I have received several complaints that my last treatment of the Problem of Evil was too complicated, so I decided to simplify my arguments:
The Problem:
The problem evil arises when one affirms that (1) God knows all true facts, (2) he can bring about any thing good (that does not involve a contradiction), (3) that God is morally perfect, (4) and such a moral perfection means that God should eliminate evil as much as he can. If one affirms all of these then there is a contradiction because there should be no evil, because a good and powerful God would eliminate evil as much as he possibly can.
Not a Contradiction for Christians:
However, for most Christians this is not a problem because many Christians would reject that moral perfection means one should eliminate evil as much as possible. The reason why Christians reject this is because they think that God has morally justifying reasons for bringing about or permitting evil in the world. In other words, the sort of moral perfection that God has is compatible with evil because he has morally sufficient or justifying reasons for permitting evil to occur.
A Possible Atheist Response?
One atheist response might be to say that God could not or would not have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. But how do you know that it is impossible that if God existed he would have no morally justifying reason for the evil he has permitted? The atheist can say that they cannot think of any good reason for permitting evil in the world. But just because you do not know of any good reason does not mean that there is no good reason. I might not know an answer to a math problem, but that is different than saying that there is no answer to the math problem. So just because we do not know God's reason does not mean that he does not have one. In fact, it is unclear if he does or does not just by reason alone, so an unclear argument cannot be used to show that a position is unreasonable (especially since we have over 10 good arguments in favor of God's existence). On atheism, all we have is one argument that is unclear because either way we do not know whether or not God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil he permits. One unclear argument cannot outweigh 10 clearer arguments.
The Probablistic Problem of Evil
A weaker claim would be to say that evil makes God improbable because it is improbable that God would have reasons for all the intense evil that exists. But the problem with this is that God's thoughts are beyond ours, much like our thoughts are above and beyond those of an insect. So we cannot say that it is improbable because for all we know it could be that the morally sufficient reason God has is beyond our understanding and comprehension, much like astrophysics is above an insect's comprehension.
Two Possible Answers
Unfortunately for the atheist, it only gets harder from here, because theists have developed two good possible reasons for why evil might exist.
The Non-Reformed Response
The first one is the most common and it is called a free will defense (being Confessionally and Philosophical Reformed I reject this one). God cannot do anything that is logically impossible but he can only do what is possible. What is impossible is that God cause or make free creatures to do whatever he wants. So the only way to have free creatures is to not control and cause them. What God wants on this view is to bring as many people into a saving relationship with him by their free will and since free will is involved human beings can freely choose to hate God and do evil. What explains evil things that occur is the free will of demons and humans which cause evil, but God does not cause evil. God lets them choose freely so as to bring about as many people to a free loving relationship with him as possible so that he can give them eternal life (there is no world God can create where people only do good on this response). This defense was developed by Alvin Plantinga and the consensus in philosophy is that this argument shows that logical problem of evil is unsuccessful.
My Reformed Response
The next possible defense was developed by Calvinists thinkers like myself. Calvinists believe that God is in control and ordains everything so there can not be free will as traditional understood by many. In this view God ordains humans to choose to sin so that he can show his love, grace, and mercy through Jesus Christ. Grace and mercy can only exist with sin because if something is sinful there is no reason to merciful and gracious. When evil is in the picture God can show his love even more to human being by loving them through Christ Jesus even though they are sinful. I show my love for my dog charlie even more so when he does bad things, if he does good then I simply am showing my love to him and not showing my unconditional love for him. Furthermore, with evil in the picture God gets to show his hatred and punishment towards sin. God shows his glory also by finally punishing and eliminating all evil in the end. Evil also allows God to redeem us by the most perfect picture of love, mercy, and justice which is the Crucifixion of the Lord Jesus Christ. All of these great things about God get maximized when evil is in the picture and so it brings God's Glory and hence this could be another morally sufficient reason for why evil exists.
(This was meant to be a simple, concise overview of the Problem of evil and not a complete picture of my own view).
Actually the problem with the notion that god *might* have a sufficient reason is that it is ad hoc. Without that sufficient reason one is justified in concluding that because of evil god probably doesn't exist. Especially if the question is, on balance, does the existence of evil provide a reason for not believing in god's existence.
ReplyDeleteYour probabilistic response isn't helpful either, since we can can only make determinations about things based on the available evidence. In other words, we have to make a reasonable determination based on what we have, and it's not reasonable to simply assume that god must have a reason when the very question is, is it reasonable for god to exist in light of evil.
