I have previously written on the classical ontological argument on this blog, but this post I want to give a ontological argument that is a bit more contemporary and that I believe firmly to be valid and sound. Here it goes:
P1: I can think of the greatest possible being (G*)
P2: It is better to be necessary rather than not if one were G*
P3: G* entails that he will have every property that is better to have rather than not
P4: G* is necessary
C: G* exists and exists necessarily and we call this being God.
We know that P2 is true on the basis of intuition. We know a lot of things through intuition like mathematical, modal, and moral truths. But some intuitions we have to flush out and argue for. For me personally it is pretty obvious that it is better to be necessary rather than not, but for those of us that are not so convinced perhaps this argument might persuade you:
P5: It is better to be the precondition of moral facts rather than not
That is to say that morals exist because God exists. This would be through some sort of divine nature or divine command theory, whichever you think is more reasonable. Moral truths are necessary truths. It could never be okay for us to murder or rape. But in order for God to be the precondition of moral facts or truths God would have to be necessary. Necessity has to be true in order for P5 to be true then it seems that necessity is a precondition of P5. If something is great to have then it seems like all of the preconditions that make it to be are great to have. P5 is great to have and a precondition of it is Necessity therefore Necessity is great to have.
Conclusion:
It seems then from this line of argumentation that it is more reasonable to believe in God rather than not. I will make further posts using this similar type of reasoning as to what this God is like in terms of features.
Hey Nate.
ReplyDeleteI'll begin with noting a couple of minor things, then I'll move on the more serious objection.
I'll grant (1) for the sake of argument. I happen to think that there are some decent arguments for the incoherence of divine attributes, but there's no sense in going down that trail right now.
Premise (2) is also questionable. Is it any better to exist necessarily than not? In some respects one might think so, as this would mean that such an entity was incapable of going out of existence, and we usually consider ceasing to exist to be bad for an entity, at least one with self-awareness and a vested interest in its continuing to exist. However, I see no reason to think that necessary existence is necessarily better than existence simpliciter. Think about it: Is it better for a spoon to exist or exist necessarily? Well, for the spoon its really not better; the spoon has no vested interest in its continued existence. Nor is the spoon noticeably better in this universe for us: actual spoons are, to us, every bit as good as necessarily existing spoons, unless we're concerned about them lasting forever (which we wouldn't be). Additionally, I can conceive of beings for whom necessary existence would be worse than actual existence, if, for instance, their existence was filled with suffering or not worth living due to various conditions. Even those these conditions may not apply to God as he has been defined, I don't think this premise is at all self-evident, and it's indispensable to the argument.
Premise (3) is where the more serious problems start. I assume you mean that the mere definition of G* entails that he--that entity--will have every property it's better to have rather than not. But this doesn't follow; you still haven't made the move from properties about the concept and definition of God (or G*) to actual properties instantiated by an existing entity.
It's true that if we accept (1) and (2), God must be defined as a being that necessarily exists, if he exists at all. But that's still yet to be established; it's what the argument is designed to prove.
That's why Plantinga and others today attempt to use modal arguments, and try to establish this premise:
If G* exists, G* exists necessarily.
Then the move is to say that it's possible for God to exist; in other words, the theist will then assert that the notion or definition of G*--that is to say, the concept itself is not self-contradictory. If that's true, then in modal speak, G* exists in at least one possible world. And by definition, if a being exists necessarily in any world, then that being exists in all worlds, including the actual one (since the definition of necessary existence is existence in all possible worlds.)
There's a reason that contemporary theologians and theistic philosophers argue this way: It's the only way to get from the concept to actual existence. Anselmian-type arguments like this (non-modal ones like this) lack that key element, which is why Kant's objection to these kinds of ontological arguments is usually considered definitive.
I think Kant explains the mistake you're making pretty well:
"Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, 'God is omnipotent', contains two concepts, each of which has its object -- God and omnipotence. The small word 'is' adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If, now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among which is omnipotence), and say 'God is', or 'There is a God', we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being an object that stands in relation to my concept."
[Emphasis added. That whole section is readily available online right here: http://www.ghc.edu/HUMANITIES/DLARSON/kanto.htm , although I'm sure you have the book. Too many versions for page numbers, though.)
