The first Transcendental argument I am going to give is the moral one. William Lane Craig and Greg Bahnsen use this form of argumentation and I have been greatly influenced by both of these men on issues pertaining to arguments for God's existence. So here goes my formulation of the Transcendental argument for God's existence from what I will call "moral facts". Here it goes:
P1: If God does not exist moral facts do not exist
P2: Moral facts exist
C: Hence, God exist
Moral Facts:
What I mean by moral facts is that there are good and bad things independent of our recognition of it. This is sort of like the fact that sea world exists, even if no one recognized the existence of such a place as sea world the place would still exist. Likewise, with moral facts they exist independent of our recognition of it. Suppose there were a possible world P* where everyone thought that the holocaust was morally praiseworthy and that everyone thought putting your first born child into a microwave was morally obligatory, in P* everyone would be moral wrong in doing these things even if not a single human being recognized it.
God and Moral Facts:
If God does not exist then these sort of moral facts do not exist. God is a necessarily good being that always commands what ought to be done and what ought not to be done. It is necessary that God command the good in the Christian theistic tradition. This sort of God would be the necessary meta-ethical foundation for all moral facts.
No Moral Facts without God:
If God does not exist how could moral facts exist? They simply cannot. Some might argue for atheistic moral realism, the view that immaterial forms or propositions are our meta-ethical foundation for moral facts. But this view is implausible for a number of reasons: 1) It is hard to conceive of a immaterial objects having content apart from a mind with thoughts that possess content, 2) We are only obligated to persons and morality requires moral obligation and there can be no moral obligation on atheistic moral realism since they reject the person hood of God, 3) we would have no way to know what is in fact good because these immaterial forms or propositions do not cause or relate to the world, 4) The meta-ethical foundation of the good (forms or propositions) would be themselves not good because only persons can possess moral properties of goodness and badness. The good would not be good in this case which would be a contradiction.
Conclusion:
The God of Christianity or tradition theism fulfills criteria 1-4 and thus if one wants to be a) reasonable and b) believe in moral facts then they ought to believe in the existence of God.
Nate,
ReplyDeleteanticipating some possible questions/concerns from our readers, let me ask a few questions:
1. What do you mean when you say that immaterial objects cannot have content? I mean, wouldn't we say that a proposition has content? In which case, wouldn't moral propositions have content regardless of whether or not they were in a mind? Did you mean to say that we can't really conceive of the immaterial objects (like propositions) themselves as existing outside of a mind?
2. What do you mean when you say that only persons can possess moral properties? Don't we often ascribe moral properties such as goodness and badness to non-personal things (like actions, states-of-affairs, or, as Christians, creation itself)?
These are both good questions and concerns David. I would strongly encourage anybody reading this post to try to find problems with the argument I am giving.
ReplyDelete1) I would say that it is hard to conceive of immaterial things having content apart from a mind. I would say that all propositions are in the mind of God. This consideration will lead me to further transcendental arguments in future posts. I guess the idea of propositions and forms being outside the mind of God is really a hard thing to even conceive of as possible.
2) Only personal agents can have moral properties, but of course other things may be good like a table or a computer but they are not morally good. It may be good that I am a human being, but it is not morally good that I am a human being because physical and immaterial states in which I lack violation over are not things that I am morally responsible for and thus they are not moral properties.
I hope that helps!
NPT
You claim that there are "moral facts" which are "good and bad things independent of our recognition of it." I suppose that on this understanding of moral facts, I would have to deny the second premise. Of course, I am ultimately going to want to base "good" and "bad" on enjoyment and suffering (with no claims of an objective morality). Thus, I think it would be impossible for action X to be wrong but not a single entity aware of it; at least the being who was caused decreased enjoyment or experienced some kind of suffering would experience some sort of relevant mental phenomena. Long story short, I suppose I believe there are no moral facts in the way you're defining them (being transcendent and independent of human thought, attitudes, etc.).
ReplyDeleteAnd while I think the first premise is true, that is only because I believe the consequent is true regardless. That is, I fail to see how theism is any more conducive to moral realism (or the belief in moral facts) than is atheism or any other -ism. The Euthyphro dilemma (which is really just one form of a general problem for any kind of authority, in my opinion) still looms large for any kind of divine command theory, which I am assuming you're wishing to advance here.
Could you further explain exactly how God is supposed to ground objective morality? How do you deal with the Euthyphro dilemma, if you take a DCT route?
PS:
ReplyDeleteWe could put the question this way: How does God ground morality? Just having a big powerful entity in the sky telling us what to do doesn't make right and wrong, does it? Some part of the story is missing.
I realize that the story somehow involves moral laws allegedly being thoughts in God's mind. But how does that obligate us?