In short, you seem to be begging the question.
The free will defense is weak, IMO, as free will is generally incoherent and it's not immediately obvious why free will is actually a good thing. It's also not obvious that the god of the bible approves of or wants free will. In fact, there are several places where god interferes with free will (I'm thinking of the Pharaoh here) and I believe that Paul even makes a statement about humans being like clay pots an all that.
Your calvinist response seems better then the rest, but it still doesn't actually explain why sinners are sent to hell. It would be more beneficial to just make them cease to exist after they died.
Also, it doesn't seem to make sense of the intense nature of evil. I can be looked at as 'good' when letting my child make their own decisions when encountering certain types of evil. However if I allow my child to rampantly slaughter other people AND I had the means to stop my child, then I would not be looked at as good. If this is the case, why does god get a pass for essentially doing the same thing?
The fact that if God exists he might have morally suffcient reason for evil is not an explanation so it cannot be ad hoc. With all things being epistemically equal if we cannot think of a morally suffcient reason shouldn't one just be agnostic about whether there is one or not? Why think that without a morally suffcient reason we have to conclude that there is no such reason especially with our finite and limited intellect?
ReplyDeleteYou are right we have to make determinations on the available evidence, but I am suggesting that we do not available evidence or we are not in a position to have available evidence either way. We should not say well we do not have evidence either way so therefore God does not exist. Just because a person wants the available evidence from evil to count against God does not epistemically justify the position that evil counts against the existence of God. You infered from this that I am begging the question but from the 2 paragraphs you have written previously I do not see how this logically follows.
I do not see anything incoherent with Libertarian free will per se, even though I do not hold to it with respect to creatures for other theological and philsophical arguments. The fact that Libertarian freedom is good is not used for the freewill defense, rather they say God cannot justly punish or reward you for your actions because you would be like a robot without any sort of control. Hence, nothing is up to you on this view and God cannot have a real relationship or reward you.
Your point about this form of free will contradicting the Bible is true and for these reasons I do not accept it. But I do not think the Free will theist cares because they would say their philosophy trumps my interpretation to the Bible.
God punishes sinners in hell to show his justice and hatred toward sin.
Well I do not think it would be right for you to let your children slaughter others for a number of reasons. However, these reasons are not true of God so the argument does work effectively against the goodness of God. God is the greatest possible being, he knows all true facts, and he has to work out the greatest end because of his greatness. None of these things are true of you so the analogy of evil you draw here is not legitimate. God can allow intense suffering like murder in order that more of his infinite value of his glory can be displayed through his justice, mercy, and grace in Christ Jesus and the condemnation of evil in hell. Thank you for your thoughts.
God Bless,
NPT
"The fact that if God exists he might have morally suffcient reason for evil is not an explanation so it cannot be ad hoc."
ReplyDeleteBut that's not the question. The question is does evil show that god doesn't exist. You say that god might have a sufficient reason, but this seems to me to be completely ad hoc.
"With all things being epistemically equal if we cannot think of a morally suffcient reason shouldn't one just be agnostic about whether there is one or not? "
No, since the question posed is a question against epistemic equality.
"Why think that without a morally sufficient reason we have to conclude that there is no such reason especially with our finite and limited intellect? "
That isn't exactly what one is concluding. What we conclude is that evil seems to be evidence against god's existence. Now, it's not a proof and not definitive, but it does seem reasonable. What you (seem to be) are arguing for is certainty and I just don't think that it's available *on this question*. With our finite intellect we can only make a reasonable assumption with the available evidence.
"You are right we have to make determinations on the available evidence, but I am suggesting that we do not available evidence or we are not in a position to have available evidence either way."
I don't see how that follows from 'there might be a reason for evil'. That's like Russel's teapot, yeah, it might exist orbiting pluto, but all the available evidence points against it and there seems to be an argument against it (ie, how did it get there). So there's no reason to believe that a teapot is orbiting pluto.
"We should not say well we do not have evidence either way so therefore God does not exist. "
That's not quite what I'm saying. I'm saying that the argument from evil seems to weigh against god's existence and the possibility that there exists an argument against it isn't sufficient to refute the argument from evil.
To put it another way: Let's suppose the TAG is valid.