When you say that S has property x, you are already asserting that S exists, as well as that it has that property, for an entity that does not exist cannot possess any properties whatsoever. Therefore you're merely just covertly importing God's existence as a premise by saying that God is x, because to say that "God has property x" presupposes that God exists.
Take one of Russell's favorite examples from another context. If I say "the present king of France is bald," I've already presupposed that the king of France exists--that there is a current king of France. When I say "X is y," I am really asserting that there exists an X such that X is y." Existence is a prerequisite of property-instantiation.
The same thing applies here. You aren't bridging the gap between the properties the entity of whom you are thinking--a mere concept for all we know at this juncture. Yes, if God exists, he will have to have the properties of omniscience, etc. But we still don't know whether he does, because we don't know whether he exists in order to instantiate such properties.
Don't get me wrong, however: I don't think the modal arguments work any better, although I think they are valid, unlike the above argument. Since this isn't the kind of argument you're proffering here, suffice to say that such arguments have little dialectic effectiveness, and aren't even considered proof of God's existence by those who defend it (e.g., Plantinga). This is because such dialogues almost immediately (if everyone understands the argument properly) turn to the question of whether God's existence is possible: The theist uses the mere possibility of God's existence to show that he exists in all possible worlds, while the atheist points out that the mere possibility of God's non-existence would entail his non-existence in all possible worlds (since, by definition, if an entity does not exist in all possible worlds it doesn't exist necessarily). It quickly has the appearance of both sides just asserting that God exists or doesn't.
Always interesting to read your arguments, though, and I appreciate the dialogue.
-T
Addendum:
ReplyDeleteI was technically wrong to call your argument invalid, because properly understood it is viciously circular. (Once Russell helps us unpack that premise.) Otherwise understood (as is often the case), it would be invalid. That's the dilemma.
And apologies for the grammatical errors. Hope you can read through all that!
-T
I'll begin with noting a couple of minor things, then I'll move on the more serious objection.
ReplyDeleteI'll grant (1) for the sake of argument. I happen to think that there are some decent arguments for the incoherence of divine attributes, but there's no sense in going down that trail right now.
Response: Very well. I happen to think there are no good arguments for the incoherence of the divine attributes, but Patrick Grim I think comes the closest. I will write a post on this in the future and you can comment on that if you so desire.
Premise (2) is also questionable. Is it any better to exist necessarily than not? In some respects one might think so, as this would mean that such an entity was incapable of going out of existence, and we usually consider ceasing to exist to be bad for an entity, at least one with self-awareness and a vested interest in its continuing to exist. However, I see no reason to think that necessary existence is necessarily better than existence simpliciter. Think about it: Is it better for a spoon to exist or exist necessarily? Well, for the spoon its really not better; the spoon has no vested interest in its continued existence. Nor is the spoon noticeably better in this universe for us: actual spoons are, to us, every bit as good as necessarily existing spoons, unless we're concerned about them lasting forever (which we wouldn't be). Additionally, I can conceive of beings for whom necessary existence would be worse than actual existence, if, for instance, their existence was filled with suffering or not worth living due to various conditions. Even those these conditions may not apply to God as he has been defined, I don't think this premise is at all self-evident, and it's indispensable to the argument.
Response: I actually already have answered this objection in my first blog on the ontological argument on the great making property of existence, a post in which you commented on. But for the sake of others I will explain it again. I think that necessity and existence are only great making properties when they are instantiated in substances that are more great than not and since God is the greatest possible being then Necessity would surely be a great making property for such a being. Thus, your defeater is insufficient and on top of it all you did not even deal with my argument for necessity being a great making property in these cases.
Premise (3) is where the more serious problems start. I assume you mean that the mere definition of G* entails that he--that entity--will have every property it's better to have rather than not. But this doesn't follow; you still haven't made the move from properties about the concept and definition of God (or G*) to actual properties instantiated by an existing entity.
