinking that one is justified by faith alone when Paul speaks of being "justified by his grace" in Romans 3:24. According to Romans 11:5-6, if something is on the basis of one's works then it is no longer grace, because grace by definition excludes works as its basis. One may object to my understanding of Romans 11:5-6 by saying that e;rgon is being used to indicate a specific type of work, rather than good and bad works in general. However, the problem with this objection is that in Romans 9:11 e;rgon is being used synonymously with good and bad actions. Moreover, in Romans 4:16 we see Paul teaching that a promise is by faith in order that it can have a gracious character. Grace, in Paul's thought, is such that it excludes works as its basis, yet it is compatible with the nature of faith that he describes in Romans 3 and 4. Therefore, when Paul speaks of justification by grace in Romans 3:24, he is speaking of a justification that excludes all types of works, yet includes faith; this is the doctrine of justification by faith alone.

Justification in Christ Alone

Now that I have established that necessary inference from scripture is legitimate, the requirement of perfect perpetual obedience to the law for justification, and justification by faith alone, we can infer from these three truths that Jesus's active obedience is legally imputed to us in justification. In order for us to be justified, God requires perfect perpetual obedience that cannot be replaced by sacrifice. When one is justified by faith alone, it cannot be because of one's own perfect perpetual obedience. There are two reasons for this assertion. The first is that every person has failed to meet God's demands for perfect perpetual obedience because all persons other than Jesus are sinners (Rom. 3:23; Heb. 4:15). The second reason why it cannot be one's own perfect perpetual obedience after he or she has been justified, is because the doctrine of justification by faith alone requires that no work contributes to justification. Since it cannot be our own perfect perpetual obedience that justifies, it follows that it is another person’s perfect perpetual obedience legally imputed to us in justification. There was only ever one person who was perfectly obedient to God's standards, and the scriptures teach that this is the God-man Jesus Christ (Heb. 4:15; 1 Jo 2:1). Therefore, it follows that Jesus Christ’s prefect perpetual obedience to the law is imputed to us in our justification.

Answering an Objection

In this section I answer an objection to the doctrine of the active obedience of Christ. There are many common objections to this doctrine that are either implicitly answered in this paper, or are not compelling¹². In this section I answer a unique objection to the active obedience of Christ that may seem to be compelling.

One of the most compelling objections against the active obedience of Christ is that the doctrine relies on an unbiblical notion of merit¹³. This argument has been leveled by many who are in involved in the so-called "Federal Vision" movement¹⁴. The argument made by federal visionist proponents is that active obedience presupposes merit, and merit is unbiblical, therefore, active obedience is unbiblical. Those who object to this notion of merit often just simply claim that it is not taught in the Bible, thus it is unbiblical¹⁵. However, James Jordan goes a step further and argues that Luke 17:7-10 teaches against the idea of meriting or earning a reward¹⁶. In this parable Jesus teaches that when a servant obeys his master’s commands, he does not expect a thank you because he is only doing what he ought to do. Likewise, when Christians do what God requires they should think themselves unworthy servants, because they have just done what they ought to do. Jordan then appeals to Philippians 2:7 to warrant the idea that Jesus was a servant, and because he was a servant of God he could not merit anything, because he would only be doing what was commanded of him by the Father¹⁷. Jordan then claims the reason we get redemption through Christ is on the basis of the Father's promise to Christ, and not on the basis of the Father rewarding Christ for what he earned.¹⁸

The fundamental problem with Jordan's argument from the parable is that this parable is in the context of sin, and it is illegitimately applied to Christ. The first clear indication that this parable is to be seen in the context of sin and fallen humanity is that Jesus is addressing this parable to his disciples, who are sinners (Luke 17:1). The second indication that this is being applied to sinners is that in verse 10 the servants are deemed to be avcrei/oj, which means worthless or unprofitable¹⁹. This parable is perfectly compatible with the idea of one meriting salvation as defended in this paper, and it is also compatible with the Reformed Protestant tradition, because only persons who are sinless are in a position to merit an eschatological reward. Furthermore, Jordan's contention that this applies to Jesus on the basis of the Philippians 2:7 language of Jesus being a "servant" is not plausible, because Jesus is indeed a servant, but it does not say that he is a worthless servant. In addition, it hardly seems appropriate to call the second person of the trinity assuming human flesh to be a servant who is worthless or unprofitable, as the Greek word avcrei/oj suggests. Jordan's view of this parable is without any support, and it seems that there are good reasons for doubting his interpretation of this parable. Therefore, this parable cannot serve as an argument to refute the idea that Jesus Christ merited justification for us.

Contrary to the claims made by Jordan and other federal visionists, the idea of merit is directly taught in the scriptures. Romans 4:4-5 contrasts two alternative means of justification: one of works meriting an eschatological reward and the other trusting in God for justification. In verse 4, the first means of justification is by working, and the person who works receives a reward. Paul makes it clear that this reward is not a gift, but it is rather something ovfei,lhma, or owed to the individual who has done these works. The idea that God owes us something for our works is inherent in the concept of meriting, or earning. Furthermore, verse 4 is clearly about justification because this is the context that Paul sets up in 4:1-2. Finally, Paul uses the Greek word de. to contrast verse 4, which speaks of earning a reward by doing works, and verse 5, which speaks of justification by trusting. This suggests that Paul is contrasting two alternative ways to salvation: one meriting justification by works and the other trusting in God for justification²⁰. Therefore, the scriptures clearly teach the category of merit, contrary to the claims made by Jordan and the other federal visionists.

