Tuesday, April 27, 2010
A Philosophical Argument For Divine Retributive Justice
God is the greatest possible being which entails God has every property that is better to have rather than to lack. It is clear that it is better for God to have justice to the greatest possible degree rather than to have justice that is lesser than the greatest possible degree. God has the greatest possible degree of justice entails if there is great evil God will at least punish that evil with at least a great punishment. There is a great evil that occurs in every sin which is this: the creature is not honoring and loving with all of his ability the greatest possible being. Instead the creature loves and honors something created that is lesser than the greatest possible being. This is a dishonoring and unloving sin against the greatest possible being and it is at least a great evil. Hence, any sin that a creature commits is at least a great sin and a great sin requires from a being with the greatest possible degree of justice at least a great punishment (This great punishment could very well be understood as the traditional doctrine of hell). This argument establishes the following: God cannot freely forgive sins without retributive justice.
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Doesn't this assume that "justice" means (or necessarily includes within its meaning) the concept of retribution? In other words, why does the greatest possible degree of justice entail the greatest possible degree of retributive justice?
ReplyDeleteYes, it does. What else do you think justice to the greatest possible degree could mean? Justice to the greatest possible degree requires, it seems to me, perfection and if one were to fall from that standard and fall into a great sin then such a sin should be punished greatly and in order for that person to be righteous again in place of the great sin they committed they would need to do the right thing. This is what justice to the greatest possible degree is on the intuitive face of it for me....what do you think MG?
ReplyDeleteGod Bless,
NPT
Nate,
ReplyDeleteI don't agree. But before we proceed, I would like to know how you would answer this question: Was God perfectly just prior to creation? I think the answer is yes, and as such it seems justice cannot be defined in terms of God's infliction of punishment (even granting for a moment that this is a necessary corollary if creatures do sin). There is something more fundamental about justice than the infliction of punishment (though at this stage of approaching the question I wouldn't say we have ruled out the possibility that retributive punishment is part of what justice entails). So I'm curious if you would agree that there is more to justice than the infliction of punishment in response to guilt, and if you would agree that God was perfectly just prior to creation.
Hey MG,
ReplyDeleteI would say God in his dealings with his trinitarian communion was just. If someone is perfect then it is just to treat them as perfect. So it's pretty clear that justice is not just to do with punishment but rather rewards and treatment of the righteous. Last time I was only speaking with respect to justice and sin rather than justice and righteousness. Good question though.
God Bless,
NPT
Nate--
ReplyDeleteOkay, cool... I definitely think you are right about the relationships of the Persons.
I would add that it seems like when you say that the Trinity was just prior to creation, this justice cannot consist in each Person "giving what is due" to the other Persons. After all, God does not merit anything.
So if the Trinity was just prior to creation, but this justice did not consist in "giving what is due" to each person, how would you define that justice? Or would you disagree with me and say that God's justice prior to creation did consist in "giving what is due"? I would define the justice of God as his moral harmony. Would you agree with that definition, and say that the uncreated justice of God is the moral harmony that the Persons of the Trinity share?
Hey MG,
ReplyDeleteOnly divine persons prior to creation do not earn anything because they already have infinite value from all eternity (there is no reason to earn when you already have). I would still define justice as giving what is due or treating something according to what is deserved. God has infinite value so the God in his inter trinitarian communion would treat each other as each is due. Hence, they treat each other with infinite value. I would say what I have described here is a moral harmony. But what do you mean when you say that?
God Bless,
NPT
Nate,
ReplyDeleteThe concept of justice you are articulating seems wider than punishing or rewarding in proportion to merit. Would you agree that in that sense of "giving what is due" (where "due" means "in accordance with merit") we can't say that the divine Persons "give each other what is due"?
