John or You?

http://www.reformationtheology.com/2007/11/understanding_1_john_22.php

Very nice to see and hear thoughts on the exegesis of God's Word that goes beyond what particular individual X would like the text to mean given his 21st Century high school education.... Context, anyone? Let me advise this - any comment given will be subject to the same respect God's Word is given in that comment, meaning if terms are definable apart from and indifferent to authorial intent, so will be the response. I am, honestly, tired of the popular arminian's disrespect of Holy Writ and postmodernized response to what is written. Give an understanding that is consistent with what you expect from your own writing - respect to authorial intentions and the author's defined words given not only in his/her own understanding but also his/her culture's use of such terms. Let John define his terms, not your particular theological/philosophical theory.

Blessings!

Beau McKinley Boyd

A Philosophical Argument For Divine Retributive Justice

God is the greatest possible being which entails God has every property that is better to have rather than to lack. It is clear that it is better for God to have justice to the greatest possible degree rather than to have justice that is lesser than the greatest possible degree. God has the greatest possible degree of justice entails if there is great evil God will at least punish that evil with at least a great punishment. There is a great evil that occurs in every sin which is this: the creature is not honoring and loving with all of his ability the greatest possible being. Instead the creature loves and honors something created that is lesser than the greatest possible being. This is a dishonoring and unloving sin against the greatest possible being and it is at least a great evil. Hence, any sin that a creature commits is at least a great sin and a great sin requires from a being with the greatest possible degree of justice at least a great punishment (This great punishment could very well be understood as the traditional doctrine of hell). This argument establishes the following: God cannot freely forgive sins without retributive justice.

Is Christianity Compatible with Supererogatory Actions?

A Supererogatory action is an action that goes above and beyond one's moral duty, but how can this be a possible perspective in christian ethics when Jesus seems to teach against it? Such as these scriptures:

Matthew 22:36-39 36 "Teacher, which is the great commandment in the Law?" 37 And he said to him, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul and with all your mind. 38 This is the great and first commandment. 39 And a second is like it: You shall love your neighbor as yourself.

How can we go above our moral duty when Jesus teaches that we are to continually love the Lord with all that we are. If s performs an action x that were good but there were a greater action y that s were aware of, then according to these scriptures s should have performed y. How then can this be compatible with supererogatory actions?

Science and its Place in the World - A Criticism of Atheism

Is Atheistic Naturalism Preferable to Theistic Contributions to Science?

In considering the issue of science and faith, the atheistic community has, in general, argued vociferously that science sits solely within the realm of the atheist and therefore has absolutely no place in the theistic realm of faith and non-empirical ideologies. Indeed, today the question of Intelligent Design, an attempt to avoid localizing science to any particular religious tradition or faith movement but rather to act within the realms of science to show the plausibility of creation over and against atheistic evolution, is hotly debated. Many atheists refuse to even engage Intelligent Design advocates because they believe that doing so would open the door for all kinds of silliness, irrationality, Scientology and other Buck Rogers-style religions. To even debate the issue, many atheists claim, would be to open the platform for craziness that has no place in the public square of academia.

As I ponder such claims, however, numerous questions come to mind as to not only the truthfulness of such atheistic claims but also the moral force (or lack thereof) driving such attempts as these. Does the atheist truly hold the realm of science unequivocally? Do faith and non-empirical beliefs truly have absolutely no place in the fields of science? Does debating advocates of particular ideologies such as Christianity, Islam, and Judaism truly open the door for Xenu's Galactic Confederation of L Ron Hubbard? I assert that such claims by the atheist are not only false and unprovable, but are also a smoke screen for the utter failure of the atheistic belief system and an attempt to silence the opposition simply because as long as the followers of such incorrect ideologies are not allowed to think for themselves or even hear the other side, they are made gullible and left ignorant enough to follow, without question, the iron fisted proclamations of the atheistic elite and the ingenuity of their man made religion, hidden under the guise of "objective science."

To begin, it is simply false, and obviously so, that science is exclusively in the realm of the atheist. This claim alone, so popular and thrown about so easily by many atheists today, is something that raises serious questions as to the moral framework of those promoting it. For someone to have a Ph.D, or even a MS or BS in any field of scientific inquiry, they will have taken at least one class on the history of science. This means that anyone at the level of public science advocacy knows, at least basically, the history of their belief, which further means they know where many main branches of science have originated. Yet still, it is claimed that atheism alone rules the realm of science unequivocally against any type of theism or faith-based belief. What does the historical evidence have to say about it?

Here is a simple list of some of popular and/or heavily influential scientists of the past, all of which were theistic in their ideologies:

- Aristotle (384 BC – 322 BC) - Some of the earliest work in physics and biology

- John Philoponus (late 6th century) - Christian critic of Aristotle. Aristotle did, while bringing much solid science to a very non-scientific world, still employ a good deal of nonsense in his studies and Philoponus attempted to correct him.

- Hugh of St. Victor (c. 1096-1141) "Theologian of Science"

- Dietrich von Frieberg (c. 1250 - 1310) Priest who explained the Rainbow through scientific inquiry

- Nicole Oresme (c. 1320 -1382) Inventor of Graphing Techniques

- Georgias Agricola (1494- 1555) Founder of Metallurgy, Roman Catholic who died sadly desiring the reconciliation of the Protestant and Romanist faiths.

- Francis Bacon (1561 - 1626) The so-called scientific method goes back to a man who didn't think science could take place apart from God's existence.

- Johannes Kepler (1571 - 1630) Discovered the Laws of Planetary Motion

- Johannes Baptists van Helmont (1579 - 1644) Founder of Pneumatic Chemistry and Chemical Physiology

- Blaise Pascal (1623 - 1662) Mathematician, physicist, and Catholic philosopher

- Robert Boyle (1627 - 1691) Founder of Modern Chemisty

- Niels Steno (1638 - 1686) Founder of Geology

- Carolus Linnaeus (1707 -1778) Contributed much to the genus and species classifications that we know and understand today

- Michael Faraday (1791 - 1867) Presbyterian preacher and major contributor to electrical research

- Matthew Fontaine Maury (1806 - 1873) Nicknamed Pathfinder of the Seas, he revolutionized sea travel by studying and discovering the currents of the seas after reading certain passages out of the Psalms

- Asa Gray (11810 - 1888) Famous Botanist

- George Boole (1815 - 1864) Ever wonder where boolean logic came from.... yes, that's correct, from a, wait for it..... minister! So intent on becoming a minister he lived a very impoverished life to save up for his training, and began teaching math at a young age.

- James Prescott Joule (1818 - 1889) Anyone even basically familiar with electricity knows Joule's Law. Sadly, though, thanks to deceptive atheists, few know of his religious faith and motivation by his faith to study the orderly world.

- William Thomson (aka Lord Kelvin) (1824 - 1907) While we learn about his great contributions to thermodynamics and classification of temperature named after him we, thanks to those great moral atheists, are never taught that he used to recite Scripture from memory before his university lectures.

- Isaac Newton (1643 - 1727) Certainly not orthodox in his theology from a Christian perspective (probably a socinian, though most likely an anti-trinitarian at best)

"Gravity explains the motions of the planets, but it cannot explain who set the planets in motion. God governs all things and knows all that is or can be done." - Tiner, J.H. (1975). Isaac Newton: Inventor, Scientist and Teacher. Milford, Michigan, U.S.: Mott Media

The list could go on quite a ways, but I believe the point has been made. How is it, O great atheist, that to even think that science is of the realm of the theist is such anathema when in fact the very footsteps every scientist follows in today are of a theist of some sort? Why is it that, when integrity and honesty are the virtues to be sought in proper scientific endeavor (or all endeavors, for that matter), so few atheists are honest enough to deal with the historical fact of the positive influence of theism in science? What possible case could the atheist continue to make in this area? The answer, sadly, is pretty obvious. As stated above, it is true that if such indicative states of affairs were presented to the public, the atheist would lose his ability to stomp his feet and dogmatically declare that science excludes faith and that religion has no place in such inquiry. Sad, but when a despotistic regime is in control of the academy, we are to expect no less.