Another reason for thinking that a perfect person can merit justification is as follows: if one rejects the idea of merit, then he or she has ultimately undermined the idea that God is the most perfect being²¹. For God to be the most perfect being entails that he will have the highest degree of justice. It would be entirely unjust of God not to reward a creature who were to follow all of his demands perfectly. If God did not reward the perfectly good creature with a good reward, then God would not be a perfect being. God is a perfect being, however, so out of the necessity of his nature, he has to reward the perfectly good creature with a good reward. Clearly, when one rejects the idea of a creature meriting by perfect perpetual obedience an eschatological reward from God, then one has ultimately undermined the perfection of God.

Conclusion

In this paper I have demonstrated that the active obedience of Jesus Christ is taught in scripture by a good and necessary inference from the doctrine of justification by faith alone. I established this by giving a biblical and theological justification for the use of a good and necessary inference from scripture to support doctrinal positions. Secondly, I established that justification requires perfect perpetual obedience to the law that cannot be replaced by sacrifice. Thirdly, I established the doctrine of justification by faith alone. Fourthly, I argued that these three truths lead to the conclusion that Christ is the ground of our active obedience, which is legally imputed to us. Lastly, I responded to an objection to this thesis. Throughout this paper we have seen that a rejection of the active obedience of Christ is not only unbiblical, but it either undermines the doctrine of God, or it undermines the doctrine of justification.

Bibliography

Bibleworks 6.0

Clark, R. Scott. Covenant, Justification, and Pastoral Ministry: Essays by the Faculty of Westminster Seminary California. Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Pub, 2007.

Husbands, Mark, and Daniel J. Treier. Justification: What's at Stake in the Current Debates. Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 2004.

Johnson, Gary L. W., and Guy Prentiss Waters. By Faith Alone: Answering the Challenges to the Doctrine of Justification. Wheaton, Ill: Crossway Books, 2006.

Moo, Douglas J. The Epistle to the Romans. The new international commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 1996.

Morris, Thomas V. Anselmian Explorations: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987.

Sandlin, Andrew. Backbone of the Bible: Covenant in Contemporary Perspective. Nacogdoches, TX: Covenant Media Press, 2004.

Sandlin, Andrew, John H. Armstrong, Don B. Garlington, Mark Horne, Peter J. Leithart, Rich Lusk, and Norman Shepherd. A Faith That Is Never Alone: A Response to Westminster Seminary California. La Grange, Calif: Kerygma Press, 2007.

Spear, Wayne R., and Anthony T. Selvaggio. The Faith Once Delivered: Essays in Honor of Dr. Wayne R. Spear. Westminster Assembly and the Reformed Faith. Phillipsburg, N.J.: P & R Pub, 2007.

The Westminster Confession of Faith

White, James R. The God Who Justifies. Minneapolis, Minn: Bethany House Publishers, 2001.

Wilkins, J. Steven, and Duane Garner. The Federal Vision. Monroe, La: Athanasius Press, 2004.

1 The Westminster Confession of Faith, Chapter XI Of Justification, Paragraph 1.

2 Husbands, Mark, and Daniel J. Treier. Justification: What's at Stake in the Current Debates. Downers Grove, Ill: InterVarsity Press, 2004,pg.17-45; Wilkins, J. Steven, and Duane Garner. The Federal Vision. Monroe, La: Athanasius Press, 2004, pg. 192-195; Sandlin, Andrew, John H. Armstrong, Don B. Garlington, Mark Horne, Peter J. Leithart, Rich Lusk, and Norman Shepherd. A Faith That Is Never Alone: A Response to Westminster Seminary California. La Grange, Calif: Kerygma Press, 2007, pg. 249-278.

3 Spear, Wayne R., and Anthony T. Selvaggio. The Faith Once Delivered: Essays in Honor of Dr. Wayne R. Spear. Westminster Assembly and the Reformed Faith. Phillipsburg, N.J.: P & R Pub, 2007, pg. 171-190.

4 Moo, Douglas J. The Epistle to the Romans. The new international commentary on the New Testament. Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 1996, pg. 147-148.

5 Morris, Thomas V. Anselmian Explorations: Essays in Philosophical Theology. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987, pg. 10-25.

6Morris, Anselm, 10-25.

7 Johnson, Gary L. W., and Guy Prentiss Waters. By Faith Alone: Answering the Challenges to the Doctrine of Justification. Wheaton, Ill: Crossway Books, 2006, pg. 136.

8 Johnston, By Faith Alone, 136.

9 Johnston, By Faith Alone, 137.

10 White, James R. The God Who Justifies. Minneapolis, Minn: Bethany House Publishers, 2001, pg. 209.

11White, Justifies, 209.

12 Clark, R. Scott. Covenant, Justification, and Pastoral Ministry: Essays by the Faculty of Westminster Seminary California. Phillipsburg, N.J.: P&R Pub, 2007, pg. 252-265.

13Sandlin, Andrew. Backbone of the Bible: Covenant in Contemporary Perspective. Nacogdoches, TX: Covenant Media Press, 2004, pg. 85-101.