It is not reasonable for me to take the position that since I am of finite intelligence therefore there *might* be a counter argument to the TAG.
"Just because a person wants the available evidence from evil to count against God does not epistemically justify the position that evil counts against the existence of God."
It's not about 'wants'. Were it so, then the idea that there *might* exist a sufficient reason for evil would be a good argument.
"You infered from this that I am begging the question but from the 2 paragraphs you have written previously I do not see how this logically follows."
Okay.
"I do not see anything incoherent with Libertarian free will per se, even though I do not hold to it with respect to creatures for other theological and philsophical arguments."
So how does LFW work? It seems contradictory to me, like choices just randomly pop up in someone's head (which would contradictorily compel the person). If that's not the case then the choices a person makes are a result of their DNA, position in history, etc, etc. And if that's not the case then what are choices based on?
"The fact that Libertarian freedom is good is not used for the freewill defense, rather they say God cannot justly punish or reward you for your actions because you would be like a robot without any sort of control. Hence, nothing is up to you on this view and God cannot have a real relationship or reward you."
ReplyDeleteThat's not the point, really. The point is that does god granting entities LFW outweigh evil. I don't see it as obvious that it does.
"Your point about this form of free will contradicting the Bible is true and for these reasons I do not accept it. But I do not think the Free will theist cares because they would say their philosophy trumps my interpretation to the Bible."
By 'my' do you mean that they would believe that if the bible is rightly interpreted then it points to free will or do you mean *your*? Sorry, this might be nit picky.
"God punishes sinners in hell to show his justice and hatred toward sin."
I'm not sure how that can be the case, since eradicating the sin would be more efficient and would actually get rid of the sin (instead of letting it stay around). Further, I'm not sure how it can be said that sinners are being justly punished, since they could only be guilty of a finite crime.
"Well I do not think it would be right for you to let your children slaughter others for a number of reasons. However, these reasons are not true of God so the argument does work effectively against the goodness of God. God is the greatest possible being, he knows all true facts, and he has to work out the greatest end because of his greatness. None of these things are true of you so the analogy of evil you draw here is not legitimate. "
You are essentially arguing that the ends justify the means - correct?
"God can allow intense suffering like murder in order that more of his infinite value of his glory can be displayed through his justice, mercy, and grace in Christ Jesus and the condemnation of evil in hell. Thank you for your thoughts."
How does allowing suffering translate to more value? If God is the greatest of all possible beings and is an omnimax entity then god's glory would have already been infinite prior to creation.
In fact, the whole 'creation' thing seems superfluous. Further, if this is the case, then why isn't there *more* suffering? Why have a heaven at all, if suffering provides more value? Additionally does this mean that good people should not interfere or try to stop the suffering of others since their suffering is contributing to god's greatness?
It's been a good convo so far, thanks.
But that's not the question. The question is does evil show that god doesn't exist. You say that god might have a sufficient reason, but this seems to me to be completely ad hoc.
ReplyDeleteResponse: The fallacy of ad hoc has to do with illegitimate explanations because they are simply stated to save a hypothesis. I am simply not providing an explanation, but I am saying it is unclear whether or not God has a morally sufficient reason.
No, since the question posed is a question against epistemic equality.
Response: Whether or not one asks a question for or against a position does not alter its epistemic status.
That isn't exactly what one is concluding. What we conclude is that evil seems to be evidence against god's existence. Now, it's not a proof and not definitive, but it does seem reasonable. What you (seem to be) are arguing for is certainty and I just don't think that it's available *on this question*. With our finite intellect we can only make a reasonable assumption with the available evidence.
Response: I was not assuming that it had to be certain. I was asking why think that it is probable that God does not have a morally sufficient reason?
I don't see how that follows from 'there might be a reason for evil'. That's like Russel's teapot, yeah, it might exist orbiting pluto, but all the available evidence points against it and there seems to be an argument against it (ie, how did it get there). So there's no reason to believe that a teapot is orbiting pluto.
Response: I am suggesting that the evidence we have is at least unclear either way. This is the available evidence we have and I do not see it as analogous to Russel’s tea pot.
That's not quite what I'm saying. I'm saying that the argument from evil seems to weigh against god's existence and the possibility that there exists an argument against it isn't sufficient to refute the argument from evil.
To put it another way: Let's suppose the TAG is valid.
It is not reasonable for me to take the position that since I am of finite intelligence therefore there *might* be a counter argument to the TAG.