But not only is it the case that history, so hidden and swept under the rug by the atheist, opposes the atheist agenda in science today, but science itself also clearly denies such an agenda. I am convinced that, as Jesus replied to the Pharisees who demanded He silence his disciples, "I tell you," he replied, "if they keep quiet, the stones will cry out” (Luke 19:40), that if given a voice, science itself would cry out against such a morally and epistemically reprehensible agenda, for the creation itself knows its creator. It is the suppression of God in the hearts of the wicked that deny that “The heavens declare the glory of God; the skies proclaim the work of his hands” (Psalm 19:1).

So then what of science itself? Can it truly act consistently within the alleged empirical constraints of empiricism? I suggest that it certainly cannot. Consider this list of necessarily assumed and scientifically unargued for presuppositions that science can neither prove nor operate in the absence of:

1. The uniformity of nature

2. The veridicality of induction

3. The existence of a world independent of our minds

4. The proper function of our cognitive faculties

5. The ability of our cognitive faculties to properly and truthfully apprehend the mind-independent world

6. The laws of logic

7. The minds ability to properly and truthfully access the raw data of the mind-independent world

8. The existence of values such as truth

9. The superiority of values such as truth over falsehood in the hopes of accurate reports by scientists in their respective fields

Are any of these presuppositions proven by science? Are they acquired by science? Are they even the conclusion of science? The problem for the atheist who believes that science alone is the only true and proper realm of veridical discourse falls victim to the self-exception fallacy. Just as the epistemic relativist claims that “all truth is relative” all the while assuming that the statement “all truth is relative” is itself the one exception and thus not a relativistic statement, the atheist advocate of scientism states “science is the only accurate source for truth” all the while assuming that the statement “science is the only accurate source for truth” is the one exception to truth statements. The fact of the matter is that science cannot even get off the ground without certain assumptions that are non-empirical necessities. How does the atheistic scientist prove induction? How does the atheist prove the proper function of cognitive faculties? How does the naturalist warrant the existence of a mind independent world, let alone our ability to properly and accurately apprehend it? Even more so, how would he even begin such an endeavor? Certainly he cannot use the scientific method since induction is of course assumed in such, so what route would he take? Is induction tasted, smelled, heard, felt, or seen? Where are the scientific reports proving such?

The world is uniform and gravity doesn’t suddenly reverse or increase, our minds don’t suddenly stop providing us externally apprehended data (apart from certain disorders, etc. that aren’t relevant to our discussion), our cognitive faculties don’t take breaks from proper function (again, apart from certain disorders, etc.). We in fact need to assume a very orderly universe where laws and constants remain consistent with only, at best, minor exceptions, but note that this fact cannot be proven by science, only assumed by it. For the atheist, these are in fact articles of faith, not empirical conclusions. Does this fact seem to set science solely in the realm of the atheist? Inquiring minds would like to know.

Furthermore, let’s think about the theories of the atheist in regards to his naturalistic assumption of the origins of life. The atheist needs to go beyond the above stated presuppositions and assume a few more non-empirical presuppositions that simply cannot be proven by the scientific method (or scientific “methods” depending on one’s philosophy of science).

1. Either a) the world is eternal and always existed and the Big Bang was one of many such events (oscillating universe model), b) there are many worlds/universes out there and the interaction of such worlds/universes cause Big Bang style events in bringing about new worlds (multiple universe or multiverse theories), or c) the universe sprang into existence out of nothing via the Big Bang.

2. Life arose from non-life (contra the law of biogenesis)

3. Contra the 2^nd Law of Thermodynamics, matter organized itself apart from intelligence and developed into incredibly complex systems over years of “beneficial” mutations despite the fact that most mutations are harmful and fatal.

4. Non-sentient matter became sentient

Any honest scientist is going to have to admit that the above presuppositions are not empirically derived conclusions, but are articles of, wait for it…. faith. While my atheist friends froth at the mouth when I dare to make the obvious known to them, the fact of the matter is that the atheist worldview goes far beyond the realm of the empirical in order for the atheists to substantiate (or at least attempt to) their theory.

Do we see matter become sentient today? Do we see matter organize into information today apart from intelligence? Do we see non-existence producing existence or other worlds produce new worlds? The fact of the matter (pun intended) is that we do not.

Let me here humor the atheist and comment on certain possible refutations of my position to far.

“Beau, it is obvious that complexity comes about apart from intelligence because salt crystals and vortexes form in our bathtubs when we drain the water!”

This is where (nod to Aristotle) virtue plays a role in our endeavors. I say this simply because any scientist worth his salt (yes, pun once again intended) knows clearly the differential between repetition and complexity, and thus we hope and expect that knowledge of the scientist to play a role in discourse such as this. While salt crystals and vortexes form repetition of minor instances of order, they do not go beyond that – mere repetitions of minor forms of order. Salt crystals are repetitions of a very basic structure completely incapable of providing stability for life and vortexes are mere repetitions of another very basic pattern of gravity, environment, and the nature of water. Consider even the “simplest” life form – a single celled bacterium. I suggest anyone unaware of this issue take a basic biology textbook and examine the depth of complexity required for a “basic” single celled organism to live. From metabolism to reproduction, the simplest amoeba requires and exhibits much more complexity than any salt crystal or bath tub vortex. Whilst there are indeed certain instances of minor repetition of simple structures in the world, the depth of order and complexity required for life to exist, let alone thrive, transcends the simple examples the atheist scientist holds so dearly.

Perhaps another attempted refutation of my position would be the claim that origins of existence, by necessity of being non-repeatable and non-empirical, are still scientific because they are the logical conclusion of empirical science.

This critique would end up being the most devastating for the atheist simply because it is (minus the faulty conclusion) exactly what the advocates of Intelligent Design are arguing! Notice that such a position has now denied (and rightly so) that science is limited to empirical research. It has opened the door to what should have been truly required from the beginning and for what has been the driving force for scientists all along who possessed scientific integrity and believed in a creator – that it is the logical conclusion of the evidence and where it points that should be sought in scientific inquiry (the Latin word, scientia, literally means "truth") - not some agenda driven strong arming of a worldview over and against the evidence as is simply the case today. The atheistic scientist cannot make this above stated possible refutation because in doing so he shatters his desperate attempt to hold on to a purely empirical methodology by now allowing for conclusions to that which cannot fit into their empirical-only realm of thinking! (Of course, it is sadly not unexpected to see special pleading taking place when agenda driven worldviews replace truth in permitting the indoctrination of students to replace what began as a very noble and honorable enterprise, alas.)

The question then becomes – what is the more logical conclusion to all the scientific data? Note that for the atheist the “logical” conclusion of complexity and information is nothing other than time + matter + chance. The great moral sacrifices of altruism and cultural revolutionaries opposing evil regimes, the incredible complexity of life, and the amazing ability of a mind to apprehend and assimilate mind-independent reality is reduced to merely time + matter + chance! Now remember, friends - I’m the one being accused of blind faith here!

Why is it that even given our greatest scientific accomplishments (which are indeed great, and I thank God for them, just as the atheist should), when earthquakes strike Haiti and terrorist attacks leaving people injured that people come out in droves (notice the moral praiseworthiness of such instances) to provide blood? Certainly it cannot be the case that something so simple as the very basic and early developed inner life force of the higher developed and complex organisms, blood, is too complex to have evaded even the greatest scientific minds of scientists today to create in a laboratory, can it? Since it merely evolved by non-rational, non-telic and non-sentient means (time + matter + chance) it certainly cannot defy the scientists ability to create in a laboratory, can it? Maybe if we add billions of years, the god called Chance, assisted by matter (though we dare not question matter’s origin) could bring about a complex entity such as this...?

Furthermore, why is it that our greatest creations in the realms of computers (or anything else for that matter) are, oddly enough, incapable of doing what the simplest single celled organism can do – reproduce? Surely we should be able to create a self-reproducing computer as reproduction, seen in the earliest example of “simple” life, is merely an instance of mindless thoughtless evolution necessary in full effect from the very beginning, right?

Perhaps some sparkling red wine, a handful of raw oysters and a little Barry White would assist with such an event...?