14Wilkins, Federal Vision, 192-195

15 Sandlin, Never Alone, 276-278.

16 Wilkins, Federal Vision, 192-193.

17 Wilkins, Federal Vision, 192-193.

18 Wilkins, Federal Vision, 192-193.

19Bibleworks 6.0

20David VanDrunen, Class Lectures on Justification, Fall 2010.

21Morris, Anselm, 10-25.

A Philosophical Argument in Favor of Perfect Perpetual Obedience for Justification

A reason for thinking that justification requires perfect obedience is from Anselmian perfect being theology. Perfect being theology starts with the premise that God is a perfect being and then from that premise it infers certain characteristics about the nature of God. The reasoning then for the Law requiring perfect obedience for justification would be as follows: God is the most perfect being and because he is the most perfect being he will have every property that is better to have rather than for Him to lack that property. It is better for God to have the property of requiring perfection in his law for justification rather than not. This is a strong intuition because of the fact that a perfect being would obligate perfection for justification rather than be satisfied with imperfection for justification. Therefore, it follows from this that God obligates perfection for justification. Furthermore, it also seems that it would be better for the most perfect being to have the highest quality of righteousness rather than lacking this property. The highest quality of righteousness would be such that it would require perfection for righteousness. God has the highest degree of righteousness and therefore requires perfection for righteousness.

This is for the paper I am writing for Active Obedience in my Holy Spirit Class @ WSCAL, so any feed back would be most appreciated. (Just so everyone knows this is a indirect argument for justification in Christ alone by faith alone because only Christ was perfect to earn justification in our place which is received by us through faith).

A Philosophical Argument For Divine Retributive Justice

God is the greatest possible being which entails God has every property that is better to have rather than to lack. It is clear that it is better for God to have justice to the greatest possible degree rather than to have justice that is lesser than the greatest possible degree. God has the greatest possible degree of justice entails if there is great evil God will at least punish that evil with at least a great punishment. There is a great evil that occurs in every sin which is this: the creature is not honoring and loving with all of his ability the greatest possible being. Instead the creature loves and honors something created that is lesser than the greatest possible being. This is a dishonoring and unloving sin against the greatest possible being and it is at least a great evil. Hence, any sin that a creature commits is at least a great sin and a great sin requires from a being with the greatest possible degree of justice at least a great punishment (This great punishment could very well be understood as the traditional doctrine of hell). This argument establishes the following: God cannot freely forgive sins without retributive justice.

An Argument for the Trinity from Divine Love

In this post I will give an philosophical argument for there being multiple persons in one God. The argument is as follows:

P1: There is one God who is the greatest possible being
P2: Greatest possible being has every moral perfection to the highest possible degree
P3: Love is a moral perfection
P4: Love to the highest possible degree is not solely centered on ones own person but on another person in love (GL)
P5: God either has GL by his very substance or by things outside of his substance
P6: It is false that God has GL outside of his substance
P7: God has GL in his substance entails that the substance has multiple persons
P8: God has GL in his substance
C: Hence, God is multiple persons




Premise 1:

The greatest possible being is such that there can only be one because it is better that God's greatness has no equal rather than there be an competing equal to God. It also seems that the greatest possible being would be a being worthy of worship and hence God is the greatest possible being.

Premise 4:

Love to the highest possible degree is not solely centered on ones own person but on another person in love. This seem plausible because when a person only loves himself this seems like not the best kind of love but rather it seems self-centered. For this reason a love that is not for another person is a imperfect love and not a property that is had by the greatest possible being.

Premise 6:

This love cannot depend on creation (which is something outside of God) because creation happens to exist by an act of God's free will to create. There are some possible worlds where God does not create and in those worlds God would still be loving even if there are no other created beings. In other words: God's love is necessary and essential, but creation is contingent so created persons cannot be the object of God's love because God's loving nature is necessary.

Conclusion:

This argument shows that God is one substance, but this one substance has multiple persons so that the greatest possible being can have the greatest possible love which would be one person loving at least one other person. General revelation using reason as it's instrument can demonstrate such a truth as there being a plurality of persons in one substance but special revelation alone can give us the most precious truth that God is three persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

The Legal Exchange of Redemption

The Traditional Protestant position teaches that Christ was legally imputed our sins and that we are legally imputed his righteousness. But is there any basis for this teaching in the Bible? I believe that there is a strong basis for this in 2 Corinthians 5:21, it reads:

"For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God."

How should we understand this passage? Did Jesus actually sin or was it merely legal?

From this scripture verse we can develop the following argument

P1: Jesus becoming sin is either actual or legal

P2: It is not actual

C: Hence, it is legal

There are two reasons for supposing the truth of Premise 2. The first reason is biblical: the bible clearly and unequivocally teaches that Christ did not actually sin (Heb. 4:15). The second reason is philosophical: God being the greatest possible being it is rather impossible that such a being would be united with a sinful human nature. For if God could be united to such a sinful nature then we could think of a greater being, a being that was not united to a sinful nature. And then God would no longer be God, a clear contradiction. Thus, we are forced to conclude that the transaction is legal.

There is further Biblical evidence that the redemption event was legal in Colossians 2:13-14:

"13 And you, who were dead in your trespasses and the uncircumcision of your flesh, God made alive together with him, having forgiven us all our trespasses, 14 by canceling the record of debt that stood against us with its legal demands. This he set aside, nailing it to the cross."