Moral harmony is, on my view, more than just giving others what is their due. It is the naturally morally appropriate relationships of a person's aspects, as well as the morally appropriate relationships of a person to other people. This goes beyond repaying for dismerit or merit, because many relationships are morally appropriate but are not such relationships of repayment. Part of what it means for a person to be just, it seems, is for that person's faculties to be functioning in a morally appropriate way--for the intellect and will to be rightly related, for instance. Parent/child relationships can be just or unjust (morally harmonious or morally disharmonious) based on factors other than the merit or dismerit of parent and child in relation to each other. A parent can be unjust to a child if he or she neglects trying to give the child what the child needs. The justice of a parent seems like it can include giving what a child needs, not necessarily what a child earns.
Nate,
ReplyDeleteYou wrote:
“I do not see that you are saying anything different than myself in the second paragraph. I do not think you are saying something that my view of justice could not accommodate.”
At this point you seem to deny that justice is “giving each person what is merited.” Your concept of “due” is broader than merit, so I can agree with you.
When you say
“I would say morally appropriate relationships are just and so when Christ had such relationships he earned merit for us by God.”
it sounds like you are saying that acquiring merit and being given what is due is something that is consequent upon having morally appropriate relationships. This seems to deny that morally appropriate relationships are just relationships according to your definition (relationships of giving what is due). Is that correct? Or would you say that God’s relationship of giving merit to Christ was consequent upon the fact that he gave what is due to others?
You wrote:
“If a person is perfect and is intellectually responsible then that is just as well and it meritorious before God. In the example of parent and child relationships are just if the child and parent who were acting perfectly and they are treating each other perfectly then this relationship would be likewise meritorious by God. Hence, all of these relationships are just and they receive merit from God if one were perfect. It seems then that my view of justice I can accommodate this.”
But what makes that parent-child relationship just? Is it the fact that the child merits good treatment from his parent by earning it from his parent? Whether it is meritorious before God or not isn’t relevant to defining whether the relationship of child to parent is an inherently just one (although it may be a necessary consequence). It seems like you are trying to accommodate this example into your view of justice by maintaining the idea that the only non-meritorious justice is divine justice, and then saying that because the examples I identified (if done perfectly) are meritorious, God gives what is due if they are accomplished correctly. But I’m saying that wholly apart from the issue of whether or not they are meritorious, we would identify a parent-child relationship as just if the parent gave to the child according to need. It would be unfair/unjust for the parent not to do so, and fair/just to do so. And this is what is relevant to the definition of something as “just” or “unjust”—not whether God bestows moral credit on someone (though God would, of course, do this if He thought the person had earned the merit; and thus merit would be consequent upon these just/fair relationships).
Hey,
ReplyDeleteI wrote a response to you but it was when I just woke up and I was feeling a little out of it, so I will write a different response.
I would say that justice is giving what is due both in terms of both intrinsic value and earned merit. God it seems would have a infinite value and hence would require a giving due of infinite treatment. To answer your question: the persons are just because they give to each other what is due intrinsically and not by virtue of earn merit.
It seems that there is a lack of demonstration that moral harmony entails more than giving others what is their due. In your example about appropriate relationships I would think that we ought to be loving to all persons on a individual level because we are giving what is due to them by virtue of the fact of them being made in the image of God. This gives them high value and our due is to love all persons. The relationships that are morally appropriate are those in which the person is giving the person what is due because they are made in God's image. When I act unloving to one person and loving to another this is most unjust because both persons deserve my love because they are made in the image of God.
When a person is intellectually responsible with his cognitive equipment and they are not in a position of demerit (only Adam and Christ see Romans 5) then they do merit good treatment from God. They are being just because they are loving God with all their being and treating him with the highest value they possibly can and God is just for rewarding them for their good service to him and for his glory.
The child has intrinsic value and all children have such a value require that their needs ought to be sufficiently meant. This is our due to children and to follow God's commandments to our children. In any instance we give due to another we are also giving due to God by following his commandments which are morally binding upon us as God's creatures. Hence, when a parent is giving a child what she needs she is giving what is due to a child by virtue of that child having intrinsic value by being made in the image of God.
At this point it would still seem to me that moral harmony and giving what is rightfully due intrinsically and by earning by virtue of actions are the same thing. Hence, I see no reason for thinking that moral harmony is more than giving what is due in the two senses that I have outlined above. I have appreciated your thought provoking questions. Good day!