It is indeed obvious to anyone not already convinced hook, line and sinker of atheistic scientism and subsequently evolution that any serious thought concerning this issue precludes atheism from being true. But then again, as proven by majority of atheists today, you are not allowed to question or defy the Religion of Chance because you’ll only be excommunicated from their worship services if you do and so mocked, publicly and privately, and condemned as unworthy to even raise a voice (see the documentary Expelled with Ben Stein for one particular instance of how these folks are treated when not bowing down before the altar of the all-powerful Chance...) that, as is clearly the goal, others will not listen to you and the truth will not be permitted to grace the scene.

One final point – the atheist who believes that empirical science is the only realm of accurate and trustworthy apprehension of knowledge truncates the human life and ends up being quite inconsistent with him or herself. The most obvious and glaring example of this is the question of morality. It is understandable that atheists want to do everything in their power to avoid discussion of morality other than to make attacks against theists from the alleged problem of evil. Why is this so? Let’s take a pretty simple and sad example.

How would the atheistic scientist empirically solve this question – is it better to love and protect little babies or torture and kill them for fun?

Is there a scientific method capable of solving this? Is there a test tube large enough to answer this question? Is there a physical constant found in the world able to provide insight to this?

The answer, of course, is a resounding “no.” Science cannot tell us what the law written on our hearts clearly can. It is wrong to hurt and kill infants for fun and no law of the natural world draws us to that conclusion; it is the answer given to us by natural law in our bearing of the image of the sovereign and divine Creator. For the atheistic scientist who is consistent within his or her life, this fact overturns any attempt to necessitate and localize truth on purely empirical grounds. And for the atheistic scientist who admits that truth and knowledge exist outside of empirical science, then there is serious discussion that needs to take place concerning what the atheists are promoting and how he/she can reconcile this inconsistency, and the touting of the popular atheistic mantra, “science as the only viable source for truth!” seriously needs to be discarded. The fact of the matter is that most scientists go home to their wives and believe them when they say, “I love you,” without having to hook her up to some kind of truth electrodes to verify the veridicality or lack thereof of that statement. "Inconsistency is the sign of a failed argument" - James R. White, Alpha and Omega Ministries.

It is important to understand that science is indeed a valuable realm of truth and rational discourse but it is not the only one, and to limit all of reality merely to this realm, as many atheists clearly and sadly do today, is to truncate the human life; a morally reprehensible thing to do. Truth is not limited to the five senses, and there is no argument capable of presenting that view without appealing to non-sensory truth claims. Science should be properly focused on the immediate empirical facts of reality; no theist debates this, but that does not necessitate that it denies all other realms of truth-inquiry. Once science attempts to deviate from the immediate recording of empirical data (i.e. origins science) it cannot be twisted by the atheist to remain only in the realms of the presupposed agenda of atheists and then falsely presented as truth to others – it then needs to either incorporate theistic discussions or remain in the realm of a descriptive entity, not as a prescription of reality. Putting on a white cloak does not make a scientist a theologian, thus the promotion of the atheistic religion is shameful and deceitful when done in such a manner. I have no problem with one promoting his/her belief system. As is true for any Christian as well as non-Christians (and shame on those Christians who do in fact violate this imperative); promote your beliefs in the marketplace of ideas, but do so with truth, integrity, honor, consistency, and respect, and permit opposition to have its voice. To do otherwise is immoral. When atheists steps out of his or her area of expertise to dogmatize their agenda upon others at the expense of truth itself, they forfeit their right to lead anyone despite their intellectual capability in their respective field.

Now one may wonder why the atheist tries so desperately to hold onto the realm of science in opposition to such obvious problems with their pet theory. The answer seems pretty straight forward to anyone evaluating the evidence: for the atheist, scientific naturalism is the only game in town! Truth becomes irrelevant when an agenda is at stake. Even the desperate theories of Sir Frederick Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinghe, scientists at least honest enough to admit the mathematical failure of naturalistic origins of life ideologies, are so patently faith based as to make the junior high school student furrow his brow in confusion at the atheist mantra of “science is the only truth!” Just Google "Panspermia" and see for yourself.

In conclusion, the fact of the matter is that the atheist advocate of purely empirical scientism is morally insufficient in his or her claims and entrenched in a morass of falsehoods and faith based assumptions. Not only is he/she unable to present an accurate conception or description of history, but he/she is also incapable of taking off the blinding glasses of atheism and realizing that it takes a whole lot more faith to believe that the depth of complexity found in the world is seriously the product of non-telic non-rational causes than it does to believe that mind, rationality, complexity, existence, and morality is the cause of a rational and moral Creator. My hat goes off to the atheists – you win when it comes to faith. I just don’t have enough faith to believe in atheism. Let’s hope that someday the absurd bias of naturalism will be overturned by the virtues of truth and integrity amongst atheists created in the image of God and the dialectic discourse within science will once again be one of honor, truth and integrity.

Soli Deo Gloria!

Beau McKinley Boyd

Answering The Problem of Evil 101

I have received several complaints that my last treatment of the Problem of Evil was too complicated, so I decided to simplify my arguments:



The Problem:

The problem evil arises when one affirms that (1) God knows all true facts, (2) he can bring about any thing good (that does not involve a contradiction), (3) that God is morally perfect, (4) and such a moral perfection means that God should eliminate evil as much as he can. If one affirms all of these then there is a contradiction because there should be no evil, because a good and powerful God would eliminate evil as much as he possibly can.

Not a Contradiction for Christians:

However, for most Christians this is not a problem because many Christians would reject that moral perfection means one should eliminate evil as much as possible. The reason why Christians reject this is because they think that God has morally justifying reasons for bringing about or permitting evil in the world. In other words, the sort of moral perfection that God has is compatible with evil because he has morally sufficient or justifying reasons for permitting evil to occur.

A Possible Atheist Response?

One atheist response might be to say that God could not or would not have a morally sufficient reason for allowing evil. But how do you know that it is impossible that if God existed he would have no morally justifying reason for the evil he has permitted? The atheist can say that they cannot think of any good reason for permitting evil in the world. But just because you do not know of any good reason does not mean that there is no good reason. I might not know an answer to a math problem, but that is different than saying that there is no answer to the math problem. So just because we do not know God's reason does not mean that he does not have one. In fact, it is unclear if he does or does not just by reason alone, so an unclear argument cannot be used to show that a position is unreasonable (especially since we have over 10 good arguments in favor of God's existence). On atheism, all we have is one argument that is unclear because either way we do not know whether or not God has a morally sufficient reason for the evil he permits. One unclear argument cannot outweigh 10 clearer arguments.

The Probablistic Problem of Evil

A weaker claim would be to say that evil makes God improbable because it is improbable that God would have reasons for all the intense evil that exists. But the problem with this is that God's thoughts are beyond ours, much like our thoughts are above and beyond those of an insect. So we cannot say that it is improbable because for all we know it could be that the morally sufficient reason God has is beyond our understanding and comprehension, much like astrophysics is above an insect's comprehension.

Two Possible Answers

Unfortunately for the atheist, it only gets harder from here, because theists have developed two good possible reasons for why evil might exist.

The Non-Reformed Response

The first one is the most common and it is called a free will defense (being Confessionally and Philosophical Reformed I reject this one). God cannot do anything that is logically impossible but he can only do what is possible. What is impossible is that God cause or make free creatures to do whatever he wants. So the only way to have free creatures is to not control and cause them. What God wants on this view is to bring as many people into a saving relationship with him by their free will and since free will is involved human beings can freely choose to hate God and do evil. What explains evil things that occur is the free will of demons and humans which cause evil, but God does not cause evil. God lets them choose freely so as to bring about as many people to a free loving relationship with him as possible so that he can give them eternal life (there is no world God can create where people only do good on this response). This defense was developed by Alvin Plantinga and the consensus in philosophy is that this argument shows that logical problem of evil is unsuccessful.

My Reformed Response

The next possible defense was developed by Calvinists thinkers like myself. Calvinists believe that God is in control and ordains everything so there can not be free will as traditional understood by many. In this view God ordains humans to choose to sin so that he can show his love, grace, and mercy through Jesus Christ. Grace and mercy can only exist with sin because if something is sinful there is no reason to merciful and gracious. When evil is in the picture God can show his love even more to human being by loving them through Christ Jesus even though they are sinful. I show my love for my dog charlie even more so when he does bad things, if he does good then I simply am showing my love to him and not showing my unconditional love for him. Furthermore, with evil in the picture God gets to show his hatred and punishment towards sin. God shows his glory also by finally punishing and eliminating all evil in the end. Evil also allows God to redeem us by the most perfect picture of love, mercy, and justice which is the Crucifixion of the Lord Jesus Christ. All of these great things about God get maximized when evil is in the picture and so it brings God's Glory and hence this could be another morally sufficient reason for why evil exists.