Response: It is not the definition of G* but rather the conception of G*. I do not think I do not have to make such a move since when I think of 1+1 and then I use intuition to see if it equals 2, I just know since my faculties are reliable 1+1=2 has to be true because I have analyzed the concept and seen all of its entailments. This the same thing with concept of G* I just intuitionally infer from the concept that he has or necessarily exists. Now if you want to be a skeptic about numbers and other things known via intuitive that is perfectly fine but do not expect everyone else think that this move is more reasonable than not. We use our concepts as bridges to reality in almost everything we do and it is properly basic that this is reasonable enterprise.
It's true that if we accept (1) and (2), God must be defined as a being that necessarily exists, if he exists at all. But that's still yet to be established; it's what the argument is designed to prove.
Response: I already mentioned that it is established on the basis of intuition if one just "sees" with their minds eye the concept of the greatest possible being.
Then the move is to say that it's possible for God to exist; in other words, the theist will then assert that the notion or definition of G*--that is to say, the concept itself is not self-contradictory. If that's true, then in modal speak, G* exists in at least one possible world. And by definition, if a being exists necessarily in any world, then that being exists in all worlds, including the actual one (since the definition of necessary existence is existence in all possible worlds.)
Response: I am aware of all this and I know Plantinga's argument.
There's a reason that contemporary theologians and theistic philosophers argue this way: It's the only way to get from the concept to actual existence. Anselmian-type arguments like this (non-modal ones like this) lack that key element, which is why Kant's objection to these kinds of ontological arguments is usually considered definitive.
I think Kant explains the mistake you're making pretty well:
"Being' is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of something which could be added to the concept of a thing. It is merely the positing of a thing, or of certain determinations, as existing in themselves. Logically, it is merely the copula of a judgment. The proposition, 'God is omnipotent', contains two concepts, each of which has its object -- God and omnipotence. The small word 'is' adds no new predicate, but only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If, now, we take the subject (God) with all its predicates (among which is omnipotence), and say 'God is', or 'There is a God', we attach no new predicate to the concept of God, but only posit the subject in itself with all its predicates, and indeed posit it as being an object that stands in relation to my concept."
[Emphasis added. That whole section is readily available online right here: http://www.ghc.edu/HUMANITIES/DLARSON/kanto.htm , although I'm sure you have the book. Too many versions for page numbers, though.)
When you say that S has property x, you are already asserting that S exists, as well as that it has that property, for an entity that does not exist cannot possess any properties whatsoever. Therefore you're merely just covertly importing God's existence as a premise by saying that God is x, because to say that "God has property x" presupposes that God exists.
Take one of Russell's favorite examples from another context. If I say "the present king of France is bald," I've already presupposed that the king of France exists--that there is a current king of France. When I say "X is y," I am really asserting that there exists an X such that X is y." Existence is a prerequisite of property-instantiation.
The same thing applies here. You aren't bridging the gap between the properties the entity of whom you are thinking--a mere concept for all we know at this juncture. Yes, if God exists, he will have to have the properties of omniscience, etc. But we still don't know whether he does, because we don't know whether he exists in order to instantiate such properties.
Response: I have already responded to this line of argumentation on my last post on the ontological argument as well.
I wrote:
"There is a descriptive difference between a horse in the imagination and a horse that is existing independent of the imagination. And if there is a descriptive difference between these two concepts then there is a difference in properties. So I do not really see kant's argument as a threat really."
Now it is true is true when I predicate or think of God as having necessity at that point that entails that he exists but the basis for doing so is via intuition from the concept of G* or the greatest possible being. It is the conclusion of the argument from inferential and intuitional reasoning that gets me there. There is obviously a difference between a being that is contingent and necessary and if there is a difference then there is a difference in property. Kant's objection is taking as Dogma by many philosophers but it is a Dogma that is based on poor reasoning and sloppy epistemology. Your king of france example is odd because we can all think of a unicorn and predicate things about such a creature and know that such a creature does not exist. Thus, I conclude as Brian Davies does on his section from Anselm in the Cambridge companion that it is hard to see any problem with this sort of argument.