Response: I would argue that TAG has the sort of epistemic weight of that of 1+1=2 being true is deductive and a clear a priori truth (at least the moral argument of TAG). Figuring out whether or not a infinite being all knowing being has a reason for something or other seems to be a entirely different epistemic position as clear and deliberate a priori truths of reason.
So how does LFW work? It seems contradictory to me, like choices just randomly pop up in someone's head (which would contradictorily compel the person). If that's not the case then the choices a person makes are a result of their DNA, position in history, etc, etc. And if that's not the case then what are choices based on?
ReplyDeleteResponse: They are based on the agent causing himself to follow two or more competing desires. These sort of Libertarians would hold to agent causation and a immaterial self so I am not sure any of the above objections would refute their position.
That's not the point, really. The point is that does god granting entities LFW outweigh evil. I don't see it as obvious that it does.
Response: Interesting. I am a Calvinist that is opposed to the free will defense and I think that it does outweigh evil. I suppose we just have different intuitions there.
By 'my' do you mean that they would believe that if the bible is rightly interpreted then it points to free will or do you mean *your*? Sorry, this might be nit picky.
Response: They would say you need to interpret the Bible with philosophy so that when you interpret the Bible with philosophy only then is it rightly interpreted. No need to be sorry those sort of small things do not bother me.
I'm not sure how that can be the case, since eradicating the sin would be more efficient and would actually get rid of the sin (instead of letting it stay around). Further, I'm not sure how it can be said that sinners are being justly punished, since they could only be guilty of a finite crime.
Response: But in eradication you can not demonstrate your hatred and justice against sin for all eternity. I would say either that the sin’s quality is of infinite so it warrants infinite punishment or people continue to sin in hell.
You are essentially arguing that the ends justify the means - correct?
Response: Yes, I am a divine consequentialist.
How does allowing suffering translate to more value? If God is the greatest of all possible beings and is an omnimax entity then god's glory would have already been infinite prior to creation.
Response: Yes, but you can add to an infinite and it will still be infinite. And he desires to display his attributes to his creatures and to himself in Trinitarian communion.
In fact, the whole 'creation' thing seems superfluous. Further, if this is the case, then why isn't there *more* suffering? Why have a heaven at all, if suffering provides more value? Additionally does this mean that good people should not interfere or try to stop the suffering of others since their suffering is contributing to god's greatness?
Response: Well there will be suffering for all those in hell for all eternity and it is a good thing to stop suffering for those who have received the grace and mercy of the Lord Jesus Christ. I am only a divine consequentialist, but I am not a consequentialist with respect to contingent agents such as human beings. We are deontologically bound to the commands of God and as such we are morally obligated to follow it (hence no means justify the means for us).
Thank you for your time.
God Bless you,
NPT
"The fallacy of ad hoc has to do with illegitimate explanations because they are simply stated to save a hypothesis. I am simply not providing an explanation, but I am saying it is unclear whether or not God has a morally sufficient reason."
ReplyDeleteIf it's unclear then how can you say it's not a contradiction for Christians? How can you say:
"However, for most Christians this is not a problem because many Christians would reject that moral perfection means one should eliminate evil as much as it possible can. The reason why Christians reject this is because they think that God has morally justifying reason for bringing about or permitting the evil in the world."
What is that reason? That reason is that there *might* be a sufficient reason; ie, this *might be* is a hypothetical used to save the Christian position. I'm actually not sure why you have a difficult time seeing this.
I'll have to save the rest of the discussion for later (possibly), as I'm short on time.
If it's unclear then how can you say it's not a contradiction for Christians?
ReplyDeleteResponse: It would be only unclear if I had no reason to think that God existed (hence, all things being equal as I have stated earlier). But if I had good reason to think that God existed and that he was morally perfect then give my evidence for these I really ought to infer that he would have a good reason. Also, most Christians think that one can give a possible reasons for why evil exists so if you can give a reason for it and you evidence that God is good then you are reasonable in thinking that he has such a reason.
What is that reason? That reason is that there *might* be a sufficient reason; ie, this *might be* is a hypothetical used to save the Christian position. I'm actually not sure why you have a difficult time seeing this.
Response: It could be the those two I offered or it could be that it is beyond our comprehension. I am not sure what it would be, but since I know God is morally perfect then it is reasonable to infer that he would have some reason even though I may not know precisely what that is. Thank you for your time.