Given that the sin that Christ recieved was only legal in 2 Corinthians 5:21 and not actual then it is only reasonable to suppose that the righteousness spoken of in this context is legal as well. Thus, what we have here is a glorious transaction between sinner and a righteous man. A transaction that is only compatible with Protestant theology and not with Rome and Orthodoxy. We as sinners are as piles of dung covered in the snow of the glorious righteousness of Christ.

Perfect Being Theology And The Classical Western Conception of God

Anselmian Perfect being theology and philosophy argues for the Divine properties from the conception of God being the greatest possible being. In this blog post I will argue for the traditional western conception of God on the basis of Perfect being theology and philosophy.

The formula to determine what properties God has in Anselmian Perfect Being theology is the following propositions:

P1: God is the greatest possible being

P2: God being the greatest possible being entails that he will have every property that is better to have rather than not.

P3: It is better to have x rather than not

C: Hence, God has x



This is an example of how this would work in practice: Reformed Theology wants to say that God is omniscient which means He knows all true propositions even future ones.

Lets apply this to the argument formula provided above:

P3: It is better to have omniscience rather than not

C: Hence, God is omniscient

This seems pretty reasonable considering that we think that it is better to know things rather than being completely ignorant. Thus, it seems more reasonable than not to think a greater being would know every truth rather than not.

From this example we see that the concept of God as the greatest possible being acts as a sort of divine properties generating machine; that is to say: we can apply this formula to warrant many of the properties we would want to predicate of God.

Here are some more Divine Properties that God has in Reformed Theology and in Traditional Western theology:

Divine Properties:

1) Omnipotence: being able to do anything that is logically possible and great (this is a good combination of Anselm's and Aquinas's Definition of omnipotence)

2) Morally Perfect: Being of the highest moral perfection and grounding moral perfection it-self

3) Omnipresent: God being conscience of ever event and point in History, God is not bound to any particular historical event but is boundlessly present at every point in the natural world.

4) Immutability: God's essential, necessary, and intrinsic properties are such that they are not subject to any sort of change.

5) Impassibility: No one can act on God, God only acts on all things. Thus, God in his Divine nature cannot be destroyed, suffer, or be injured.

6) Atemporal: God is timeless. He is not bound by time or bound inside of time.

7) Eternal: God does not begin to exist, but he always exists.

8) Aseity: God is only dependent upon himself.

Reasons for believing 1-8 (the numbers below corresponds with the numbers above)

1) When we think of a great being we tend to think of him being able to a lot of great things rather than being able to either do a) really bad things or b) nothing good at all all.

2) This one is perhaps the most obvious a perfect being is better than a evil being.

3) A God that is everywhere at once is better than a God that is limited to time and space.

4) If God is already the greatest possible being then why would he need to change if he already is the greatest.

5) A God that can be damaged and is not the source of action on everything is not as good as a God who cannot be damaged and acts on everything.

6) A God who is bound by time is not as great as a God who is not constrained by time or atemporal.

7) If God is the greatest possible being then it would be better if he always existed rather than not because this makes him unique from his creation and the it is better for the best to always be existing.

8) Everything outside of God is not as great so it seems that a being that is only dependent upon himself as the greatest possible being would be the greatest possible being.

All one has to show is that there is more reason to believe that 1-8 is greater to have rather than not in order to show that God has these properties. The way we justify that these properties are better to possess rather than not is our intuition. Intuition is basically our mental seeing. We sort of just see that 1+1=2 and we just sort of see that murdering infants for fun is in fact wrong. We cannot give arguments for these sort of things but they are reasonable to believe. This is just like it is reasonable to believe that you see a tree in front of you and that you believe rightly that a tree exists in front of you. You cannot give any argument apart from saying "look and see the tree is in front of me". Likewise, you cannot give a argument for these apart from just using your mental conception to see that one is better to have rather than not.

Conclusion:

The Divine properties 1-8 are properties had by the traditional Western concept of God and since these properties are more reasonable to believe rather than not then we are warranted in believing that a God such as this exists.

Perfect being Theology and Eastern Orthodoxy

In this post I will look at a modified Anselmian model of the Divine Essence. I will argue that this modified version is more reasonable than not and that it is wholly incompatible with the Eastern view of the Divine essence, thereby showing that Eastern Orthodoxy is necessarily false.

Here are some ontological arguments and then after I will briefly show how these are incompatible with the Eastern view of the Divine Essence:

The Three strongest ontological arguments:

The one that is falsely attributed to Anselm, but it is still valid and sound:

1) I can think of the greatest possible being (or I define God as the greatest possible being)

2) It is better to exist in reality and in thought than just merely in thought

3) Since the greatest possible being is the greatest then he will have everything that is better to have rather than not to have those great things

4) If the greatest possible being does not exist in reality and in thought then he is not the greatest possible being

5) The greatest possible being would not be the greatest possible being which is a contradiction

6) Therefore, The greatest possible being exists in reality and in thought and this is what we call God

Answering the most popular objection: It is often objected to this argument that just because I can think of the greatest possible thing doesn’t mean that it exists because I can think of the greatest possible Island, animal, house, or girl but that doesn’t mean that those things exists. The problem with this counter argument is it over looks the definition of God as being the greatest possible being. If God is the greatest possible being then he would have only those attributes that would be great to have rather than not have those attributes. One of those great making attributes is that God is entirely unique from the creation which is his creation is lesser than God in many ways. One of those ways in which his creation is lesser is that God is the only being that in his definition or nature there contains a claim of existence. In other words God would be better if he was the only being that could be shown to exist merely by contemplating him rather than not. Since God is the greatest possible being then he is the only being that could be shown to exist merely by contemplating him since this displays a great making property of God, namely his utter uniqueness from the lesser created things.