Don't get me wrong, however: I don't think the modal arguments work any better, although I think they are valid, unlike the above argument. Since this isn't the kind of argument you're proffering here, suffice to say that such arguments have little dialectic effectiveness, and aren't even considered proof of God's existence by those who defend it (e.g., Plantinga). This is because such dialogues almost immediately (if everyone understands the argument properly) turn to the question of whether God's existence is possible: The theist uses the mere possibility of God's existence to show that he exists in all possible worlds, while the atheist points out that the mere possibility of God's non-existence would entail his non-existence in all possible worlds (since, by definition, if an entity does not exist in all possible worlds it doesn't exist necessarily). It quickly has the appearance of both sides just asserting that God exists or doesn't.
Response: I think your critique of my argument is mistaken but I think your critique of Plantinga's argument is right on. And this is why I no longer use this line of reasoning and I actually think it to be valid and sound but only for those of us who already committed to theistic belief, as I am.
Always interesting to read your arguments, though, and I appreciate the dialogue.
Response: Likewise, Travis. I would encourage you to find more problems with my argument in the future. Thank you for your time.
NPT
Hey again, Nate.
ReplyDeleteRegarding premise (2):
You wrote:
____________
"I think that necessity and existence are only great making properties when they are instantiated in substances that are more great than not and since God is the greatest possible being then Necessity would surely be a great making property for such a being. Thus, your defeater is insufficient and on top of it all you did not even deal with my argument for necessity being a great making property in these cases."
_____________
This is an invalid argument. Even if it were true that "necessity and existence are only great making properties when they are instantiated in substances that are more great than not," and even if "God is the greatest possible being," that would not entail that necessity is a always (or necessarily) a great-making property in general, nor for God more specifically. The premises go:
"necessity and existence are only great making properties when they are instantiated in substances that are more great than not"
Which we can translate as:
(i) Necessity and existence are great making properties only if they are instantiated in substances that are more great than not.
Then,
(ii) "G* is the greatest possible being"
and you conclude that, therefore, "Necessity would surely be a great making property for such a being," which I am assuming I should translate as
(iii) Necessary existence is a great-making property for G*
But that doesn't follow. If translated:
(i) If non-X, then non-Y. (The Y "only if" X)
(2) G* is X
(Since being the greatest possible being would require that being to be greater than not, barring some very weird views about greatness that aren't worth discussing.)
Therefore, (3) G is Y.
But that's a classic fallacy. Just because being more great than not is a prerequisite for necessity and existence (necessary existence, do you mean?) being great making properties doesn't mean that necessary existence will be a great making property for any being that is greater than not--even the greatest. One might as well say that since all squares are rectangles, if we have a rectangle, it must be a square.
Regarding premise (3):
You wrote:
______________
"It is not the definition of G* but rather the conception of G*. I do not think I do not have to make such a move since when I think of 1+1 and then I use intuition to see if it equals 2, I just know since my faculties are reliable 1+1=2 has to be true because I have analyzed the concept and seen all of its entailments.
"This the same thing with concept of G* I just intuitionally infer from the concept that he has or necessarily exists. Now if you want to be a skeptic about numbers and other things known via intuitive that is perfectly fine but do not expect everyone else think that this move is more reasonable than not. We use our concepts as bridges to reality in almost everything we do and it is properly basic that this is reasonable enterprise."
___________
This entire analogy is rather suspect and unconvincing, due to the fact that there are serious dissimilarities between the two topics being compared--God and numbers--but also because of serious limitations in our understanding or agreement concerning the nature of the latter (and the nature of the former is precisely what is at issue). It's rather unclear precisely what "THE number five" is, when we put aside symbolic representations, mental representations, etc. So to use the existence of something we're not sure really exists--and even if so, in what kind of capacity--to bolster claims about an entity about equally questionable (well, what we're debating at least), is rather problematic. That is, it's hard to clear up an issue by raising an equally thorny and controversial one.
Furthermore, despite the problem with understanding the nature of mathematical laws and numbers themselves, from the little we know about them, I think we can be sure of several profound differences between numbers and laws on the one hand, and God as we are understanding him on the other. For one, we take numbers to be abstract entities, not concrete entities with minds, volition. It's hard to see, therefore, how you can expect atheists or agnostics to take seriously the notion that the claim that an abstract proposition, or a truth, or a law, may be immutable or in some way necessary is on a par with claiming that an omnipotent, omni-benevolent, omniscient being with a will and a volition and who experiences emotions exists, always has, and could never come out of existence. We're just talking about two very different kinds of things (and maybe that's not even a proper word to use) here.