(This was meant to be a simple, concise overview of the Problem of evil and not a complete picture of my own view).

Did The Early Church Fathers Know The Gospel? (Also: Patristics For Busy Pastors)

Dr. Ligon Duncan, one of the growing number of Protestant scholars who is actually familiar with the writings of the Early Church Fathers, did a wonderful interview for Sovereign Grace Ministries titled "Patristics for Busy Pastors." This is a great introduction for those unfamiliar with the Fathers, especially those who don't have time to take seminary courses or attempt to wade through the massive body of Patristic literature on their own. If you're already familiar with the Fathers, this is still an interesting interview and well worth your time. And if you're like me, a Protestant who laments modern Protestant ignorance of the Fathers (this was not the case in the 16th century!), then you should be cheering that Dr. Duncan and others like him are attempting to cure that ignorance!

Now, on to the provocative title of this blog post! It is the title of Dr. Duncan's message from last week's Together For The Gospel Conference. The Video is below.

But, let's face it, the real reason for this blog post was an excuse to share this picture of Dr. Duncan's head on a Church Father's body (courtesy of Sovereign Grace's website).

T4G 2010 -- Session 7 -- Ligon Duncan from Together for the Gospel (T4G) on Vimeo.

A Simple Argument For The Deity Of Christ

This is a brief and strong argument that my long time friend Jonathan Sakovich brought to my attention:

P1: Only God is Good
P2: Jesus is Good
P3: Therefore, Jesus is God

Premise 1 is supported by the following:

Mark 10:18 And Jesus said to him, "Why do you call me good? No one is good except God alone.

This verse teaches that only God is good

Premise 2 is supported by the following:

Hebrews 4:15 15 For we do not have a high priest who is unable to sympathize with our weaknesses, but one who in every respect has been tempted as we are, yet without sin.

This verse teaches that Jesus was without sin and hence good.

Godfrey on The Roman Catholic Canon Argument

"Let us look at the church further by raising a related issue: the canon of Scripture. Romanists will try to make much of the issue of the canon. They will tell you that the Bible alone cannot be our authority because the Bible does not tell us what books are in the Bible. They will argue that the church must tell us what books are in the Bible. When they say the church tells us, they mean popes and councils must tell us. This implies that we did not have a Bible until Pope Damasus offered a list of the canon in 382, or, perhaps, until 1546 when the Council of Trent became the first “ecumenical”council to define the canon. But of course the people of God had the Bible before 1546 and before 382."

- Dr. W. Robert Godfrey, from Chapter One in Sola Scriptura: The Protestant Position on the Bible, Edited by Don Kistler. Published by Soli Deo Gloria Publications. (Click the link at the right for more info, or to purchase the book).

This chapter can be found online here.

An Argument for the Trinity from Divine Love

In this post I will give an philosophical argument for there being multiple persons in one God. The argument is as follows:

P1: There is one God who is the greatest possible being
P2: Greatest possible being has every moral perfection to the highest possible degree
P3: Love is a moral perfection
P4: Love to the highest possible degree is not solely centered on ones own person but on another person in love (GL)
P5: God either has GL by his very substance or by things outside of his substance
P6: It is false that God has GL outside of his substance
P7: God has GL in his substance entails that the substance has multiple persons
P8: God has GL in his substance
C: Hence, God is multiple persons




Premise 1:

The greatest possible being is such that there can only be one because it is better that God's greatness has no equal rather than there be an competing equal to God. It also seems that the greatest possible being would be a being worthy of worship and hence God is the greatest possible being.

Premise 4:

Love to the highest possible degree is not solely centered on ones own person but on another person in love. This seem plausible because when a person only loves himself this seems like not the best kind of love but rather it seems self-centered. For this reason a love that is not for another person is a imperfect love and not a property that is had by the greatest possible being.

Premise 6:

This love cannot depend on creation (which is something outside of God) because creation happens to exist by an act of God's free will to create. There are some possible worlds where God does not create and in those worlds God would still be loving even if there are no other created beings. In other words: God's love is necessary and essential, but creation is contingent so created persons cannot be the object of God's love because God's loving nature is necessary.

Conclusion:

This argument shows that God is one substance, but this one substance has multiple persons so that the greatest possible being can have the greatest possible love which would be one person loving at least one other person. General revelation using reason as it's instrument can demonstrate such a truth as there being a plurality of persons in one substance but special revelation alone can give us the most precious truth that God is three persons: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Atheism and Moral Skepticism

In this post I will argue that if one is an atheist then they ought to be a skeptic with respect to moral facts. But it seems that moral skepticism is false and hence if atheism entails moral skepticism then atheism is false.

P1: If God does not exists then moral skepticism obtains
P2: It is false that moral skepticism obtains
C: Hence, God exists


The argument is as follows:

P1: If God does not exists then moral skepticism obtains

If atheism is true then there is no good reason to trust our moral intuitions because moral facts or objective moral propositions do not have causal control over anything. In other words, they are causally impotent. These moral facts or objective moral propositions are impersonal, necessary, immaterial, and transcend the physical world. There seems to be no thing in the natural world alone to ensure in any sense that we will have reliable moral intuitions that correspond to the objective moral propositions. Moral skepticism is the position that we do know what is in fact right or wrong. Hence, if atheism is true we do not know what is in fact right or wrong.

P2: It is false that moral skepticism obtains

Premise 2 seem more reasonable to affirm than it's negation because the truth that 1+1=2 seems just as clear as it is wrong to torture a infant for no good reason. These truths are obvious and apparent to us. Hence, it seems that I know more that it's wrong to torture infants for no good reason than I know that moral skepticism is a reasonable position.

C: Hence, God exists

If God exists then he is a necessary immaterial personal being that has causal power and causes us to have reliable moral faculties. Theism provides us with moral knowledge rather than moral skepticism. Hence, because I have moral knowledge this entails the truth of theism.

We're Back!

Hello everyone! After some deliberation, the authors here at Reason From Scripture have decided to return here to our home at Blogger. We will no longer be using the new Wordpress site that we announced last week. If you made any comments on posts at the Wordpress site within the past seven days, please re-direct those comments to the matching post here on Blogger. We apologize for any inconvenience this may have caused. We hope you like the new look of this site. Welcome home!

A Refutation Of Monothelitism

The issue of the historical heresy of monothelitism has been giving me issues for the past few weeks. Specifically as to why should it be rejected given that I did not know the basis of such a rejection and along with this lack of knowledge, how/why could we attribute a single person(Christ) with two wills. With the help of Nate and the information in Michael Horton's prolegomena lectures I came to the conclusion that it is something that is clearly rejected by scripture.

A key verse in this is Hebrews 2:17 which states :

"Therefore he had to be made like his brothers in every respect, so that he might become a merciful and faithful high priest in the service of God, to make propitiation for the sins of the people."

This verse seems pretty straight forward in informing the audience that Christ's experience on earth was that fully of a human(apart from sin). This also would seem to mean that Christ's will was like that a human's also. A question that stems from this is: is the 'will' of a divine person different from that of a human person so as to require the possession of two wills within the person of Christ? The answer to the question seems to be yes given a qualitative difference between the human and divine. A proof of such a thing can be seen in texts such as Isaiah 40:25 and 46:5 which state:


"To whom then will you compare me, that I should be like him? says the Holy One."

"To whom will you liken me and make me equal, and compare me, that we may be alike?"

If the divine is so different it then seems to follow that His will would also embody this difference. Thus for the verse in Hebrews 2 to be correct a human will must have also been assumed. This argument may be formally written as:

1. If no difference between the human and the divine will can be found then monothelitism.
2. A qualitative difference between the human and the divine will exists.
___________________________________
Therefore, monothelitism is not the case

I will happily take critiques of this argument or any suggestions you may have.

We Have Moved!

Greetings faithful readers! For a number of reasons, the authors here at Reason From Scripture have decided to switch from Blogger to Wordpress. Here is our new address:

http://ReasonFromScripture.Wordpress.com/

We look forward to seeing you all at our new home, and continuing the great discussions and debates!