Here is my version of the argument:

P1: I can think of the greatest possible being (G*)

P2: It is better to be necessary iff one were G* rather than not

P3: G* entails that he will have every property that is better to have rather than not

P4: G* is necessary

C: Hence, G* exists and exists necessarily and we call this being God.

Here's Moreland’s formulation of the ontological argument:

1. A maximally perfect being possibly exists.

2. If a being is a maximally perfect being, it exists
in all possible worlds.

3. The actual world is a possible world.

4. Therefore, a maximally perfect being exists in the
actual world.


Now let's get to the incompatibility with this reasonable and ontologically robust view of the Divine Essence's with the Eastern view of The Divine Essence.

P1: A Essential feature of Eastern Orthodoxy is the rejection of God's existence

P2: Anselmian Perfect being theology demonstrates that God exists necessarily

C: Hence, Eastern Orthodoxy is essentially and necessarily false

The Divine Essence in Eastern Theology does not exist but it is not true that it doesn't exists (the way of negation), but in Anselmian perfect being theology God's essence exists because this is true by definition thus the eastern view is necessarily false since they believe that God's essence doesn't exist. Furthermore, The East doesn't think the Divine Essense is contigent or necessary, but on perfect being theology and philosophy (the second and third argument) the divine essence exists necessarily thus if one holds to perfect being theology he would be most reasonable in thinking that the conception of the Divine essence in Eastern Orthodoxy is necessarily false. From these conclusions it is more reasonable than not that eastern orthodoxy in necessarily false if one wants to think that God is the greatest possible being.

The Ontological Argument For God's Existence

I have previously written on the classical ontological argument on this blog, but this post I want to give a ontological argument that is a bit more contemporary and that I believe firmly to be valid and sound. Here it goes:

P1: I can think of the greatest possible being (G*)
P2: It is better to be necessary rather than not if one were G*
P3: G* entails that he will have every property that is better to have rather than not
P4: G* is necessary
C: G* exists and exists necessarily and we call this being God.


We know that P2 is true on the basis of intuition. We know a lot of things through intuition like mathematical, modal, and moral truths. But some intuitions we have to flush out and argue for. For me personally it is pretty obvious that it is better to be necessary rather than not, but for those of us that are not so convinced perhaps this argument might persuade you:

P5: It is better to be the precondition of moral facts rather than not

That is to say that morals exist because God exists. This would be through some sort of divine nature or divine command theory, whichever you think is more reasonable. Moral truths are necessary truths. It could never be okay for us to murder or rape. But in order for God to be the precondition of moral facts or truths God would have to be necessary. Necessity has to be true in order for P5 to be true then it seems that necessity is a precondition of P5. If something is great to have then it seems like all of the preconditions that make it to be are great to have. P5 is great to have and a precondition of it is Necessity therefore Necessity is great to have.

Conclusion:

It seems then from this line of argumentation that it is more reasonable to believe in God rather than not. I will make further posts using this similar type of reasoning as to what this God is like in terms of features.

A Defense of The Classical Ontological Argument

Introduction

The ontological argument has confused many people and has intrigued many philosophers. However, most people do not find the argument convincing because of an obvious problem. This problem has come up since Anselm first gave the argument and when Christian philosophers and apologist presented it to unbelievers. The problem for the Classical Ontological argument is called the “Lost Island” Objection. Although there are many objections to the ontological argument this one seems to be the most enduring . In this paper I will offer a solution to the lost Island objection and defend the general reasonableness of the Classical Ontological argument thereby providing a contribution to justified theistic belief. First, we will take a look at the ontological argument followed by a brief explanation and a defense for the argument. After this we will look at the “Lost Island” objection and my solution to it. Finally, I will make some concluding remarks.

The Argument Stated

This is how Plantinga states the argument in a way that is clear and that does justice to the primary text of the Proslogion . I have added some extra premises to make the argument even clearer. The Argument is as follows:

1. God is the being that than which nothing greater can be conceived (def. of God or it can be stated like this: I can conceive of a being that than which nothing greater can be conceived and this is what we call God)
2. God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (Assumption for reductio)
3. Existence in reality is greater than existence in the understanding alone. (Premise)
4. A being having all of God's properties plus existence in reality can be conceived. (Premise)
5. A being having all of God's properties plus existence in reality is greater than God. (From (2) and (3).)
6. A being greater than God can be conceived. (From (4) and (5).)
7. It is false that a being greater than God can be conceived. (From definition of "God".) 8. It is false that God exists in the understanding but not in reality. (From (2), (6), (7).)
9. God exists in the understanding. (Premise that the fool grants for reductio.)
10. Therefore, God exists in reality. (From (8), (9).)

Now that the basic structure of the argument is laid out we can look at explaining the premises and try to defend the ones that seem less plausible.