Sure, if something's perfect (all-great, whatever), and if part of perfection is existing necessarily, then that entity will exist necessarily. But to say that "something's perfect" is already to assume that said something exists. If the definition of X is that X is perfect, that doesn't mean that X exists. It just means that it's part of the definition of that concept.
You also wrote:
____________
"There is a descriptive difference between a horse in the imagination and a horse that is existing independent of the imagination. And if there is a descriptive difference between these two concepts then there is a difference in properties. So I do not really see kant's argument as a threat really."
______________
It can't be a difference in properties, because only one horse exists to instantiate properties!
Surely you can admit that an entity must exist to exhibit properties, yes?
If that's so, then the horse in the imagination doesn't exist and doesn't have any properties. The idea or image--as in, what is generated by the imagination--has properties, but as a thought, not as an entity. And they don't have those actual properties themselves--the idea has the idea of the property, if you will. That is, the idea of God is not itself omniscient, and the idea of horse is not itself brown. (It's a chemical-neurological process, or it's immaterial, or whatever depending on one's view--that's what I am referring to here.) But the point is that the Horse in the Imagination" itself--not the idea or image of it now, has no properties. It can't because it doesn't exist. It's not brown because it doesn't have a physical body that reflects light; it's not big because it's not extended in space at all; it's not fast because, again, it doesn't exist.
Regular horses, like the one in existence, can have all these properties.
But you want to compare the image or ideal of the horse in the imagination to the horse in reality.
You want to say:
Horse in Imagination: Brown, big, fast, etc.
Horse in Reality: Brown, big, fast, etc., exists.
This is incorrect. There is no Horse in the Imagination--what we're talking about here is an imaginary horse. The Horse in Imagination has no properties at all. Its list of properties is a null set. The idea or image or the horse in the mind has those properties.
And, as far as we're allowed to suppose in the argument, we only have an Imaginary God. So, technically speaking, it as of yet has no properties, until we first demonstrate that he exists--and that he has the prerequisites to have any properties at all. Yes, we know theists define God this way, but this argument doesn't tell us any more than what theists of your kind ought to believe to be consistent with what they believe about God.
We can't compare the properties of Imaginary God to Reality God, note that Reality God is better, then conclude that, since the definition of God is to be the best, Reality God is real, because he is by definition since he's the one that's real. That's because there is no Imaginary God--he's merely imaginary--not real, instantiation no properties at all--ex hypothesi .
You mention the unicorn example. That's a fine one. Is the following proposition true?
Unicorns have one horn.
It can't be, because there are no unicorns to have one horn.
If I said:
Triceratops had three horns.
That is true, because at one time there existed triceratops, and they had three horns.
Now, if I say:
God is omniscient.
Well, if God as defined exists, then I suppose this would be true. But note this: If he does not exist, then obviously the claim is false, right? If there is no God, then the proposition "God is omniscient" is false, since there's no God to know everything.
Likewise, when you can say (your words) God "will have every property that is better to have rather than not," that "will have" means that this statement is a hypothetical one, or it is talking about the idea itself. Either yes, God would have to have those properties if he existed; or, yes, your concept of God includes the notion that this entity has such and such properties--but this would have nothing to do with the real world, and what actually exists.
Thanks for the continuing discussion,
-T
This is an invalid argument. Even if it were true that "necessity and existence are only great making properties when they are instantiated in substances that are more great than not," and even if "God is the greatest possible being," that would not entail that necessity is a always (or necessarily) a great-making property in general, nor for God more specifically. The premises go:
ReplyDelete"necessity and existence are only great making properties when they are instantiated in substances that are more great than not"
Which we can translate as:
(i) Necessity and existence are great making properties only if they are instantiated in substances that are more great than not.
Then,
(ii) "G* is the greatest possible being"
and you conclude that, therefore, "Necessity would surely be a great making property for such a being," which I am assuming I should translate as
(iii) Necessary existence is a great-making property for G*
But that doesn't follow. If translated:
(i) If non-X, then non-Y. (The Y "only if" X)
(2) G* is X
(Since being the greatest possible being would require that being to be greater than not, barring some very weird views about greatness that aren't worth discussing.)