God Bless,
NPT
"It would be only unclear if I had no reason to think that God existed (hence, all things being equal as I have stated earlier). "
ReplyDeleteBut this isn't the case, *evil* is a reason to think that god may not exist. This is why I stated earlier that all things were not evil. The question is, given evil, is god's existence likely? So far, the 'might be' reason isn't an effective counter.
"But if I had good reason to think that God existed and that he was morally perfect then give my evidence for these I really ought to infer that he would have a good reason. Also, most Christians think that one can give a possible reasons for why evil exists so if you can give a reason for it and you evidence that God is good then you are reasonable in thinking that he has such a reason."
That's *if* you give a reason - but the response that there *might* be a reason doesn't cut it as it's not technically a reason.
"Response: It could be the those two I offered or "
Yes, it could be the other two - but I'm trying to examine the first 'reason' you gave, the 'there might be a reason' reason.
"it could be that it is beyond our comprehension."
This really doesn't cut it - as it doesn't provide any reason to think that there is a reason for evil.
"I am not sure what it would be, but since I know God is morally perfect then it is reasonable to infer that he would have some reason even though I may not know precisely what that is. Thank you for your time."
This is begging the question though. If you go this route you might as well just say that you know that god exists because you know it.
But this isn't the case, *evil* is a reason to think that god may not exist. This is why I stated earlier that all things were not evil. The question is, given evil, is god's existence likely? So far, the 'might be' reason isn't an effective counter.
ReplyDeleteResponse: I see no reason for thinking that evil is a reason for thinking that God does not exist. Hence, just given evil alone God's existence is neither likely or unlikely.
That's *if* you give a reason - but the response that there *might* be a reason doesn't cut it as it's not technically a reason.
Response: I did not say that saying there might be a reason is offering a reason. I merely am stating the simple fact that just because there is no reason that we can come up with does not mean that there is no reason and since we do not know if there is a reason or not then it is hard to see how this can be a reason to doubt the existence of God who's thought are beyond comprehension.
This really doesn't cut it - as it doesn't provide any reason to think that there is a reason for evil.
Response: It does not provide a reason to think or not think there is reason for evil it merely shows that the argument by itself is unclear.
This is begging the question though. If you go this route you might as well just say that you know that god exists because you know it.
Response: This is not what the informal fallacy of begging the question is. I am saying I know B on the basis of A. I have good reason to think that a good God exists so from that I infer that a good God would have a reason for the evil he permits. If you have grounds for thinking that a good God exist then you have more reason than not to think that a good God for which you have evidence of would have a good reason (especially when there is no reason to think that he would not have a morally sufficient reason).
God Bless,
NPT
"Response: I see no reason for thinking that evil is a reason for thinking that God does not exist. Hence, just given evil alone God's existence is neither likely or unlikely."
ReplyDeleteThen why start a post called 'answering the problem of evil 101'?
"Response: I did not say that saying there might be a reason is offering a reason. I merely am stating the simple fact that just because there is no reason that we can come up with does not mean that there is no reason and since we do not know if there is a reason or not then it is hard to see how this can be a reason to doubt the existence of God who's thought are beyond comprehension."
This seems to be an attempt at a distinction without a difference. We make determinations based on the evidence we have, gambling on a potential reason is not an evidence we have.
"Response: It does not provide a reason to think or not think there is reason for evil it merely shows that the argument by itself is unclear."
I'm not sure it does. Maybe I'm just not seeing your POV on this, can you maybe rephrase it in a different way?
"Response: This is not what the informal fallacy of begging the question is. I am saying I know B on the basis of A. I have good reason to think that a good God exists so from that I infer that a good God would have a reason for the evil he permits. "
This is a presupposition - if you approach all arguments with 'god already exists' then any attempted resolution is a bit hollow since it amounts to after the fact rationalization instead of examining the argument for it's own merits. It's misleading to say that the argument from evil has been answered when the 'answer' lies in already assuming god exists (whether it's due to a legitimate argument or not, the point is that the argument from evil has not actually been answered).
"If you have grounds for thinking that a good God exist then you have more reason than not to think that a good God for which you have evidence of would have a good reason (especially when there is no reason to think that he would not have a morally sufficient reason)."
I 1/2 way agree with you here - if you have a reason to believe that god exists (or let's say you have knock down argument), and that god is responsible for everything, then it's reasonable to assume that there is a reason for evil (if there is such a thing and if god is moral and etc, etc).