Explanation and Defense

The purpose of this section is to provide an explanation of each of the premises and to give a brief justification and defense of some of the more contentious premises.
Premise 1

Premise one can be stated in two ways as I have parenthetically noted; this is important because some might think that one way is reasonable and the other is not. For myself it is intuitively reasonable to think that God is a being such that nothing greater can be conceived. However, if one thinks that this definition of God begs the question and is put forth for the sole purpose of being able to just arbitrarily prove God by an inference from a manipulation of words then perhaps this route ought to be avoided. An alternative route that ought to be taken by the defender of the classical ontological argument is to suggest that one should just contemplate a being that than which nothing greater can be thought. If one uses the latter way of stating the premise then this does not commit anybody to any preconceived definition of God that would be considered by some to be controversial. Therefore, either way is sufficient for the rest of argument to follow reasonably.

Premise 2

This premise is assuming that one can have a mental conception of a being that than which nothing greater can be conceived. I would take Anselm’s use of the term “in the mind” or as I put in the premises “in the understanding” as being able to intellectually grasp either an attribute(s) or substance . Anselm believes that we can grasp God in some sense because he believes that God is a substance . Furthermore, one might be able to have such a concept of a being that than which nothing greater can be thought before our minds eye by taking the lesser goods that we see in the created order or before our minds and abstracting from those lesser goods to greater goods all the way to a being that than which nothing greater can be thought . However, it should be stressed that this sort of mental abstraction is not necessary to have a robust concept of a being that than which nothing greater can be thought. For myself I know that I can have such a concept before my minds eye pretty immediately and from that concept I can infer many great making properties. Thus, all one would need to grant in order for this premises to be accepted is that one can have an idea of God in the mind or in understanding. This premise is stated in such a way as to be shown in latter premises to be reduced to absurdity so that from the negation of this absurdity one can infer God’s existence.

Premise 3

The third premise of the classical ontological argument is by far the most controversial part of the entire argument because once someone accepts the third premise and the assumptions imbedded therein then the rest of the argument seems to follow inescapably. Therefore, I will deal with this premise in two parts; the first part I will examine the philosophical assumptions in this premise and the second part I will give a justification of these assumptions.

The two main assumptions that go into this premise is that there are things that are or can be objectively great and that existence is one of these things that is objectively great. What I mean by objective is that something is what it is apart from human wants, desires, and beliefs . In other words, it is not grounded in human opinion or apprehension. The assumption here is that great things exist and that they can be compared to a being that than which nothing greater can be thought. However, it might be charged that if this is true then there are things in creation that we can compare objectively to other things in creation . An example of this would be saying that a deer is objectively better than a bear and so on . Yet this example does not make any sense because it seems that a deer is not necessarily something you can compare to a bear to see which one is objectively better . Anselmian philosophical theologians are not necessarily committed to this claim as Thomas V. Morris puts it “….The characterization of God as the greatest possible being does not require universal value-commensurability. It does require that every object be value commensurable with God, but not that every object be so commensurable with every other object”. Morris is suggesting here that other things need not be comparable to one another, but the only thing that we can compare everything to is the greatest possible being, which is God . Another assumption is that existence is one of these things that are great, that is to say being is better than non-being. In the next paragraph we will give a rational justification of this assumption, namely that existence is better to have rather than not.

The rational warrant or justification for the assumption that existence is objectively great is intuition. Intuition is analogous to perception, but the difference is that it is done with mental conception, that is to say the mind’s eye. Intuition is used to justify moral, mathematical, and analytic truths . We use our mind’s eye to just see that 1+1=2. By the nature of what it is to be one and one we can just see that it has to equal two. We just see with our mental conception that the nature of goodness is as such that it would be incompatible with evilness. People have disagreed in the past over what is intuitive and what is not. This suggests that one can be mistaken about the intuition, but that does not mean that just because we can possibly be mistaken about a proposition that therefore we do not know it or be rationally warranted in believing it. We can be mistaken about things in our perceptual experience, but that does not mean that everything I perceive does not count as knowledge. For example, my best friend could be a Humanoid Robot (like in the Terminator movies) to deceive me, but there is no reason to believe such an outrageous proposition, but yet this is still possibly true. However, we would still say that I know my friend is not a Robot even though I can be possibly mistaken about that. This is a falliblistic account of knowledge as opposed to infallibilistic account of knowledge. With that understanding in hand, it seems intuitive than not to us that it is better to exist in reality rather than in the imagination alone. This is especially intuitive when we are thinking of the way in which a being that than which nothing greater can be thought exists in reality. Finally, this existence gives actuality to the greatest imaginable being so existence in this sense is inescapably better to have rather than not.

Premises 4-10

The most contentious premises have been defended and explained. Thus, I will just briefly discuss the rest of the premises for the sake of clarity. Premise 4 is the first premise which begins to flush out the argument for the assumption of the reductio in premise 2. It is arguing that the fool can conceive of a being just like God but that this being actually exists. But as premise 5 points out if this is true then this being would actually be better than God given the assumption in premises 1 that God is that than which nothing greater can be thought. Then the argument at this juncture is designed to show a contradiction from the obvious tension between premises 6 and 7. From this contradiction between 6 and 7, premise 8 infers the opposite in order to avoid God existing in the mind but not in reality. The opposite would be that it is false that God exists in the mind and not in reality. Thus, premise 9 and 10 do the work of drawing out the opposite conclusion: that God exists in the mind and in reality. This thereby shows that it is reasonable to believe that God exists.