The Teaching of Westminster Regarding the Salvific Significance of Infant Baptism

The Westminster Standards contain a robust doctrine of baptism. The Confession of faith and the Directory for Public Worship as finally set forth by the Assembly of divines propound several instructive statements regarding the salvific significance of the sacrament as administered to infants. Over the past 160 years, however, there has been much disagreement amongst Presbyterians representing denominations confessionally subscribing to the doctrine of the Standards concerning their teaching on this matter.
In the mid to late 19th century, notable American Presbyterian theologians espousing differing views regarding the salvific significance of infant baptism adduced their filial Westminster Standards in support of their respective positions. J. H. Thornwell of Columbia Theological Seminary held that the baptized children of believers were externally members of the visible church and enjoyed a special relation to the covenant of grace, but that they were to be considered spiritually at enmity with God, and unregenerate. Charles Hodge of Princeton Theological Seminary held that the baptized infants of believers were members of the visible church in full standing and to be recognized and treated as true children of God and heirs of all of Christ’s salvific spiritual benefits, and presumably among the elect. In a work originally published in 1940 and recently brought back into print, Lewis Bevens Schenck, former Bible and religion professor at Davidson College, sought to show that the Westminster Standards may be brought into line with a number of historic Reformed authorities in teaching that infants of believers may be presumed to be regenerate and therefore ought to be baptized. In recent years, David F. Wright of New College, University of Edinburgh has published an article discussing the teaching of the Westminster Standards on the subject of baptism wherein it is asserted that the Confession of Faith teaches that elect infants are ordinarily regenerated in the administration of baptism.
Thesis: This paper will demonstrate that the Westminster Standards 1) ascribe spiritual salvific efficacy to baptism in the case of elect infants, 2) do not teach presumptive regeneration, and 3) do not teach baptismal regeneration.

To explain and defend this thesis I will, for each statement of the thesis, a) clarify the statement and demonstrate its factuality based on exegesis of the Standard documents, b) outline other views respecting Westminster’s teaching on baptism that are relevant to the statement, and c) evaluate these other views.

1) The Westminster Standards ascribe spiritual salvific efficacy to baptism in the case of elect infants.
a) By this statement I mean that the Westminster Standards teach that beyond signifying (that is visibly showing) and sealing (that is confirming as with an oath) the saving benefits of Christ, the administration of baptism entails the actual giving of these saving benefits in the case of the elect (whether infant or adult).
The Confession of Faith in Ch. 28.1 - On Baptism, states,
Baptism is a sacrament of the New Testament, ordained by Jesus Christ, not only for the solemn admission of the party baptized into the visible Church; but also to be unto him a sign and seal of the covenant of grace, of his ingrafting into Christ, of regeneration, of remission of sins, and of his giving up unto God, through Jesus Christ, to walk in the newness of life.[1]

Here it is taught that besides initiation into the visible Covenant community, the true spiritual saving benefits of Christ are signified and sealed for recipients of baptism.
The Confession elucidates further as to the mode of dispensation of God’s gracious work in connection with the sign and seal. In Ch. 27 of the Confession of Faith - On the Sacraments, it is taught that in virtue of the inseparable sacramental union of the sign with the thing signified, worthy receivers are promised benefit by the right use of the sacraments. Furthermore, in the Confession of Faith Ch. 28.6, On Baptism this statement is given:
The efficacy of Baptism is not tied to that moment of time wherein it is administered; yet, notwithstanding by the right use of this ordinance, the grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited, and conferred, by the Holy Ghost, to such (whether of age or infants) as that grace belongs unto according to the counsel of God's own will, in His appointed time[2]

The Confession’s statement that “the grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited, and conferred” indeed intends a strong sense of efficacy. This becomes evident from the debate over the wording of the Confession of Faith on Baptism from Jan. 5 1646 as recorded in the minutes General Assembly. The subject matter of the debate is designated in the minutes “Debate upon baptism, ‘the grace of God bestowed sometime before.’” Jeremiah Whitaker opens the recorded discussion saying of baptism,
That it doth confer grace I do not find, but our divines do hold it. When they oppose the papists they say it is more than a sign and seal. Chamier saith the grace that is signified is exhibited; so it is in the French confession: it doth efficaciter donare. I conceive that it doth not confer it ex opere operato.[3]

For Whitaker the language of conferring and exhibiting intends something beyond signing and sealing. Whitaker’s appeal to the Chamier and the French confession shows that by grace “conferred and exhibited” we may understand grace efficiently given. This is distinguished from ex opere operato (the Roman Catholic view of baptismal efficacy) although detail as to the points of distinction is not provided. From the Confession’s statement, it may be surmised that the difference from Rome lies in that not all who receive the sacrament are thought to be regenerated but only those to whom the grace belongs – i.e. the elect. Also the efficacy is not tied to the moment of administration.
Whitaker goes on to note the strong language of Scripture in describing baptism as an ordinance prescribed to effect salvific ends. He also poses arguments from comparison of baptism with the Word and the Lord’s Supper, both of which seem to him to serve as instrumental means of grace. Herbert Palmer responds to Whitaker’s statements, countering the first point by replying “when Scripture speaks of the efficacy of baptism it speaks of those that are grown up,” and on the other points, denying the suggested consequence of Whitaker’s strict parallel of baptism with Word or eucharist. Palmer seems to indicate that he understands baptism to convey grace to those only who have already received grace of regeneration. Yet he admits that the sign and seal of baptism are not “naked.” He concedes to Whitaker, “a further union in the sacrament, it is such a union as that whatsoever is promised by the word, that is granted unto him by participation in the sign.”[4] So though there was disagreement as to the nature and temporal nuance of the work of grace conferred with baptism’s sign and seal, it seems agreement must have emerged that spiritual grace is “conferred and exhibited” or efficiently given to the elect. The clearest evidence that agreement was reached on this point is, of course, the inclusion of the language in the Confession. [5]
b) J. H. Thornwell claimed the Westminster Standards to teach that baptized infants of believers and unregenerate. Thus it could be called into question whether he held the Standards to teach that the administration of baptism entails the actual giving of the saving benefits of Christ.
Thornwell conceived of the church as subdivided into two classes respecting the covenant. The first class he delineates as “the true children of God, among whom alone exists the genuine communion of the saints.” This class consists of adult professing members of the church. The second class he calls “heirs apparent of the kingdom.” [6] This class consists of the children of professing members who are accepted into church membership in expectation and confidence based on the gracious promise of God that they will one day, upon the condition of faith and profession, enter into the true communion of the saints. Their baptism signifies and seals the saving benefits which will accrue to them if the condition of faith is fulfilled.
Thornwell is clear, however, in stating that until profession is made they are by no means to be regarded as having a part in the true communion and they are known by the Church to be “dead in trespasses and sins.”[7] Of the baptized children of believers Thornwell posits “in heart and spirit they are of the world.” Therefore the church is to treat them “precisely as she treats all other impenitent and unbelieving men.”[8] For Thornwell, the thought of subjecting non-professors already by nature outside the communion of the saints to discipline or excommunication is misplaced. Rather their conversion is to be sought through teaching and persuasion in the context of an external covenant. Thornwell appeals to the Westminster Standards and the larger body of Reformed confessions and theologians to corroborate his position.[9]
c) On Thornwell’s view, the salvific efficacy of baptism in the case of elect infants could be upheld. The baptism of infants could, for Thornwell, entail the actual giving of the saving benefits of Christ in the case of the elect. Thornwell would then be correct in claiming his view to be consonant with the Westminster Standards in this regard. Yet, it would need to be stipulated that even though the fact of their givenness is entailed and certainly anticipated in baptism, these benefits typically are not actually given until profession of faith is made. This stipulation would bring Thornwell into contradiction with the Confession of Faith 28.6 (cited above) which plainly states that the saving benefits are exhibited and conferred “to such (whether of age or infants) as that grace belongs unto according to the counsel of God's own will, in His appointed time.” So Thornwell would be wrong in claiming Westminster to deny that saving grace can be generally conferred and exhibited to infants.
Charles Hodge affirmed Westminster’s teaching of the spiritual salvific efficacy of baptism in the case of the elect. Hodge also opposed Thornwell on his views which held baptized infants to be presumably unregenerate and to be assigned a second-level status as church members. Rather, Hodge claims that they are church members of equal status with adult professors of faith, and similarly ready recipients of spiritual grace. He says
The status, therefore, of baptized children is not a vague or uncertain one, according to the doctrine of the Reformed Churches. They are members of the Church; they are professing Christians; they belong presumptively to the number of the elect. These propositions are true of them in the same sense in which they are true of adult professing Christians. [10]