However, if we are approaching this from a level playing field and the question is: Does god exist? and one response is the argument from evil (to argue that god probably doesn't exist), then it is not legitimate to just assume that god would have a sufficient reason for that evil, since it begs the question.
To clear the metaphysical air for a moment - is this blog assuming that another argument for god is successful? If so, then your criticism maybe on track, if not, then I don't see how you are not begging the question.
Anonymous (maybe you could use a first name, just so it's not so impersonal?),
ReplyDeleteI just wanted to jump in and answer your last question. Yes, Nathanael has written several posts on this blog giving arguments for the existence of God (in fact, in this post he specifically mentions that there are at least 10 good arguments, which is why we should not put much weight on one unclear argument like the problem of evil). Here are a few:
The Cosmological Argument
The Ontological Argument
The Moral Argument
Hi David,
ReplyDeleteMy mistake, I didn't mean 'blog' by the entire blog, I meant 'post'; ie, is this a stand alone post or should the reader assume that the existence of god has already been demonstrated.
He does mention that there are 10 good reasons, however it's more a note then it is part of the argument.
I took this particular blog post as dealing with the argument from evil - three specific responses. While (currently) we aren't going over the latter two anymore, we are still focusing on the first reason.
Then why start a post called 'answering the problem of evil 101'?
ReplyDeleteResponse: Because of a popular but mistaken perception that the problem of evil is really a problem.
"Response: I did not say that saying there might be a reason is offering a reason. I merely am stating the simple fact that just because there is no reason that we can come up with does not mean that there is no reason and since we do not know if there is a reason or not then it is hard to see how this can be a reason to doubt the existence of God who's thought are beyond comprehension."
This seems to be an attempt at a distinction without a difference. We make determinations based on the evidence we have, gambling on a potential reason is not an evidence we have.
Response: The evidence we have is unclear so I am not gambling on any potential reason with all things being equal. We have no evidence for or against God having a morally sufficient reason so the only determination that can be made is that the argument from evil is unclear and hence cannot be a defeater for the classical theistic position. Also, saying that there is a reason seems fundamentally different than it’s unclear if there is a reason or not. Here is the difference: One makes a positive claim the other does not.
I'm not sure it does. Maybe I'm just not seeing your POV on this, can you maybe rephrase it in a different way?
Response: The problem of evil is not evidence for or against the existence of God because it is unclear if God has or has not a morally sufficient reason.
This is a presupposition - if you approach all arguments with 'god already exists' then any attempted resolution is a bit hollow since it amounts to after the fact rationalization instead of examining the argument for it's own merits. It's misleading to say that the argument from evil has been answered when the 'answer' lies in already assuming god exists (whether it's due to a legitimate argument or not, the point is that the argument from evil has not actually been answered).
Response: It is a presupposition that is established by evidence as David has pointed out. If you come to the problem of evil by it’s own merits then it is unclear, but if you come to it with already having evidence for God’s existence then you have good reason for thinking that God has a morally sufficient reason.
"If you have grounds for thinking that a good God exist then you have more reason than not to think that a good God for which you have evidence of would have a good reason (especially when there is no reason to think that he would not have a morally sufficient reason)."
I 1/2 way agree with you here - if you have a reason to believe that god exists (or let's say you have knock down argument), and that god is responsible for everything, then it's reasonable to assume that there is a reason for evil (if there is such a thing and if god is moral and etc, etc).
However, if we are approaching this from a level playing field and the question is: Does god exist? and one response is the argument from evil (to argue that god probably doesn't exist), then it is not legitimate to just assume that god would have a sufficient reason for that evil, since it begs the question.
Response: Of course I do not grant that the argument for evil shows that God probably does not exist. It is unclear and so an unclear argument cannot be a successful argument against a position.
God Bless,
NPT
"Of course I do not grant that the argument for evil shows that God probably does not exist. It is unclear and so an unclear argument cannot be a successful argument against a position. "
ReplyDeleteYes, you don't grant that, but not because of this first defense. You grant it either because of the other two defenses or because of a prior commitment to god's existence (which is the only way this first response would work - the god has sufficient reason response).