A Popular Objection to the Classical Ontological Argument

One of the most popular and apparently decisive objections to the classical ontological argument was by a monk named Gaunilon. Gaunilon tried to offer a counter example to defeat the intuition that it is better to exist in reality rather than just in the imagination alone. This is called the lost Island argument and it is so apparently devastating that it ought to be quoted:

“…it is said that somewhere in the ocean is an island, which, because of the difficulty or rather the impossibility, of discovering what does not exist, is called the lost Island. And they say that this Island has an inestimable wealth of all manner of riches and delicacies in greater abundance than is told of the Islands of the Blest….Now if some one should tell me that there is such an Island, I should easily understand his words…..suppose that he went on to say, as if by a logical inference: “you can no longer doubt that this island which is more excellent than all lands exists somewhere, since you have no doubt that it is in your understanding. And since it is more excellent not to be in the understanding alone, but to exist both in the understanding and in reality, for this reason it must exist. For if it does not exist, any land which really exists will be more excellent than it; and so the island already understood by you to be more excellent will not be more excellent ”

Gaunilon was trying to reduce Saint Anselm’s intuition that it is better to exist rather than not to absurdity. If Anselm’s formula was correct then we could define anything into existence that is greatest in its class. We could show that an Island that than which no greater Island can be thought does exist and also a unicorn that than which nothing greater can be thought. If a unicorn that than which nothing greater can be thought did not in fact exist then we could think of a greater unicorn, namely, one that exists. This would result in a contradiction or absurdity if these premises are granted and thus the greatest possible unicorn would be inferred to exist from this negation. In fact anything with the formula in front of it that says “that than which nothing greater can be thought” could be proved to exist as such. But since we know more reasonably that this is false than the intuition that it is better to exists rather than not then we have a sufficient defeater or decisive reason to doubt that it is better to exist rather than not. Therefore, Gaunilon and many people who doubt this argument are warranted in their doubt unless the defender of the classical ontological argument provides a defeater-defeater.

A Response to the Popular Objection to the Classical Ontological Argument

The response to this classic objection is going to be answered by Anselmian perfect being theology and philosophy to which I plan to define and illustrate. Then I am going to argue from the concept of a being that than which nothing greater can be thought to the conclusion that only a concept such as this can be the only concept that can be just seen to exist. Then I plan to put forth potential objections to my solution and the response to those objections.
Anselmian Perfect Being Theology and Philosophy

Anselmian perfect being theology and philosophy takes the concept of God as being that than which nothing greater can be thought or God as the greatest conceivable being and from this concept of God one can infer certain great making properties . A great making property is a property that is better to have rather than not . God will have every great making property since this is entailed by the concept or definition of him being that than which nothing greater can be thought. For if God lacked any great making property we could conceive of a greater being with all those great making properties that God has plus that great making property that God would lacked. But then this would be a contradiction since you could think of a being greater than the greatest thinkable being. In addition, these great making properties are also justified by intuition like the justification for existence being a great making property. An example of a great making property would be omniscience. For example, let us suppose we are engaging in the project of perfect being theology we would ask the question: Is it better for God to be omniscient or not? Well it is reasonable to think that all knowledge is intrinsically and objective better than having no knowledge, therefore from Anselmian perfect being theology (which includes Anselm’s concept of God) one would infer that God is omniscient. Other examples of great making properties would be necessity, omnipresence, moral perfection, and omnipotence. Moreover, there are other great making properties that are more controversial among theologians and philosophers like divine simplicity, impassability, and timelessness . Therefore, since some great making properties are uncontroversial and others controversial then we can conclude that there will be some properties that are more reasonable to hold to than others. With this view of Anselmian perfect being theology and philosophy we are now equipped to look at answering Gaunilons objection to the classical ontological argument.

A Solution from Anselmian Perfect being Theology and Philosophy

Gaunilons defeater for the ontological argument is insufficient because one can infer from Anselmian perfect being theology that only God can be intuitively seen to exist by the very concept of God. We can infer from the concept of God being that than which nothing greater can be thought that he is the only being that can be intuitively seen to exist because this itself is a great making property. In other words, a great making property of God is that he is the only being that can be seen to exist by just His concept. If God is the only being that can be seen to exist by thinking of the concept of God then we are philosophically committed to the claim that this is better to have rather than not. More importantly this would mean that only God would share this great making property and that nothing else other than God would have it. Thus, this suggests that the objector to the classical ontological argument is no longer in a position to offer a defeater that would suggest that if the ontological argument is valid and sound that one could look at the concept of the greatest conceivable tree, house, bug, and Island and just infer from their concepts that they exist.

Potential Problems with the Solution

However, it must be admitted that this defeater is successfully defeated if one shows that the concept of God is such that it is the only concept by which we can infer existence is itself a great making property and this may seem questionable to some. Since my idea has not been touched in the primary and secondary literature I have no official academic citations for the possible critiques that I am about to level against my own solution . One possible critique is that this solution is arbitrary and ad hoc. In other words the concern with my solution is that it is baselessly and artificially designed to avoid the force of Gaunilo’s apparently decisive defeater of the classical ontological argument. Another possible critique is that it is unclear whether or not that being the only being that can be seen to exist by an inference from His concept is in fact a great making property. Thus, there needs to be a clear and careful answer to these objections to my solution.