Thus Hodge could affirm the teaching of the Westminster Standards that the administration of baptism entails the actual giving of the saving benefits of Christ in the case of the elect without having to stipulate contrary to Westminster that for baptized elect infants the actual giving of the saving benefits must be generally deferred until profession.[11]

2) The Westminster Standards do not teach presumptive regeneration.
By this statement I mean that the Westminster Standards do not teach that the infant children of believers brought for baptism are to be judged by the church to have been regenerated from birth.[12]
The Directory for Public Worship devised by the Westminster Assembly directs pastors, in instructing the congregation as to the institution, nature, use, and ends of baptism before administering the sacrament to an infant, to say “that they are Christians, and federally holy before baptism, and therefore are they baptized.”[13] In the minutes of the General Assembly from July 16, 1644 debate is recorded over the meaning of this phrase and specifically of the word “holy.” In this debate Thomas Goodwin appears to present a view which approximates a doctrine of presumptive regeneration.
Goodwin’s is the first statement recorded in the debate as he begins thus
I do not know what distinction you will make betwixt federal and real holiness. It is such a holiness as if they die they should be saved. Whether a holiness of election or regeneration I know not but I think it is they have the Holy Ghost. [14]

He is called into question at first by Lazarus Seaman and qualifies his claim saying, “I do not affirm that they are actually saved, but we are to judge them so.”[15] Therefore Goodwin affirms that of infants born into the Covenant of Grace and brought for baptism, it is to be judged by the church that they are saved and are indwelt by the Holy Spirit before baptism (although he confesses he does not know whether this implies they are to be judged regenerate, or simply elect).
Goodwin is opposed, however, by almost all of his fellow divines whose statements are recorded in this debate. First Stephen Marshall responds thus to Goodwin’s statement
But for that said, we must judge that they are saved, I conceive we are not bound to judge that they are saved, for if so, that I must judge of them all singly that they are saved, I have no warrant. It is sufficient to believe in the general, that the infants of believing parents are federally holy. [16]

Marshall denies that the judgment of charity ought to involve presumption regarding the salvific status of infants born to believing parents brought for baptism. Samuel Rutherford then enters to speak of the distinction, which he seems to understand as commonplace, between federal and real holiness:
There is an ordinary distinction or real and inherent and federal holiness; I did not think to hear that real and federal holiness are one and the same. Where there is real and inherent holiness there must be a seeing of God, and being in the state of salvation.[17]

Rutherford confirms that in judging an infant federally holy, the matter is not adjudicated as to the infant’s salvific status which, in distinction, only real holiness concerns.
Goodwin maintains his side in the argument insisting he has been misunderstood and offering various clarifications and qualifications. He restates in several speeches that his aim is by no means to utter infallible pronouncement as to the reality of the matter, or to claim all Covenant infants to be saved. Rather he means only a judgment as to their real holiness which answers to the promise “I am thy God and the God of thy seed.” This he takes as an indefinite (not universal) proposition. Yet, he is opposed on every side as each of the rehearsals of his position is reproached from another quarter.[18]
Stephen Marshall, one of the more vocal opponents of Goodwin in the recorded debate, composed a polemical treatise directed against the baptistic doctrine of John Tombes which was entitled A Defense of Infant-Baptism, and was printed in 1645 during the progress of the Westminster Assembly. In this tract Marshall explains the Covenant of Grace in the “large” sense to include many who are not regenerate. [19] All who are members of the visible church, namely professors of the true religion and their children, are said to belong to the Covenant of Grace in this sense and to enjoy the administration of grace in outward ordinances and church privileges. [20] Of all of these he asserts “they are to be accounted his [God’s], to belong to him, to his Church and family, and not to the Devils.”[21] Yet it becomes evident that in accounting thus all who are fitted for membership in the visible church, Marshall means not to enter unto judgment as to their salvific status. He says of those christened with the denominations just listed “few of those many so called are elected.”[22]
Certain statements of Samuel Rutherford, in his tract The Covenant of Life Opened from 1655 also aid us in deepening our grasp of the issues involved in the debate over the wording in the Directory. Here Rutherford sharpens the distinction between the “federal or Covenant holiness” and “real holiness.” Federal holiness by which infants are qualified for baptism is “holiness of the seed, society, family or nation which is derived from a father to son.” Real holiness, on the other hand, is “not derived from a believing father, to make the son a believer… nor is it internal and effectual confederacy with God, that, by which one is a son of promise.” Real holiness, for Rutherford is the holiness of election, in the divine dispensation of which individuals are either chosen or passed by in God’s secret wisdom and providence. To the eye of the church, the presence or absence of federal holiness is manifest, and that of real holiness is hidden.[23]
In all, both Marshall and Rutherford remain reticent concerning judgment as to the salvific status of Covenant members (whether infants or professors). And if it is the case, as it appears to be from the statements of Marshall and Rutherford, that a distinction is to be made between federal holiness and real holiness such that judgment can be decided regarding the federal holiness of a person without it affecting or involving judgment regarding his or her real holiness - so do the Westminster Standards. The Standards give no statement as to whether a positive judgment is to be made by the church concerning the spiritual salvific status of infant children born into the Covenant of Grace presented for baptism.[24]
b) Lewis Bevens Schenck held that the Westminster Standards do teach presumptive regeneration.
Schenk produced a dissertation for Yale University in 1939 published in 1940 under the title The Presbyterian Doctrine of Children in the Covenant: An Historical Study of the Significance of Baptism in the Presbyeterian Church in America. Schenk’s intent was to call the American Presbyterian Church in the dissolute state of her position regarding the significance of infant baptism back to the “glorious doctrine” of presumptive regeneration to which she was heir. In his analysis, he plots the development of Reformed dogmatic conceptions of the significance of infant baptism with respect to salvation and the Covenant of Grace starting with John Calvin down to his present day. No slight emphasis is given to the statements of the Westminster Assembly as Schenck seeks to expose the deviation of subsequent Presbyterian theologians from the true doctrine of their Standards. The Westminster Confession of Faith, the Larger and Shorter Catechisms, and the Directory of Public Worship along with various extramural writings and historical commentaries are cited in order to demonstrate that Westminster’s teaching with regard to the significance of infant baptism was of a piece with Calvin’s. He cites the phrase referenced above from the Directory of Public Worship which says of which says of infants brought for baptism “that they are Christians and federally holy before baptism” as proof of his claim.[25] Schenk writes of the Reformed consensus -
Membership in the invisible church meant vital union with Christ, or regeneration by the Holy Spirit. Since the word presume meant to admit a thing to be or to receive a thing as true, before it could be known as such from its phenomena or manifestations, the presumption that an infant was a member of the invisible church meant that it was believed to be engrafted into Christ and regenerated before it gave any ordinary evidences of the fact.[26]

Schenck held that Calvin, and the Westminster Assembly in following him unswervingly, spoke to the effect that baptized infants are to be judged members of the invisible church from the womb, meaning by this to assert that they presumably enjoyed vital and saving union with Christ before baptism. Thus, Schenck thought that in the Westminster Standards, infant baptism signifies and seals the salvific benefits of Christ which infants of believers presumably possess before the rite is administered.
c) Schenck’s claim that the Westminster Standards teach presumptive regeneration is mistaken. The Statement from the Directory of Public Worship which Schenk cites as proof of his claim has been shown from the minutes of the Assembly and the writings of Marshall and Rutherford, to intend no judgment as to the infants’ spiritual salvific status. The Westminster Standards and the writings of the divines here examined appear to withhold judgment as to the salvific status of infants presented for baptism.
Robert S. Rayburn, in an article reviewing the Reformed doctrines of covenant children, covenant nurture, and covenant succession, gives a more guarded assessment of the Standards’ teaching as to the church’s judgment regarding the salvific status of infants brought for baptism, but finally expresses broad agreement with Schenck. In assessing the statements of the Directory for Public Worship pertaining to the issue of the church’s judgment of Covenant infants’ salvific status, Rayburn mitigates his statement but proceeds to support Schenck’s thesis saying, “this, I admit, is less than might have been said and less than Calvin did say. But it is his doctrine of covenant succession in its broad outline.”[27] In light of the deeper analysis of the minutes of the Assembly and the writings of individual divines, Rayburn’s claim too may call for revision. It is another question whether Calvin taught presumptive regeneration. He speaks strongly of the inclusion of infants in the membership of the church before baptism and argues that they are by no means excluded from regeneration and justification in virtue of their infancy.[28] Yet, neither are Calvin’s claims without qualification, and as the divines’ were generally committed to maintaining consistency with the continental Reformers, and especially Calvin, perhaps their clear distinction between federal and real holiness and their reluctance to judge as to the real holiness of infants brought for baptism may invite further analysis of Calvin’s doctrine.