Therefore, (3) G is Y.
But that's a classic fallacy. Just because being more great than not is a prerequisite for necessity and existence being great making properties doesn't mean that necessary existence will be a great making property for any being that is greater than not--even the greatest. One might as well say that since all squares are rectangles, if we have a rectangle, it must be a square.
Response: I agree with a great deal of what you said but I would reject your conclusion on the basis of further specifications to my argument. If I were to say that Necessity is a great making property iff it were to be instantiated by the greatest possible being then that does seem to save the principle. Perhaps necessity it is not a great making property in a general sense but just in specific instances (there is no problem with saying this), in which case if someone who was using intuition properly would see that the greatest possible being would meet this criteria.
The argument thus would look a bit something like this:
P1: I can think of the greatest possible being (G*)
P2: It is better to be necessary iff one were G* rather than not
P3: G* entails that he will have every property that is better to have rather than not
P4: G* is necessary
C: G* exists and exists necessarily and we call this being God.
Furthermore, I am not saying that being greater rather than not is a prerequisite for necessary existence therefore, all beings that are greater than not will have necessary existence. That is surely an example of invalid reasoning. What I am saying is this: The greatest possible being will have necessary existence because for the greatest possible being it is better to have necessary existence rather than not because we intuit this on the basis of the conception of the greatest possible being. Finally, with all those qualifications in it is hard to see what the precisely the problem is with this argument.
Regarding premise (3):
This entire analogy is rather suspect and unconvincing, due to the fact that there are serious dissimilarities between the two topics being compared--God and numbers--but also because of serious limitations in our understanding or agreement concerning the nature of the latter (and the nature of the former is precisely what is at issue). It's rather unclear precisely what "THE number five" is, when we put aside symbolic representations, mental representations, etc. So to use the existence of something we're not sure really exists--and even if so, in what kind of capacity--to bolster claims about an entity about equally questionable (well, what we're debating at least), is rather problematic. That is, it's hard to clear up an issue by raising an equally thorny and controversial one.
Response: I think this concern can be sufficiently cleared up when you realize that I am not saying that the content of mathematics and God are the same but rather the way in which one justifies those claims and I am arguing that they are both justified or warranted on the basis of intuition. Now concerning how one is controversial and the other is not (numbers), I would account for this phenomenon the two following ways: 1) Not all things justified on the basis of intuition have the same justificatory power, that is to say they do not have the same sort strength in their grounds. I may know that from the nature of a bachelor that he is not a married man a lot more clearly than I know it is wrong to lie in certain circumstances. Thus, there is differing strengths of intuitions, but all intuitions that are warranted of course are more reasonable than not and that is all I am asking one to accept for this argument. 2) Another reason why one is controversial and the other is not is because in Christian theology unbelievers hate God and suppresses the truth in unrighteousness so then perhaps the Christian might question the atheist’s intellectual integrity when he says that these things are really this unclear and controversial. I am sure you know what route I might take on these two option, but both seem somewhat reasonable.
Furthermore, despite the problem with understanding the nature of mathematical laws and numbers themselves, from the little we know about them, I think we can be sure of several profound differences between numbers and laws on the one hand, and God as we are understanding him on the other. For one, we take numbers to be abstract entities, not concrete entities with minds, volition. It's hard to see, therefore, how you can expect atheists or agnostics to take seriously the notion that the claim that an abstract proposition, or a truth, or a law, may be immutable or in some way necessary is on a par with claiming that an omnipotent, omni-benevolent, omniscient being with a will and a volition and who experiences emotions exists, always has, and could never come out of existence. We're just talking about two very different kinds of things (and maybe that's not even a proper word to use) here.
Response: I have state previously that I do think there is a difference between the content of the numbers and inferring things from our concepts about the divine essence. But I would expect atheists and agnostics to take this line of argumentation seriously because necessity does seem like something only the greatest possible being would have and that seems pretty intuitive.