-T
Well I think either the divine nature theory or the command theory will work fine. But I do think the Euthyphro dilemma is ultimately unsuccessful defeater against a certain view of the divine theory of ethics. One could say God is necessarily good and he necessarily commands the good and this could not be other than what it is, that is to say it is necessary. Since God commands the Good and he is the Good then we ought to follow him and since he is God we have obligation to do whatever he says since he is the greatest possible being.
ReplyDeleteAs for the fact that you do not believe in moral facts, that is sort of a conversation stopper as so to speak just like the crazy person that tells me that 1+1=4,576. So I would encourage you to do some moral intuitive reflection on that and that is probably the best I could say to that. But thanks for your time and I would encourage you to always criticize my arguments if you happen to find honest flaws with them.
NPT
There are different ways to state the Euthyphro dilemma, but I believe a good way to put it is like this. Does God have a reason for the ethical norms he has allegedly established or not? If so, then this reason is truly why particular actions are right and wrong; it is not because of the command of God. If God has no reason, then ethics is arbitrary, and fails on a fundamental level, as any ethical theory at least should give us a reason to do right or avoid doing what is wrong.
ReplyDeleteTo say that God's reason is "because he is that way" or "because that is his nature" is circular and non-explanatory in the first place, but additionally places makes ethics something that is outside of God's control; beings do not choose or make their own nature, nor can they change them. Christians like this as an answer to the question whether God can change right and wrong today, because if true, it means he cannot. But it also means that he has no control over ethics and didn't establish ethical norms.
When I say that I do not believe in moral facts, that is simply to say that I don't believe in them, as you have defined them (that's what I said). I don't believe that there are transcendent norms of behavior. But that doesn't mean that I don't think some kinds of behavior are better or worse than others by all natural criteria.
To dismiss the idea that a big powerful invisible being is responsible for basic behavior norms that human beings have established over generations upon generations of evolution and social cooperation is hardly akin to saying that 1+1=4576.
Here's what I would like to be explained. What exactly does your moral realism, or belief in moral facts as you've defined moral realism, give you that the moral anti-realist cannot have?
I can judge that by some criteria an action is worse than another. You do the same. I appeal to naturalistic criteria such as sentience, pain, consciousness, etc., and you appeal to God or a book. Then I condemn the action, and you do the same. What do you have that I don't have? The ability to say it's really, really wrong? I can say that too.
Ultimately, though, there are just two sets of criteria sorting behaviors in various ways. How is yours necessarily any better than mine? Because a big powerful being said it was? Why does that mean that this being must be right? Aren't powerful entities very often wrong? How can we know that this big powerful being is leading us in the right direction?
How do we know that God is good? What does it mean to say that God is good? Why do Christians bother to assert this, if it's allegedly true by definition (if we're to listen to your ontological argument)? It's because this is an evaluation of God's behavior. You're saying that God measures up to some standard of goodness that's ultimately independent of him.
Indeed, every one of us is ultimately the arbiter of what we think is right and wrong, regardless of what side you're on. You had to read and accept ethical claims of Christianity by utilizing your own criteria and deciding that those of Christianity weren't too strange to be believed. (I've judged otherwise.) And I look around at the world and read books and try to figure out the best way to behave and treat other entities in it, for all involved as much as they can be.
This whole search for an "objective" source is futile, since it's through subjective elements that ethics arises in the first place: a subject has particular capacities that make it better or worse for it to be treated in this way or that way (be it sentience, self-consciousness, or what have you).
Finally, it just seems so often taken for granted that God could somehow ground ethics. But even if a god exists, there's no reason to suppose that we have any reason to do what it tells us to do, or that he's not actually malevolent, until we evaluate that being for ourselves. That means we have to have some independent ethical standard by which to judge it, even if it is a subjective one.
There are different ways to state the Euthyphro dilemma, but I believe a good way to put it is like this. Does God have a reason for the ethical norms he has allegedly established or not? If so, then this reason is truly why particular actions are right and wrong; it is not because of the command of God. If God has no reason, then ethics is arbitrary, and fails on a fundamental level, as any ethical theory at least should give us a reason to do right or avoid doing what is wrong.
ReplyDeleteResponse: Well if you hold to the distinction between necessary and contingent propositions I do not think this is much of issue here. For one the good is just good and there can be no reason for it being good because it is necessary and all necessary things just have to be that way so there is no reason for a explanation for them. So I think something would only be arbitrary if it were to be contingent and lack sufficient reason. Thus, I think God just has the property of goodness-itself and we know what actions are in line with this property of God by his commands.
To say that God's reason is "because he is that way" or "because that is his nature" is circular and non-explanatory in the first place, but additionally places makes ethics something that is outside of God's control; beings do not choose or make their own nature, nor can they change them. Christians like this as an answer to the question whether God can change right and wrong today, because if true, it means he cannot. But it also means that he has no control over ethics and didn't establish ethical norms.