3) The Westminster Standards do not teach baptismal regeneration.
By this statement I mean that the Westminster Standards do not teach that the Spirit’s work of regeneration is ordinarily temporally concurrent with the administration of baptism in the case of the elect and therefore does not teach a doctrine which entails this.[29]
It must first be conceded that some of the divines at the Assembly at Westminster clearly did hold to a doctrine of baptismal regeneration. Cornelius Burgess produced a work in 1629, roughly fifteen years before the convening of the Westminster Assembly entitled Baptismal Regeneration of Elect Infants: as professed by the Church of England, according to the Scriptures, the Primitive Church, the present Reformed Churches, and many particular Divines apart. In this treatise, Burgess expounds his view of baptismal regeneration, and commends it as the sober view drawn from Scripture and upheld by the divers ecclesiastical authorities mentioned in the title. In the opening pages Burgess states his position thus
All elect infants, do ordinarily, in Baptism receive the Spirit of Christ, to seize upon them for Christ, and to be in them as the root and first principle of regeneration, and future newness of life.[30]

Burgess proceeds to carefully define the position’s central terms. He delineates that by “Spirit” he intends “the Holy Ghost dwelling in every true Christian and working grace” and not “only the grace wrought by the Spirit.”[31] By “regeneration” Burgess means, “spiritual life taken in the largest sense” although he immediately distinguishes, purportedly, “according to the Scriptures” between regeneration “initial” and “actual.” These distinctions are further elucidated, “initial regeneration” as participation in the Spirit of Christ whereby the seed and foundation of spiritual life are first laid in a Christian, and “actual regeneration” as the spiritual being produced in a Christian by the Spirit bringing him forth a new man able to believe, repent etc. when lives to years [32]
Burgess does not wish to maintain that baptized infants are the recipients of the full mature benefit of Christ that a professing adult enjoys. His contention is that they are ordinarily given the indwelling Holy Spirit in the administration of baptism as the seed which shall grow into the future full mature benefit.
Burgess guards his position with qualifications to avoid misapprehension or undue offence to Reformed brethren. He notes as points of general agreement
That some infants may and do receive the Spirit to unite them unto Christ, before baptism.
That the Spirit is not given to all, but to the Elect only
That the outward element hath not in it any physical force, either by virtue of the consecration, institution, or administration, to confer the Spirit to any at all.[33]

These points seem to set his position off against the Roman Catholic ex opere operato view. Yet Burgess affirms the following
the communication of the Spirit unto infants, from Christ himself for their first apparent engrafting into his body, and to be to them as the first seed and principle of Regeneration, in the ordinary course of regenerating such, as after Baptism, do live to years of discretion [is] ordinarily given in the baptism of the Elect
And … all the Elect do ordinarily receive the Spirit in baptism so that such as receive Him before or after, and not in Baptism, are to be held to receive the Spirit in an extraordinary and not in the ordinary course of divine dispensation thereof. [34]

Thus, it is the ordinary temporal concurrence of the Holy Spirit’s work of regeneration with the administration of baptism which Burgess seeks to prove. This he argues as the plain doctrine of Scripture, the Church Fathers, the Reformers, and the Church of England of his day. He devotes a full section of the tract to showing the 39 Articles and the Directory of Public Liturgy (which the Westminster Assembly was commissioned to revise) to be in agreement with his doctrine.
In the Directory for Public worship, the one administering infant baptism is directed to pray that God, “would join the inward baptism of His Spirit with the outward baptism of water.”[35] Debate over inclusion of this phrase in the Directory is recorded in the minutes from Session 260 July 19 1644. In the debate several of the divines evidence an affinity for the baptismal regeneration conception. Edmund Calamy is recorded stating that “it is a wonder anyone should exclude the Spirit from the time (of baptism).” Jeremiah Whitaker’s comment that “we may and should pray that God would at time give them the inward washing… we are said to be baptized into Christ” is also telling (Whitaker is also mentioned in Burgess’ 1629 tract as a fellow proponent of baptismal regeneration).[36] In this debate, while support of the baptismal regeneration view is not unanimous, it does seem from the recorded minutes to have been the prevailing sentiment.
There is no overt expression contained in the Standards, however, which would define the moment of Spiritual regeneration ordinarily at the time of administration of baptism. On the contrary, there are several expressions contained in the Standards which tend to deny that an ordinary temporal course can be defined. Therefore we must conclude the Westminster Standards do not teach baptismal regeneration.
Confession 28.6, cited above, qualifies its affirmation of baptismal efficacy in its first clause stating “The efficacy of baptism is not tied to that moment of time wherein it is administered.” As shown above, Cornelius Burgess also qualifies his baptismal regeneration view in this way, but then asserts the ordinary temporal concurrence of the work of the Holy Spirit with the minister’s proper administration of the sacrament. The Confession does not return to such an assertion. The final clause of the same statement in Confession 28.6 says that the grace promised is exhibited and conferred “according to the counsel of God's own will, in His appointed time.” The Directory for Public Worship instructs the pastor administering baptism, in explaining the institution, nature, use, and ends of the sacrament to teach “that the inward grace and virtue of baptism is not tied to that very moment of time wherein it is administered; and that the fruit and power thereof reacheth to the whole course of our life.”[37] These statements of the Standards express restraint from prescribing an ordinary temporal course for the Holy Spirit’s work of conferring and exhibiting to the elect the grace signed, sealed, and promised in baptism, as they leave the appointed time of this work to the counsel of God’s own (unrevealed) will.
b) David F. Wright in his article “Westminster and Baptism,” published in The Westminster Confession of Faith Into the 21st Century, offers a synopsis of the Westminster Standards’ teaching on baptism which deals in part with the Assembly’s view on the salvific significance of baptism. Weighing the strong language of the Confession of faith and Directory for Public Worship as to the efficacy of baptism with the tenor of the debates touching on the topic of baptismal efficacy recorded in the minutes of the Assembly, Wright concludes that the Assembly intended to propound a doctrine of baptismal regeneration. For Wright this entails two things – 1) the Standards teach the spiritual salvific efficacy of baptism in the case of the elect, and 2) the Standards teach the ordinary temporal concurrence of the Holy Spirit’s saving work with the administration of baptism. He cites the words of Confession section 28:6 as centrally significant in bespeaking this intention, which reads – “the grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited and conferred by the Holy Ghost.”[38] Wright calls attention to the fact that the verb here employed “exhibit” was at that time stronger in meaning than in modern English usage, and that its conjoining with “confer” in the context may carry roughly the conceptual weight which “convey” would for us.
Wright’s assessment is not without nuance as he shows himself mindful of language in the Standard documents and Assembly minutes which might temper his claim as to the authors’ intent. He notes the variety of qualifications added by the Assembly to the statement that baptism exhibits and confers the grace of salvation, namely that the efficacy is not tied to the moment of administration, and that grace and salvation are not so inseparably annexed to baptism that it is necessary for regeneration or that all baptized are regenerated.[39] Thus, Wright notes that the baptismal regeneration doctrine which he perceives in the Westminster Standards is certainly distinct from ex opere operato.
Yet Wright maintains that these qualifications serve only to clarify the core declaration of the Confession which he thus expounds:
The Westminster divines viewed baptism as the instrument and occasion of regeneration by the Spirit, of the remission of sins, of ingrafting into Christ (cf. 28:1). The Confession teaches baptismal regeneration. [40]