A Response to the Critiques of the Solution

The reason why being the only being that can be seen to exist by its concept is a great making property is because it makes God unique ontologically and epistemologically from all other things that exist. This would be yet another property that would make God entirely distinct from the created order because no other created thing or possibly created thing can be seen to exist by its mere concept. This would make God have a uniqueness of kind rather than a uniqueness of degree . Thus, this would give further support for the creator-creature distinction which is also a great making property. Some might argue that uniqueness is in-itself not necessarily good because we can conceive of things that are unique in a negative or evil sense. However, this overlooks the fact that the concept of God is intrinsically good and any uniqueness of his substance will always be a good thing rather than neutral or evil. Furthermore, this property is great making because it makes the grounds or reasons for belief in God distinct from any other fact in the world. In other words, it gives God his epistemological uniqueness. Furthermore, this would make God’s existence something that we can just see from His concept rather than treating God like he is something of the creation that needs to be checked out and investigated in order to be believed reasonably. Thus, because of these considerations it seems like this property is a great making property rather than an arbitrary and sneaky way out of an ancient objection.

Concluding Remarks

In conclusion, we have seen that the ontological argument is valid and sound and given my brief analysis it seems to support the proposition that God exists. We have looked at the general outline of the argument and the reasonableness of each of the premises. Moreover, this paper has also shown that one of the oldest objections against the classical ontological argument fails to apply the idea of a being that than which nothing greater can be thought consistently and as a result it tries to exploit an absurd inference from soundness and validness of the argument, namely that we could just define anything that is the greatest into existence. This opens up optimism for further philosophical theology and especially philosophical theology in Anselmian tradition. This is not a truth of merger significance and the reason why it is great significance will have to be argued in another paper, but for now I will leave us with an encouraging quote about the prospects of philosophical theology in the Anselmian tradition by Thomas Morris “I believe this is correct, that there exists at least a strong prima facie case for the coherence of the elements of classical theism, and so for the coherence of an a priori conception of deity understood as entailing these elements. If this is right, then there can be a strong prima facie case for the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, if indeed he is God, being the God of Anselm, a maximally perfect being”.




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An Argument for Eternal Punishment from Anselmian Perfect Being Philosophy

In this age people have found the doctrine of eternal damnation offensive to say the least. They use many philosophical arguments from God being perfectly loving or from God being unjust for punishing finite sins for an infinite duration. I believe that the doctrine of eternal punishment is biblical (Matt. 25:41-46; Rev. 20:10-15), but in this post I plan to explore an argument from God being the greatest possible being to the existence of a place of eternal punishment to settle the philosophical score as so to speak.

The argument would run as follows:

1: Hell is the greatest possible punishment
2: God is the greatest possible being (let us label this definition of God as G*)
3: G* will have every property that is better to have rather than not
4: It is better to have the greatest possible value rather than not
5: G* instantiates greatest value necessarily
6: It is better to have greatest possible justice rather than not
7: G* instantiates greatest possible justice necessarily
8: Any sin against G* who has the greatest amount of value is the greatest possible evil (from 5)
9: Agents committing the greatest possible evil deserve the greatest possible punishment
10: G* necessarily punishes agents that commit the greatest possible evil with the greatest possible punishment (from 6)
C: Hence, hell exists

Premise one seems reasonable because most Christians have argued that the duration and quality of hell makes it the greatest possible punishment. Premise two is just something obvious about God, that he is the greatest possible being either you see that or you do not. Premises 8, 9, and 10 are the really contentious premises so I will argue for them.

Premises 8, 9 and 10:

If I do not treat God as the greatest possible being then I am not treating him for what he is worth (the greatest possible worth that is). Any sin I commit I am not treating God as being with the greatest worth rather I am treating something which is created and not as good as if it were greater than God. This seems obvious wrong and such blasphemy deserves the greatest measure of punishment if a being were to maintain his justice. I am treating something that is of highest greatness as if it were not the highest greatness (or put different: I am sinning against the greatest possible being). Thus, when one sins he is being maximally unjust toward God since he is treating the evil desires as something of more importance than the greatest possible good. This is so unequal and such an unjust choice that it deserves greatest punishment. After all what could be a greater sin than sinning against the greatest possible being? Because God is just to the greatest possible degree then he ought to serve justice and in this case justice would require the greatest possible punishment. We sin against the greatest possible being and thus such a sin deserves and requires the greatest possible punishment and this punishment Christians call Hell.

The Nature of Hell:

Since our sin is that of infinite evil qualitatively (since God has the greatest possible value) I would think that God cannot punish us with a qualitative infinite amount of wrath since we are qualitatively finite so instead God extends the duration forever and makes the punishment the greatest possible given our finite creaturehood (and this would be the greatest possible justice that God could instantiate given the metaphysical conditions of this possible world).

This is an obvious truth of General revelation, as Paul Writes:

Romans 1:18 For the wrath of God is revealed from heaven against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, who by their unrighteousness suppress the truth.

God has revealed his great wrath towards sinners through general revelation. The only way one can be saved from this wrath is to grab onto Christ’s perfect righteousness through faith alone in the God-man Jesus Christ.