Response: I already answered the first point above. I think God has a certain amount of control even thought it is caused out of his nature. I believe your critique presupposes a libertarian view of control which I do not think has to be the only way to describe what an adequate measure of control is, I think that semi-compatibilists accounts of control are reasonable so as a result I do think this critique will work in light of those considerations.
When I say that I do not believe in moral facts, that is simply to say that I don't believe in them, as you have defined them (that's what I said). I don't believe that there are transcendent norms of behavior. But that doesn't mean that I don't think some kinds of behavior are better or worse than others by all natural criteria.
Response: I know that. Your view of morals are human dependent like what sort of color you like and so on, but it is not a fact like my car being parked outside.
To dismiss the idea that a big powerful invisible being is responsible for basic behavior norms that human beings have established over generations upon generations of evolution and social cooperation is hardly akin to saying that 1+1=4576.
Response: I would say it is justified the same way, through intuition but the content differs of course.
Here's what I would like to be explained. What exactly does your moral realism, or belief in moral facts as you've defined moral realism, give you that the moral anti-realist cannot have?
Response: Yeah, your view of morality is subjective and human dependent and as a result it lacks the same sort of factual ontological status as the proposition “Dinosaurs existed”.
I can judge that by some criteria an action is worse than another. You do the same. I appeal to naturalistic criteria such as sentience, pain, consciousness, etc., and you appeal to God or a book. Then I condemn the action, and you do the same. What do you have that I don't have? The ability to say it's really, really wrong? I can say that too.
Response: My argument has not been that you are unable to say certain things but rather you cannot claim what you are saying is in fact a moral fact. What you are really expressing is that I do not like such for such or the community disapproves of such and such. But it seems to me that we have this sort of intuition that morality is a bit more than that.
Ultimately, though, there are just two sets of criteria sorting behaviors in various ways. How is yours necessarily any better than mine? Because a big powerful being said it was? Why does that mean that this being must be right? Aren't powerful entities very often wrong? How can we know that this big powerful being is leading us in the right direction?
Response: No, I would disagree with your criteria claim; this is more of a metaphysical question about the status of moral statements rather than a sort of categorization of moral statements. The reason why we should listen to this entity is because he has the property of goodness-itself and he has the good as a necessity of his nature and it seems that we should follow what God who is the good commands us to do, if you do not think we should follow the good and you think there is no intuitive reason for doing so then I am not sure I can help you there, but I hardly think that is a sort of defeater for my argumentation thus far.
How do we know that God is good?
Response: This is like asking how “do you know that the good is good?” It just is good. Likewise, God is the only sort of thing that could ground moral facts and thus he is the only sort of thing that could be the good.
What does it mean to say that God is good?
Response: We are predicating a property of goodness-itself to God.
Why do Christians bother to assert this, if it's allegedly true by definition (if we're to listen to your ontological argument)?
Response: It is analytically and necessarily true. The reason why we assert this is because we want to flush out the properties of God or to perhaps worship those great making properties.
It's because this is an evaluation of God's behavior. You're saying that God measures up to some standard of goodness that's ultimately independent of him.
Response: Nope, I see no reason for believing this.
Indeed, every one of us is ultimately the arbiter of what we think is right and wrong, regardless of what side you're on. You had to read and accept ethical claims of Christianity by utilizing your own criteria and deciding that those of Christianity weren't too strange to be believed. (I've judged otherwise.) And I look around at the world and read books and try to figure out the best way to behave and treat other entities in it, for all involved as much as they can be.
Response: I think you are right in one sense, we are arbiter of what we think to be right or wrong but we are not the arbiter of what is in fact right or wrong. I would say that I used the data in general revelation through my moral intuitions and see if they matched with the Christian revelation and I think they cohere, but that is more of an issue about Christianity than it is God’s existence at this juncture.
This whole search for an "objective" source is futile, since it's through subjective elements that ethics arises in the first place: a subject has particular capacities that make it better or worse for it to be treated in this way or that way (be it sentience, self-consciousness, or what have you).
Response: I am not sure what you are evening arguing here. I would say that there are moral facts such as “you should not take a persons life for no reason” this manifests with different possible species or other possible worlds with different beings but the general moral principle is still factual and necessary although it might be differently applied given different non-moral properties.
Finally, it just seems so often taken for granted that God could somehow ground ethics. But even if a god exists, there's no reason to suppose that we have any reason to do what it tells us to do, or that he's not actually malevolent, until we evaluate that being for ourselves. That means we have to have some independent ethical standard by which to judge it, even if it is a subjective one.
Response: I think this critique is a bit misguided; God is good and necessarily good in my view point and as a result God is necessarily and essentially goodness itself. But we subjectively have to apprehend this truth but we do not determine this truth we merely discover it as such. We think God’s thoughts after him. And we have ever reason to do what he tells us since he simply is the good. Thank you for your insights if you have anymore critiques of my argument I would be glad to hear them.
NPT