Robert Letham, in his very recently published work The Westminster Assembly: In its Historical Context cites these statements of David Wright favorably in speaking to roughly the same inquiry.[41] Both men take care to note the measures taken by the divines to distance themselves from the Roman ex opere operato view of baptism. The sign is by no means invested with the inherent power of the thing signified, and the giving of the thing signified in baptism is not necessarily conjoined to the moment of time of administration, nor is the reception of the rite required for salvation. Yet they both observe a strong commitment to preserving a close association between sign and thing signified such that the occasion of administration of baptism is ordinarily temporarily concurrent with the Holy Spirit’s efficacious saving work in the case of the elect whether infant or adult.
c) Above it has been argued that the Westminster Standards do teach the spiritual salvific efficacy of baptism in the case of the elect such that baptism entails the actual giving of the saving benefits of Christ in the case of the elect (whether infant or adult). This is part of the baptismal regeneration doctrine which Wright claims to observe in the Standards’ teaching, and on this claim Wright is correct (as is Letham in following him). The other essential article, however, of the rendition of the baptismal regeneration doctrine which Wright (and Letham) purport is contained in the Standards is the ordinary temporal concurrence of the Spirit’s saving work with the administration of the sacrament of baptism. It has been shown that the Westminster Standards do not explicitly prescribe an ordinary temporal course for the Holy Spirit’s work of conveying to the elect the grace signed, sealed, and promised in baptism. Therefore, though his claim is not without warrant, as the resources examined render it probable that many of the divines held to the ordinary temporal concurrence of the Holy Spirit’s work of regeneration with the administration from baptism, his claim that the Standards themselves teach this would be inaccurate. Thus, an in-depth examination of the Westminster Standards, the minutes of the Assembly, and the writings of the divines can lead us to a closer grasp of the baptismal doctrine propounded in the Standards. We may conclude that the Westminster Standards teach the spiritual salvific efficacy of baptism in the case of the elect, and that they do not teach presumptive regeneration or baptismal regeneration.
[1] Alexander McPherson, The Westminster Confession of Faith. (Glasgow: Free Presbyterian Publications, 2001.), 112-113.
[2] Ibid., 115.
[3] Chad B.Van Dixhorn, Reforming the Reformation: Theological Debate at the Westminster Assembly. v. 7. (Cambridge 2004) 236.
[4] Ibid., 236.
[5] Cf. Ligon Duncan, The Westminster Confession of Faith Into the 21st Century (New York: Mentor 2001), 126. David F. Wright notes the significance of these words and argues they would have had stronger verbal denotations in the Puritan era than they might in modern English.
[6] James H. Thornwell, Collected Writings of James Henley Thornwell. (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1986),
340.
[7] Ibid., 342.
[8] Ibid., 341.
[9] Cf. Ibid., 352, 355. Thornwell claims that in the Westminster Confession the professing body is chiefly in view in its statements on Church discipline when the church is contemplated and when it is said that her purity is to be sought.
Cf. R.L. Dabney, “The Changes Proposed in Our Book of Discipline.” The Southern Presbyterian Review, 12, no. 1 (1859): 44. Dabney discusses Thornwell’s views on church membership as they led him to propose change to the Presbyterian Book of Discipline.
[10] Charles Hodge, “The Church Membership Of Infants,” Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review 30, no. 2 (1858): 389.
[11] It should be noted that Hodge did not discern warrant to presume the regeneration of infants before or in baptism. Again on this point, however, he took measures to avoid distinguishing between baptized professing adults and baptized infants with respect to church membership status.
Cf. Ibid. 374-376, 382. Hodge’s extended footnotes are helpful for understanding his commitment to maintaining consistency in his view with Westminster’s doctrine and defending a sound interpretation of the Westminster symbols against presumptive and baptismal regeneration views.
Cf. John Murray, Christian Baptism (Philadelphia: P&R Pub., 1972), 57-59. Murray engages Hodge’s viewpoint.
[12] Cf. Louis Berkhof, Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 1996), 639. The original (non-modified) Kyperian doctrine of presumptive regeneration makes this judgment the ground of admittance to baptism. It is clear from the minutes of the Assembly cited in the following paragraphs that the divines also denied that the judgment of charity should be made the ground of baptism. Here, though, I am arguing that the Standards do not teach that the church is to presume infants of believers to be regenerated from birth.
[13] McPherson, The Westminster Confession of Faith, 383.
[14] Van Dixhorn, Reforming the Reformation: Theological Debate at the Westminster Assembly v. 5, 204.
[15] Ibid., 204.
[16] Ibid., 204.
[17] Ibid., 204.
[18] Cf. Duncan, The Westminster Confession of Faith Into the 21st Century, 181. Wright suggests Goodwin is in fact misunderstood by the rest of the Divines.
[19] This is opposed to the “strict” sense which correlates to invisible church membership.
[20] Stephen Marshall, and Daniel Featley. A Defence of Infant-Baptism. London: Printed by Ric. Cotes, for Steven Bowtell, and are to bee [sic] sold at his Shop, at the Bible in Popes-head Alley, 1646. Early English Books Online; accessed November 3, 2009. 99.
[21] Ibid., 105.
[22] Ibid., 106.
[23] Samuel Rutherford, The Covenant of Life Opened. Edinburgh: Printed by Andro Anderson for Robert Brown, and are to be sold at his shop, 1655. Early English Books Online; accessed November 7, 2009, 83-84.
Cf. Rutherford, Samuel. The Due Right of Presbyteries, or, A Peaceable Plea for the Government of the Church of Scotland. London: Printed by E. Griffin, for Richard Whittaker and Andrew Crook, 1644, 109-111. Rutherford’s idea of the Church and membership are herein further elucidated.
[24] I recognize that the “judgment of charity” was common currency of the day. I do not believe the Standards to be inconsistent with the view that baptized infants may be judged by the church to be probably regenerate. Here I simply mean to argue that in the Standards themselves no judgment is enjoined on the part of the Church concerning the true or probable salvific status of infant members (or adult members for that matter).
[25] Lewis B. Schenck. The Presbyterian Doctrine of Children in the Covenant. (Phillipsburg: P&R Pub, 2003), 45
[26] Ibid., 136. Interestingly, here Schenck draws the language for stating his position from Hodge’s footnote in “The Church Membership of Infants” outlining the presumptive regeneration view which Hodge rejects.
[27] Robert S. Rayburn, “The Presbyterian Doctrines of Covenant Children, Covenant Nurture, and Covenant Succession,” Presbyterion 22 no. 2 (1996): 89.
Cf. Ibid., 79. Rayburn in line with Schenk understands Calvin to have unequivocally espoused presumptive regeneration.
[28]Cf. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion 2 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1960.),
4.16.17, 1340.
[29] It is understood that the Westminster divines rejected the other aspects of the Roman Catholic ex opere operato view. Statement 27.3 On the Sacraments clearly denies the grace exhibited in the sacraments to be conferred by and power in the Sacraments themselves. This statement avers, rather, that their efficacy depends only upon the work of the Spirit of God and the word of their institution. The ordinary temporal concurrence of the human administration and Divine work of regeneration is here considered. This ordinary temporal concurrence is an essential article of “baptismal regeneration” as conceived by David F. Wright and Robert Letham.
[30] Cornelius Burgess, Baptismall regeneration of elect infants professed by the Church of England, according to the Scriptures, the primitiue Church, the present reformed churches, and many particular divines apart. Oxford : Printed by I. Lichfield for Henry Curteyn, 1629. Early English Books Online; accessed November 10, 2009, 3.
[31] Ibid., 12.
[32] Ibid., 14.
[33] Ibid., 19.
[34] Ibid., 20- 21.
[35] McPherson, The Westminster Confession of Faith, 383.
[36] Burgess, Baptismall Regeneration of elect infants, 56.
[37] McPherson, The Westminster Confession of Faith, 383.
[38] Duncan, The Westminster Confession of Faith Into the 21st Century, 168.
[39] Ibid., 168-169.
[40] Ibid., 169.
[41] Robert Letham, The Westminster Assembly:Reading its Theology in Historical Contex (Phillipsburg: P&R Pub, 2009), 333.