God Bless,
NPT
MG,
ReplyDeleteI believe what I have written above addresses your concerns that you have just written. If I have failed to address anything in my thoughts above just let me know. Please feel free voice any questions or concerns about my view of justice because it is going into a paper on the atonement. Thanks!
God Bless,
NPT
This is a very stimulating discussion, but Nate, I need to step in here and tell you to put the polemicizing off until you finish that paper. I know the temptation, but knock it off. Seriously, bro, take this up on the weekend and get that done.
ReplyDeleteThanks for your comments, too, Michael. This discussion is very helpful for me thinking on this issue as well, but I'm sure at this time you are also at wit's end with finishing the semester stuff, so pick this up after finals, both of you.
Good point Beau....You know how compulsive this can get for me. It is so much more interesting to discuss this with MG than write a paper on 2 Samuel 3:20-39. MG if you are in school then do not worry about responding to me until you are done, but if you are not then you can leave your comments in and I will incorporate your concerns in my paper. I will then get back to discussing this further next month. Thanks for the help! I am blessed that I have such good friends. :)
ReplyDeleteGod Bless,
NPT
Nate:
ReplyDeleteYou wrote:
“I would say that justice is giving what is due both in terms of both intrinsic value and earned merit. God it seems would have a infinite value and hence would require a giving due of infinite treatment. To answer your question: the persons are just because they give to each other what is due intrinsically and not by virtue of earn merit.”
If this is so, then you agree that justice can consist (at least sometimes, and at least partly) in acting in a way that properly recognizes the inherent moral value of the objects of your action. If so, then why think that God’s justice with respect to creatures is any different? Why think that God’s justice also requires paying back for dismerit or merit?
Michael, I think the problem here is the different views Reformed have of the creature/Creator distinction. To say that because this kind of justice (both the intrinsic worth and the constant acts, thoughts, etc. of perfect holiness on the part of the Trinity) exists in the case of God certainly in no way entails that the same could be said of the creature. Remember:
ReplyDelete5 For those who live according to the flesh set their minds on the things of the flesh, but those who live according to the Spirit set their minds on the things of the Spirit. 6 For to set the mind on the flesh is death, but to set the mind on the Spirit is life and peace. 7 For the mind that is set on the flesh is hostile to God, for it does not submit to God's law; indeed, it cannot. 8 Those who are in the flesh cannot please God. (Rom 8:5-8 ESV)
Nate's point is that God, as the greatest possible being, requires the greatest praise and honor. Those in the flesh cannot and do not provide such. Saying that the Godhead is x doesn't entail that therefore the creature is also x. It is my understanding that the Orthodox accept this distinction as well? Please correct me if I'm wrong or missed your point, though. This is not an area I claim to be an expert in. My contribution is such that I feel you've drawn an illogical entailment principle from Creator to creature.
Hello MG,
ReplyDelete"If this is so, then you agree that justice can consist (at least sometimes, and at least partly) in acting in a way that properly recognizes the inherent moral value of the objects of your action. If so, then why think that God’s justice with respect to creatures is any different? Why think that God’s justice also requires paying back for dismerit or merit?"
This is a very good question.
Here is my response:
My reason for thinking that God's justice requires paying back for dismerit is the argument I have given in the blog post. I would agree with Beau's point on the creator/creature response. But I would make this qualification: Creatures who are sinless like Adam prior to the fall have sufficient value before God to earn or merit eternal life. So God is just is letting the value of sinless human being earn their eternal life because they are made in God's image and are to act like God. However, if a human sins then the argument I have given on retributive justice above would apply. So basically our value in terms of how God treats us justly is by allowing us to earn eternal life and by allowing Jesus to take our place as a human to earn eternal life for us. But if we reject both ways of salvation which either by the perfect works of ourselves or another then God has obligation to punish us for not valuing ourselves and God. It is also important to note that our value as persons has sufficient value for it to be just by God to love us depending on the degree of value we have (depending on whether we are elect or non-elect).
I hope that helps....if you have anymore questions on clarification do not be shy to ask!
God Bless,
NPT