Sure, if something's perfect (all-great, whatever), and if part of perfection is existing necessarily, then that entity will exist necessarily. But to say that "something's perfect" is already to assume that said something exists. If the definition of X is that X is perfect, that doesn't mean that X exists. It just means that it's part of the definition of that concept.
It can't be a difference in properties, because only one horse exists to instantiate properties!
Response: The content of our thoughts have mental properties and the thought itself has properties and my contention is that those are different than that of the properties of a thing that is actually existing, but especially existing necessarily.
Surely you can admit that an entity must exist to exhibit properties, yes?
Response: I think my above qualification makes that clear. Certainly the thoughts in my mind exist as well as the thought itself.
If that's so, then the horse in the imagination doesn't exist and doesn't have any properties. The idea or image--as in, what is generated by the imagination--has properties, but as a thought, not as an entity. And they don't have those actual properties themselves--the idea has the idea of the property, if you will. That is, the idea of God is not itself omniscient, and the idea of horse is not itself brown. (It's a chemical-neurological process, or it's immaterial, or whatever depending on one's view--that's what I am referring to here.) But the point is that the Horse in the Imagination" itself--not the idea or image of it now, has no properties. It can't because it doesn't exist. It's not brown because it doesn't have a physical body that reflects light; it's not big because it's not extended in space at all; it's not fast because, again, it doesn't exist.
Regular horses, like the one in existence, can have all these properties.
But you want to compare the image or ideal of the horse in the imagination to the horse in reality.
You want to say:
Horse in Imagination: Brown, big, fast, etc.
Horse in Reality: Brown, big, fast, etc., exists.
This is incorrect. There is no Horse in the Imagination--what we're talking about here is an imaginary horse. The Horse in Imagination has no properties at all. Its list of properties is a null set. The idea or image or the horse in the mind has those properties.
And, as far as we're allowed to suppose in the argument, we only have an Imaginary God. So, technically speaking, it as of yet has no properties, until we first demonstrate that he exists--and that he has the prerequisites to have any properties at all. Yes, we know theists define God this way, but this argument doesn't tell us any more than what theists of your kind ought to believe to be consistent with what they believe about God.
We can't compare the properties of Imaginary God to Reality God, note that Reality God is better, then conclude that, since the definition of God is to be the best, Reality God is real, because he is by definition since he's the one that's real. That's because there is no Imaginary God--he's merely imaginary--not real, instantiation no properties at all--ex hypothesi .
You mention the unicorn example. That's a fine one. Is the following proposition true?
Unicorns have one horn.
It can't be, because there are no unicorns to have one horn.
If I said:
Triceratops had three horns.
That is true, because at one time there existed triceratops, and they had three horns.
Now, if I say:
God is omniscient.
Well, if God as defined exists, then I suppose this would be true. But note this: If he does not exist, then obviously the claim is false, right? If there is no God, then the proposition "God is omniscient" is false, since there's no God to know everything.
Likewise, when you can say (your words) God "will have every property that is better to have rather than not," that "will have" means that this statement is a hypothetical one, or it is talking about the idea itself. Either yes, God would have to have those properties if he existed; or, yes, your concept of God includes the notion that this entity has such and such properties--but this would have nothing to do with the real world, and what actually exists.
Response: Believe it or not I actually agree with most of what you have said here but I hardly think this acts as a defeater to my argument. I would say that a unicorn does instantiates imaginary or subject properties from the object of contemplation via my minds eye. I would distinguish between subjective properties and objective ones. We have no reason for believing that lies before my minds eye in the case of the unicorn has real existence so we should be agnostic about it until we can infer anything from its definition that it has to exist, it is merely a subjective in all of its properties. But in God’s case we can infer necessary actual existence from our subjective metal properties about such a being. Thus, such a being has objective properties and we know this on the basis of our subjective properties about such a being. This is just like how we know on the basis of our subjective properties that 1+1=2 is an objective truth about the real world independent of our conceptions about it. God as I have argued is like this, on the basis of intuition inferred from the mere idea or subjective properties of the greatest possible being. Thus, there is a real distinguish between subjective and objective properties and hence, necessary existence is a property.
Thanks for the continuing discussion,
Response: No problem, you have caused me a great deal of happiness by your critical thinking. I would encourage you to continue to find problems with my argument.
NPT