I'm not sure why you can say it's unclear. Here's the argument you put forward:
"The problem evil arises when one affirms that (1) God knows all true facts, (2) he can bring about any thing good (that does not involve a contradiction), (3) that God is morally perfect, (4) and such a moral perfection means that God should eliminate evil as much as he can. If one affirms all of these then there is a contradiction because there should be no evil, because a good and powerful God would eliminate evil as much as he possibly can. "
On the face of it, it seems legitimate and clear.
You attempt to introduce a difficulty by supposing that it's possible that there is a sufficient reason for evil to exist.
You give us no reason - outside of our ignorance - to believe that there actually *could be* a sufficient reason (Keep in mind, I'm only addressing the first objection you bring up).
You simply assert that there could be one.
Because it's supposedly possible for there to be a sufficient reason this somehow means that it is possible for there to be a sufficient reason.
Why though? Because what you are essentially doing is shifting the burden of proof onto the other interlocutor to try to have them show that there couldn't be one.
You state this "The reason why Christians reject this is because they think that God has morally justifying reasons for bringing about or permitting evil in the world."
SO what is this 'morally justifying reason' that you stated that Christians have? There is no reason (because if there was one, then this whole 'there could be a reason' wouldn't be an issue). Instead what we've uncovered is that this reason is a prior commitment to the existence of god. Which is fine, but in reality it doesn't mean that the argument from evil loses it's bite.
I'll let you have the last word - it's been a good convo. Thanks.
ReplyDeleteYes, you don't grant that, but not because of this first defense. You grant it either because of the other two defenses or because of a prior commitment to god's existence (which is the only way this first response would work - the god has sufficient reason response).
ReplyDeleteResponse: I do not grant it because I have emphasized again and again it is unclear by itself independent if one can come up with a morally sufficient reason or if one has arguments for the existence of God.
I'm not sure why you can say it's unclear. Here's the argument you put forward:
On the face of it, it seems legitimate and clear.
Response: It’s unclear because there is no reason for thinking that God has a morally sufficient reason and there is no reason for not thinking that God has a morally sufficient reason. This is presupposing that there is no argument for the existence of God and that one has no reason to give.
You attempt to introduce a difficulty by supposing that it's possible that there is a sufficient reason for evil to exist. You give us no reason - outside of our ignorance - to believe that there actually *could be* a sufficient reason (Keep in mind, I'm only addressing the first objection you bring up).
Response: I have given no reason to think that there is morally sufficient reason in the first objection only the possibility that there might be one. But you have given no reason to think that there is probably not one or that there could be no morally sufficient reason only the possibility that there might not be one. So all things being equal it seems like the argument is unclear either way.
You simply assert that there could be one.
Response: And you simply assert that there is probably not one.
Because it's supposedly possible for there to be a sufficient reason this somehow means that it is possible for there to be a sufficient reason.
Response: This line of reasoning cuts both ways. Because it’s supposedly possible for there to be no morally sufficient reason then this somehow means that it is possible for there to be no morally sufficient reason.
Why though? Because what you are essentially doing is shifting the burden of proof onto the other interlocutor to try to have them show that there couldn't be one.
Response: You are shifting it on me and I am shifting it on you. Either one of us cannot bear our burdens because we have no arguments either way. My conclusions stands: the argument is entirely and utterly unclear as evidence for God having a reason or not having a reason for evil. Hence, the problem of evil as an argument for doubting God’s existence is to be regarded as an utter failure.
SO what is this 'morally justifying reason' that you stated that Christians have? There is no reason (because if there was one, then this whole 'there could be a reason' wouldn't be an issue). Instead what we've uncovered is that this reason is a prior commitment to the existence of god. Which is fine, but in reality it doesn't mean that the argument from evil loses it's bite.
Response: It does lose it’s bit because either way it is unclear whether or not you think there is good reason for believing in God or if you can come up with a possible reason.
Thank you for your time.
God Bless,
NPT
Wow.... all I can add is the fact that the theist is not pressed too hard here as the only requirement for the theistic position to stand is that God may have morally sufficient reasons for allowing evil, and given that evil cannot even be discussed as a serious issue apart from God's existence and the fact that God's nature is clearly revealed from Scripture as well as in creation as a sovereign Lord, I'm curious as to why this case is pressed so hard. Atheist answer me thus: whence come evil? why is it a problem? And if God is such as revelation reveals Him to be, then this discussion should center more on the question of His existence, not man's concept of evil.
ReplyDeleteCheers,
Beau McKinley Boyd